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Abstract
The purpose of this study is to determine which factors affect an ethnona
tional group's decision to utilize terrorism to obtain their desired outcomes.
Current theories have reached an answer, but theoretical underpinnings of
those answers are disparate and weak. Thus, in answering this question, a
new model of terrorism is necessary - one which spans the four primary
levels of analysis. I do this using a weak rational choice model as a cross
level link, and using psychological models as a basis for the individual-level
actions.
While the model is not unequivocally and universally supported by the
tests, it is able to explain several previous findings in the literature and to
explain the counter-intuitive findings regarding democracies.
The model is then applied to two real-life examples, the Ulster Catholics
and the Scots, to determine what light it can shed on the differences in
outcomes for those not too dissimilar groups. These findings reveal that the
1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement was doomed to failure because the underlying

terrorism action pressure was too great, while the 1998 Good Friday Accord

had a much greater probability of success because the terrorism action

pressure acting on the Ulster Catholics was significantly lower in the mid1990s.
Finally, several suggestions are made to reduce the probability of an
outbreak of terrorism among a state's ethnonational minorities. W hile past
use of terrorism is, by far, the best indicator of future use, other factors
show importance as indicators. The percent of youth in the state, economic
vii

differentials, level of democracy in the state, and globalization all increase
the probability that the group will become a terrorist group. These results
are especially important, especially given the current trends in the world.
These trends, namely globalization, increased economic differences within
and among states, and the increased number of adolescents in the world,
are coming together to create an opportunity to either avert a catastrophic
increase in terrorist events, or to allow it to occur.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Bygone battles, like old sins,
cast long shadows.
Proverb

EvER since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States,
terrorism has occupied the minds of many Americans, for those attacks
were different - fundamentally different - from earlier ones. Earlier at
tacks on America either were by American citizens (e.g., Timothy McVeigh,

the Weathermen, and the Earth Liberation Front) or were perpetrated

overseas (e.g., East African Embassy bombings, the USS Cole, and the
Berlin Discotheque).
The importance of terrorism as an issue facing individual states is not
simply limited to the United States. In the European Union as a whole,
terrorism ranks as the fourth most important issue at 10%. However, in
1

Spain, it ranks as number one at 46% (Figure 1. 1) (European Commission
2005: 26). This may be due to the great number of terror-related deaths
in Spain as compared to the European Union as a whole over the last four
decades (Figure 1. 2).
The media, politicians, and academics have each said much and written
even more about terrorism and America's reaction to it over the past three
years. Because of this, several pre-existing difficulties have made them
selves quite apparent. First, there is no universally agreed-upon definition
of terrorism. The US government itself employs four separate definitions for
the one word. 1 Each definition reflects the needs and views of that individ
ual agency. But more importantly, even in academic literature, terrorism
lacks a universal definition. While researchers have written chapters upon
chapters and volumes upon volumes trying to pin down a satisfactory def
inition for terrorism, 2 no single definition has gained common acceptance
(Bantekas 2003). Is this a factor of the inherent 'fuzziness' of the concept
and lingering cultural myopia, is this indicative of trying to cover too much
with one definition, or is this yet another case of reification?
Tied in to this second question is a second difficulty made obvious by

recent writings - rationale differs among terrorist groups. This means

more than just that the ETA has a different mandate than does al Qaeda
1The four definitions are found in the State Department, the Defense Department,
the FBI, and the Homeland Security Department.
2 See, for example, Bruce Hoffman, Inside Tenvrism, (Columbia University Press,
1998); David Tucker, Skirmishes at the Edge of Empire: The United States and In
ternational Tem,rism, (Praeger, 1997); Charles Kegley, The New Global Tenvrism:
Chamcteristics, C auses, Controls, (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2003); and Peter C.
Sederberg, Tem,rist Myths: nlusion, Rhetoric, and Reality, (New Jersey: Prentice
Hall, 1989).
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because they are in different regions of the world. It means that they are
fundamentally different, because the terrorists and their aims are funda
mentally different. The ETA seeks independence from Madrid, whereas
al Qaeda seeks, among other things, a pan-Islamic caliphate. 3 Do these
differences really matter in the study of terrorism? Can the conclusions
reached f or one type of terrorism be applied to a second?
Neither of these questions has received its due attention until now.
In past studies, researchers have tended to group all terrorists together.
Recently, however, research has begun focusing either on a specific variety
of terrorists or on the individuals themselves. This dissertation seeks to
place itself in this ever-expanding field. Instead of examining the causes of
the creation of all terrorist groups, it specifically limits itself to a specific
limited type in a specific limited geographical location - ethnonational
minorities in Western European states.
Does restricting this research to a limited type of terrorism in a limited
area of the globe severely restrict is usefulness? No. As Figure 1.3 shows,
nationalist and separatist groups constitute the highest proportion of ter
rorist groups in the world, and of all regions, Western Europe is second
only to the Middle East in terms of the number of nationalist and sepa
ratist groups using terrorism (Figure 1.4), and the number of ethnonational
Specifically, they seek "to establish a pan-Islamic Caliphate throughout the world by
working with allied Islamic extremist groups to overthrow regimes it deems 'non-Islamic'
and expelling Westerners and non-Muslims from Muslim countries" (TerrorismFiles.org
Terrorist Organizations: al-Qa'ida).
3
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groups is far from zero (see Figure 1. 5) . 4 As such, circumscribing the uni
verse in this manner arguably limits the applicability of the research little.
And, should the results not be generalizable to the world, then a further
finding would be that the factors affecting terrorism in one region is funda
mentally different than the factors affecting it in another, that civilization
does matter, to use Huntington's ( 1996) term.
A framework developed by Martha Crenshaw ( 1981), but adapted and
adopted by both Jeffrey Ian Ross ( 1993) and Ernst Haas ( 199 7), serves as
the inspiration for this study. However, instead of using the framework to
examine and explain progress in terms of nationalism, as did Haas, I use it
in the same vein as did Crenshaw and Ross - to examine and explain why
groups take that step from simple civil disobedience to genuine terrorism.
In short, I ask what factors increase the propensity of a group to commit
terrorism.

1.1

Theory and Model

Before briefing the research design, certain terms must be defined. These

terms refer to both the action and the people investigated. Once the terms

are defined, a brief examination of the four levels of analysis is undertaken.
After that, a logical categorization of conditions is explored. Finally, the
research design, including statistical models, is briefly examined.

4It is also interesting to note, and I further expound on this point, that Western
Europe is far from immune to terrorist groups, even with its history of liberal democracy
(see Figure 1.6} (MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Database 2002} .
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1.1.1

Terror, Terrorism, and Terrorists

As discussed earlier, researchers have spent many hours and much ink fer
reting out a satisfying definition of terrorism. Four definitions are quickly
sketched in this section. This section does not attempt to definitively define
terrorism in a universal sense; it merely seeks to set the stage for further
examination of what such a definition would entail.
The US Department of Defense defines terrorism as, "the unlawful use
of - or threatened use of - force or violence against individuals or prop
erty to coerce or intimidate governments or societies, often to achieve politi
cal, religious, or ideological objectives" (Hoffman 2004: 19). This definition
places an emphasis on coercion. A person is a terrorist based upon his/her
purposes, not just the methods he/she uses. The definition used by the
FBI is similar in emphasis, but adds a clause about the legality of actions. 5
The only major difference between these two definitions is the emphasis
on the illegality of actions. The US State Department includes a third as
pect in its definition, that of the noncombatant. 6 Here, " 'noncombatant'
is interpreted to include, in addition to civilians, military personnel who
at the time of the incident are unarmed or not on duty" (Hull 2001) . The
Department of Homeland Security uses the most comprehensive definition

of terrorism of these four (see, for example, The Homeland Security Act of
2002, § 2 11 5).
5

This is the definition created by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978.
50 U.S.C. §1801, (c) ( 1 ) and (2), 1982.
6 22 u.s.c §2656 (f)(d
).
,
.
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Each definition emphasizes certain aspec�s of terrorism. The State De
partment emphasizes the targets of terrorism, but precludes the ability of
a state to be a terrorist. The Department of Defense emphasizes the goals.
The Federal Bureau of Investigation emphasizes legality. The Department
of Homeland Security attempts to create an all-inclusive definition of ter
rorism, focusing on both the individual and their rationale.
The second chapter explores in greater detail the search for a working
definition of terrorism. While all four US definitions do have commonali
ties, they also have important deficiencies covered by the other definitions.
Furthermore, even in academic literature, differences between terrorism
definitions are legion. The definition used in this research needs to cover
the important aspects of terrorism and needs to deal with the uniqueness
of ethnonational minorities. Chapter Two ends with a working definition
of ethnonational terrorism, based heavily on Schmid (1983).

1.1.2

Four Levels of Analysis

Now that the actions under consideration have been sketched, let us briefly
consider the four levels of analysis and the insights each can give to the
study of terrorist groups. Chapter Three explores these and the relevant
theories in greater detail.
Many of the theories f or the individual level of analysis center on psy
chology and what causes a person to become violent. Is the answer just
some psychological deformity or defect? No. The desire to kill, like the
desire to live and to love, is deep inside each of us, a part of our very

12

being. Thanatos, the death instinct, working in concert with our inborn
survival instinct, pushes us to commit acts destined to grant us immor
tality, whether those acts are of great creation or of great destruction
( Guggenbiihl-Craig 2002).
Beyond the inborn drive for immortality, there are a number of external
factors which encourage us to act in certain ways - even violent ways.
Gurr (1970) referred to these factors in his rendition of the theory of relative
deprivation. They include any form of differential between one person and
the next. As seen later, when these differentials are based on in-group/out
group dynamics, they become even more potent.
At the group level, four broad theories of conflict present themselves:
Ethnic Competition Theory, Ethnic Segregation Theory, Uneven Develo1r
ment Theory and Relative Deprivation Theory. The first of the four, Ethnic
Competition Theory, asserts that ethnic conflict comes from groups com
peting for the state's resources (Medrano 1995). With limited resources
available, the competition breaks out along ethnic lines. One result of this
is that conflict between ethnic groups should occur more frequently when
the groups interact than when they are separate (Belanger and Pinard
1991; Tilly 1991). Ethnic competition may also result from occupational

desegregation, as the ethnic groups would then be competing for the same
employment positions. Susan Olzak (1 992) showed that such economic
desegregation did lead to a greater level of ethnic conflict, at least in the
United States between the years 1 880 and 1 920.
Ethnic Segregation Theory asserts the opposite - ethnic conflict comes
from one group segregating itself from the others (Medrano 1995 ) . This
13

segregation can be physical (movement to ghettoes) or economic (one eth
nonation inhabiting only one employment sector). In either case, both eth
nic cohesion and an increased probability of ethnic conflict result from lim
itations on upward mobility, either real or perceived (Gellner 1983; Hechter
1999).
The third, Uneven Development Theory, specifies that when an eth
nonation is regionally concentrated, as are the Basque in northern Spain,
then there is a greater chance for them to display ethnonational sentiment,
as that region will probably be either economically advanced or econom
ically retarded when compared to the rest of the state (da Silva 1975).
Economically advanced groups will see the rest of the state as pulling
them down, whereas economically regressed groups will see the rest of the
state as retarding their possible growth - often to the point of internal
colonization. This leads to the counter-intuitive conclusion that agitating
groups may, in fact, be richer than the rest of the state {Medrano 1995).
F inally, Gurr built on previous relative deprivation theories. He com
bined economic and political repression in a general explanation of why
certain groups rebel against the authority of the central government. For
Gurr, the basic reason is relative deprivation; i.e., there exists a gap be
tween value capabilities and value expectations. Gap growth is vital to
Gurr's theory. As long as groups do not have expectations too far above
what they receive, there is no great impetus to rebel. However, when the
group sees the gap grow greater, they resolve into action (Gurr 1970).
Theories at the state level_ of analysis involve the effects of regime type
and strength on the behavior of groups. Crenshaw (1981) concluded that
14

democracies should have a higher probability of experiencing domestic ter
rorism than should non-democracies. She bases this counter-intuitive find
ing on the fact that democracies are less willing and less able to exert
the controls necessary to control their citizens in a way that effectively
eliminates the ability of terrorist groups to operate freely. The empirical
evidence supports these contentions ( see Chapter Three). Moreover, free
states have a free media, which is an important, if not necessary, compo
nent to successful terror campaigns, for the knowledge of the terrorist event
must be transmitted before the terror can spread amongst the citizenry.
Furthermore, such results are magnified in the presence of international
news media (Burton 1985; Nash 1995).
Finally, the system level examines the effects of the increased interac
tions between the states, the increased levels of media penetration, and
the increased rates of change in the employment sectors. Globalization
theories suggest that increased interaction between the states and lower
transportation costs should result in a sometimes catastrophic change in
employment. That is, as transportation costs drop, states tend to special
ize in what they pPoduce. As a result, those who worked in sectors not
related to the specialization are at a greater risk of unemployment (Kellner
2002; Krugman and Venables 1 995) .

1 .2

Framework for Analysis

Now that the action is defined as well as some background for the causes
of ethnic conflict provided, the framework for this study can be erected.
15

Martha Crenshaw ( 1981) developed a framework for examining the condi
tions that led to outbreaks of terrorism in a state. Later, Ian Ross (1993)
expanded upon that framework, and Ernst Haas (1997) recast it to exam

ine the conditions necessary for progress to occur in social collectivities,

especially vis-a-vis nationalism. In each of these works, the researcher
posited that there existed necessary and trigger conditions crucial for the
event under study to take place ( terrorism for Crenshaw and Ross, social
evolution for Haas) . It is upon this scaffolding that I begin my search for
an effective theory of terrorism.
A necessary condition is one that must be in place for the result to
occur. Contrast this with sufficient conditions that cause the result by

themselves. An example should demonstrate the differences between the

two. In terms of current terrorism models, necessary conditions include
those conditions that must be in place for terrorism to occur. Crenshaw
(1981) referred to them as permissive conditions. In this category, she
included such items as weak central state and modernization. In addition to
these two, Ross {1993} includes geographical location. All of these factors

must be in place before terrorism can occur. They are necessary for the

commission of terrorist acts.

Trigger conditions are a subset of the necessary conditions. They be

come sufficient when certain other necessary conditions are met. How
ever, there is a fundamental difference between necessary and trigger con
ditions.

Necessary conditions are steady-state, background conditions,

whereas trigger conditions are events. For instance, a high crime rate
is a background condition, whereas the assassination of a popular leader
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is a trigger event. The existence of an ethnonational

group

is a necessary

condition, but a split in the representative body of that group is a trigger
event. (Crenshaw 1981, Ross 1993)

As necessary conditions are those steady-state conditions existing prior
to the effect, they will tend to be living conditions, historical conditions,
and other 'background' conditions that do not rapidly (or often) change.

But what conditions should be examined? The model of terrorism proposed
in this paper produces several expected indicators of increased terrorism
risk. Among these are ethnic differences, the level of democracy in the

state, and the percent of youth in the state.

Chapter Four lays out the actual theory of terrorism - the Pressure
Model of Terrorism - based on the concepts of action pressure and a
weak rational choice model. Creating this model forced a re-examination
of trigger conditions as conceptualized by Crenshaw (1981), Ross (1993),
and Haas (1997) . It is quite clear that the trigger conditions cited for
causing terrorism campaigns are triggers only because terrorism followed
and not because of any inherent properties of the event itself. In fact, to

support theories based on trigger conditions, much selective parsing of the

historical record had to take place.

For instance, which of the following was a trigger event in the history of

the South Tyroleans? Was it separation from Austria (and the North and
East Tyroleans) at the end of World War I; legislation designed to elimi

nate the South Tyrolean nation in Italy in the 1920s; attacks on the South
Tyroleans by Italian Fascists during the 1930s; refusal of Hitler to annex
South Tyrol into the German state after the Anschlufi; refusal of the United
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States to recognize South Tyrolean claims to national self-determination
after both World Wars; or the failure of the United Nations to force Italy
into granting them more autonomy? Apparently, at least according to cur
rent 'trigger' theories, the answer is the last; "The Bombings" occurred
shortly after Austria, Italy, and the UN failed to reach agreement on Ty
rolean autonomy. In other words, the last is the trigger condition because
the terror campaign shortly followed it.

1 .3

Methods

This study examines the ethnic minorities in Western Europe to determine
what factors encourage (and discourage) ethnonations to make the move
to the use of terrorist tactics in their attempt to attain what they feel
they should have. This reduction of the universe of discourse is done for
several reasons. First, the ethnic minorities examined (indigenous people,
ethnonational minorities, and national minorities) constitute what this au
thor considers one fundamental grouping of proto-terrorists. 7 That is, this

group seems to have a different motive for terrorism than the universal
group as a whole. Second, the choice of Western Europe was made for two
primary reasons. In the spirit of Przweorski and Teune, and Huntington,
Western Europe has a shared tradition; hence many of fundamentals that
7 0ther

fundamental groupings include groupings based primarily on religion (e.g.,
Palestinians in Israel and Kashmiri in Pakistan and India) and ethnic groupings among
displaced peoples (e.g. , Turks in Germany and the foreign workers in Switzerland).
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define a civilization are similar. Also, these countries, a subset of Hunt
ington's Western Civilization, arguably constitute a most�similar system
(Huntington 1996; Przweorski, Teune 1970).
Finally, this study is only the first step in the process of discovering
the underlying causes of terrorism. In the scientific process, the first step
to a generalized theory is to simplify the problem. Instead of finding a
theory to cover all types of terrorism in all of the world, this initiates the
process by examining a small piece of the picture - the piece that includes
ethnonational groups in Western Europe.
Chapter Five sets the stage for a statistical analysis of the available

data, exploring the statistical models to be used, along with their strengths
and weaknesses. In the end, while the data appear to be survival-time data,

and thus best analyzed using survival time techniques, they are not - at
least in their current form.8 In lieu of survival-time analysis, population
averaged cross sectional time series general estimating equations were used,
with the appropriate corrections for the expected autoregressive correlation
structure. As binary dependent variables require appropriate models, logit,
probit, and complementary log-log models are used.
Chapter Six concludes with a discussion of the results as they relate

to the PMT model and the hypotheses. Finally, Chapter Seven concludes
this

magnum opus

by offering suggestions for policy changes designed to

reduce the fundamental risk of terrorism breaking out in states and in
groups prone to using it.

When, and if, a working theory of trigger events is created, then event history
analysis can be utilized in the study of what affects terrorism. Until that point, unless
one assumes that only global factors matter, event history analysis cannot be performed.
8
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Let us end this chapter at the beginning - with ethnonational terror
ism and its primary impetus - national self-determination. Nationalist
struggles have existed from the beginning, but it was not until the early
twentieth century that national self-determination became the watchword.
The end of World War I saw Wilson's Fourteen Points express to the world
its importance. As a minor member of Wilson's cabinet, future-president
Franklin Roosevelt never forgot the idealism Wilson represented, the vision
that he saw for the future of the world. As such, the Atlantic Charter, a
description of what the post-World War II world should look like, drawn
up between Churchill and Roosevelt, reiterated and reclarified Wilson's
sentiments. The United Nations charter, written less than a decade later,
further echoed it. Ethnic groups around the world have heard and re
sponded to it, dreaming of national self-determination. And yet, when the
final decisions have been made, self-determination was sacrificed to power
politics and expediency (Moynihan 1993).
In fact, the idealism of the Fourteen Points did not even survive the end
of the Great War. The ninth point stated, "A readjustment of the frontiers
of Italy should be effected along clearly recognizable lines of nationality."

The end of the war did see an adjustment in the borders of Italy and
Austria - the Tyrolean Alps south of the Brenner, the upper Adige River
basin - became Italian land, even though the inhabitants were not Italian.
They were Tyrolean and Ladin. In dismembering the Austria-Hungarian
Empire, the victors of the War to end all Wars sacrificed the Tyroleans on
the altar of security (Alcock 197 0; Steininger 2003) .
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On the other hand, historic borders have also served as the primary
rationale for denying many nations their autonomy.9 This is as true of the
Jurassiens and the Bretons as it is of the Basques of Spain and France.
While the Basque kingdom of Navarre prospered for much of the Middle
Ages and, in fact, gave to France their King Henry IV (the first of the
Bourbon dynasty), that did not keep France and Spain from dividing the
Basque homeland ( Euskal Herria) between the two states. The recent
Basque calls for autonomy went largely unheeded because the Basque lands
have been traditionally divided between the two states, and, although the
Basques do have a large measure of autonomy in Spain today, they lack any
in France - the three Basque provinces in France ( lparralde) are merely
a part of the French department of Pyrenees Atlantiques (Collins 1990;
Medrano 1 995) .
History casts a slightly different light on the Irish difficulties. The
Irish have their own troubles and have had "The Troubles" since 196 9
when the civil rights movement for Roman Catholics turned violent. The
English first invaded Ireland before England spoke English - in 1160.
During the next seven and a half centuries, England ruled the island with
9 The drawing of the borders in Europe at the close of both the Napoleonic era and of
World War I created several ethnic minorities without self-determination. The number
of groups at risk has varied since the close of World War II due to population fluctua
tions and internal achievement of autonomy. Compare the number of groups operating
in democratic states (Figure 1. 7) to the number of groups using terrorism (Figure 1.8}
in the post-World War II era. These support Crenshaw's contention that democracy is
a necessary condition for terrorism ( 1981 ).
Furthermore, comparing Figure 1.8 to the smoothed survival-time non-parametric base
line hazard function in Chapter Six demonstrates the strengths of the other variables in
the model through the differences in the graphs. Thus, during the early 1980s, when the
hazard function was near zero, the other covariates were at their highest, thus creating
the high rate of terror activity in the 1980s (Minorities at Risk 2002).
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varying degrees of ability. The plantations created by King James VI/I,
and Queens Mary Tudor and Elizabeth further Anglicized Ireland. And
yet, even with this incredibly long history of subjection to England, the
Irish were able to recreate their national identity and begin their 19th
century fight for independence. The regions of the island that were heavily
ethnic Irish (and therefore Roman Catholic) received independence at the
urgings of Michael Collins and Eamon de Valera - if a terrorist campaign
can euphemistically be called urging. The northern six counties of Ireland
remained with the United Kingdom after the partition of 1921, as they
were the most heavily Protestant and most heavily Scot due to James
VI/I, who encouraged Scottish Presbyterians to settle in Ireland and run
the plantations. (Brennan and Gillespie 1996; Ellis 2 004; Gray 1995)
Thus did the landscape of Ireland exist at the start of the civil rights
movement in the late 1960s. Thus does it exist today after the Good Friday
accords of 1998, which instituted a ceasefire between the Provisional IRA
and the British government. And thus will it exist into the foreseeable
future. For those who remain unhappy with the overlordship of the British
on Northern Ireland, the violent - yet patriotic - examples of Collins

and de Valera remain. For those unhappy with the incursion of Roman

Catholics into a Protestant region, or Protestants onto a Roman Catholic
island, the actions of the Normans and Tudors, and every Parliament since,
still haunts.
These are just four of the groups used in this research. The others are
the Bretons and Corsican of France, the Scots of the United Kingdom,
the Catalans of Spain, the Jurassiens of Switzerland, and the Sardinians
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of Italy. All ten groups have their own story, their own history. It is this
history that sets the backdrop to their actions, that gives a purpose to it.
While Smith (1988) denies the reality of the nation, he does not deny its
effects on the people. The sins of the past truly are visited on the sons of
today in the form of grievances against the state by the nations and in the
form of terrorist actions.
Bygone decisions, like old sins, cast long shadows.

25

Chapter 2
Ethnonational Terrorism
We need to know what causes
terrorism and how to stop it.
Eqbal Ahmad

AcRES upon acres of trees have died to furnish the paper used in the
search for a single, universal definition of terrorism. W hile the League
of Nations proffered the first official definition of terrorism in 1937, no
universally-accepted United N ations definition currently exists (UNODC

2000). Furthermore, no single universally-accepted definition exists in the

American government - it utilizes no fewer than four different definitions.

Academics are just as inconsistent when it comes to defining terrorism;

each researcher tends to use his or her own definition, emphasizing the
aspects of terrorism that particular researcher desires to emphasize. Is a
cursory tackling of its current definitions yet more intellectual onanism, or
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is there genuine value to the undertaking? While there are several superior
surveys of definitional problems inherent in the term (see for example Cren
shaw 1981; Gambill 1998; Gibbs 1989; Schmid 1983; Thomas and Standley
1988), I find myself engaging in this enterprise for the simple purpose of
creating and presenting a theoretically sound definition of a specific subset
of terrorism - ethnonational terrorism - and showing how it fits in with
other definition. As such, necessity forces me to first discuss the difficulties
inherent in science pilfering a highly-politicized word for its own, especially
vis-a-vis the problem of the freedom fighter.

2 . 0. 1

Freedom Fighters?

Whenever discussing terrorism, a priority should be given to defining what
the author means by terrorism, since political scientists, sociologists, politi
cians, and journalists have all proposed, and employed, a whole host of
starkly different definitions. There is little agreement within the disci
plines, even less among them.
Politicians and the media are known for using language as a tool to
evoke predictable emotions and produce desired responses among the pop
ulace. In doing this, they delineate and shape the arena of discussion about
a topic. They may even be able to completely eliminate any realistic pos
sibility of rational public discussion about it. Today, no one in public life
debates the relative merits of terrorism and terrorist activities. Anything
labeled 'terrorism' in the West is automatically equated with anti-Good,
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anti-Americanism, and anti-Western civilization - a sort of political de
monizing (Thomas and Standley 1988). Were the United States and its
allies not sponsors of terrorism, or what some may define as terrorism,
there would be few problems with this - at least within the American
system. However, with her history, America is susceptible to the charge
of hypocrisy, as American foreign policy did (and perhaps does) encour
age rebels fighting against governments unfriendly to the United States
- rebels often termed terrorists by those very states. 1 Without changing
the 'public' definition of terrorism, the American leaders, notably Ronald
Reagan, have given tacit approval to terrorism when it helps a friend or
hurts a foe. One of the more famous of aphorisms is, "One man's terrorist
is another man's freedom fighter." Used by politicians to give credibility
to both covert and overt military action, this maxim speaks to the Amer
ican vision of the embattled revolutionary trying desperately to cast off
the yoke of a tyrannical government. Unfortunately, all rational debate
seems to be lost once you axiomatically exclude freedom fighters from the
definition of terrorists. Further, any discussion quickly reduces to a mere
'point of view' argument (Sederberg 1995). Fortunately, social scientists do
continue studying terrorism, its causes, and its effects. Unfortunately, cre
ating a universally-accepted definition for such a politicized term is hardly
painless.
Why should the time and effort be expended to create a definition

of terrorism? Could it simply be that terrorism is like Justice Stewart's
pornography - indefinable, except on an I-�now-it-when-1-see-it level?
1 Examples include the Contras in Nicaragua, the Mujahidin in Afghanistan, and
UNITA in Angola.
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This might explain why no single definition of terrorism has gained wide
spread use. However, finding a single, universal definition of terrorism is
important. I would argue that it is the most important thing we can do.
The battles waged over what to include and what to exclude in the def
inition, and the effort undertaken to defend those boundaries, demonstrate
its paramount importance. Authorities at the highest levels wrangle over
the definition. Government responses are all but dictated by the definition.
World leaders block summits because of the definition.
A case in point: When Senator Lieberman and a representative of the
PLO discussed the possibility of talks between the two countries,
Liebermann [sic) invoked the "terrorist" acts of the PLO leader
as a block to talks; the PLO representative stressed Israeli mili
tary violence against "women and children." He wanted this vi
olence categorized as "terrorism," which Liebermann [sic) con
sistently resisted. (Paletz and Boiney 1 992: 24)
Both sides understood the primary importance of that definition, of its
implicit and often explicit moral connotations, and automatic moral re
pugnance and condemnation.

2.1

Terrorism, Towards a Definition

While it is true that there is a moral connotation to the term 'terrorism',
especially as we now use it in public forums, we cannot allow that fact to
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stop us from creating an appropriate definition. Yes, the term terrorism has
been use to instill hostility, hatred, and fear, and to elicit predictable re
sponses from the citizens of various states. Regardless, we can still achieve
a definition for terrorism in accord with social science practices and require
ments, while leaving the political definition to our elected (and unelected)
authorities (Schmid 1983; T homas and Standley 1988).
To give the reader a point of reference, let me present my working defi
nition of terrorism so that one can compare it to other definitions used and
to other definitions discussed in this chapter. Here, I define ethnonational
terrorism as:
An anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, em
ployed by groups, for the expressed purpose of increased auton
omy for their historical homeland, whereby the direct targets
of violence are not the main targets. The immediate human
victims of violence are generally chosen randomly or selectively
from a selected target population, and serve as message gener
ators. Threat-based and violence-based communication travels
between the terrorist organizations, its victims, and its main
targets, thus turning the target into a target of terror, a tar
get of demands, or a target of attention, depending on whether
intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought.
This definition is a minor reworking of Schmid's (1983) effort on creating
a universal definition. The only changes are those that restrict the defi
nition to ethnonational groups and aims and to include the possibility of
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symbolic inanimate objects, like the World Trade Center in New York, as
legitimate targets of terrorist events. How does this definition compare to
other definitions used in the literature? Perhaps more importantly, how
does this definition compare to those used by the US government?

2.1.1

The Law

Two criticisms of the legal definitions of terrorism center on their great
variations and their egocentric motivations. A recent book discussing the
effort of the United Nations and other international bodies to create an
acceptable definition of terrorism lasts three volumes and over 1, 800 pages
- without reaching a conclusion. The United Nations has passed several
resolutions against terrorism, but it has yet to define what it is resolving
against (Whitaker 2001).
During the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terror attacks, the
UN Security Council adopted Resolution 13 7 3, which required states to
take steps to combat terrorism. Unfortunately, what is and what is not

terrorism has yet to be defined by the UN. Even more interesting, thirty

two years have passed since the time that the United Nations first stated

that finding a definition for terrorism was crucial (Thomas and Standley
1988). Why has the United Nations failed in defining terrorism? Perhaps it

is the knowledge that the United States has vetoed every Security Council
resolution condemning the actions of Israel and that any usable definition of
terrorism would most likely include some actions of the Israeli government.
For example, are the Palestinian suicide bombers terrorists? Or, was the
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assassination of Muslim religious leader Sheik Ahmed Yassin by Israel a
terrorist act? According to the definition I use, the answer to each is Yes.
While the United N ations has yet to formulate any definition of terror
ism, the United States has no fewer than four official, legal definitions of
terrorism, each including and each emphasizing different aspects of terror
ism. The US Department of Defense, as stated in the Field Manual of the
US Army, defines terrorism as, "the unlawful use of - or threatened use of
- force or violence against individuals or property to coerce or intimidate
governments or societies, often to achieve political, religious, or ideological
objectives" (Hoffman 2004: 19) . The definition used by the FBI is sim
ilar in emphasis, but adds a clause about the legality of the individual's
actions: terrorism is any
. . . violent or dangerous acts that would be crimes if commit
ted in the United States and that appear to be intended to
intimidate or coerce a civilian population or to influence the
policy or conduct of a government or political subdivision of a
government by intimidation or coercion. 2
The US State Department defines terrorism as, "premeditated, politi

cally motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by sulr

national or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience"

(Tucker 2000: 10).3 F inally, created in the wake of the September 11, 2001

terrorist attacks, the Department of Homeland Security defines terror as
2

This is the definition created by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978,
as amended in 1982, 50 U.S.C. §1801, (c) ( 1) and (2), 1982.
3
This is the definition found in Section 140 (d) (2) of the Foreign Relations Autho
rization Act, 1988, and also found in 22 U.S.C. §2656 f (d) (2).
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. . . any activity that: (A) involves an act that - (i) is dangerous
to human life or potentially destructive of critical infrastructure
or key resources; and (ii) is a violation of the criminal laws of the
United States or of any State or other subdivision of the United
States; and (B) appears to be intended - (i) to intimidate or
coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy of a
government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the
conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or
kidnapping. (Homeland Security Act of 2002, §2 ,15)
Why so many definitions? Why do they differ so much? Each definition
conforms both to the needs of the agency and to the conditions of the
world at that time. The two earliest definitions are unsophisticated and
simple because those definitions were most clear and concise, and because
the shades of meaning were unimportant to those agencies. The State
Department definition shows greater complexity due to its need to deal
with other countries from their perspectives. Oddly enough, however, the
State Department definition is the only one that stipulates that terrorist

acts must be carried out by non-state actors. In other words, terrorism
cannot, by the State Department's definition, be performed by a state.
The definition from the Department of Homeland Security is the most
extensive, yet it is also the most US-centric; an act that would not break
a· US law cannot be termed terrorism. However, it is encouraging to note
that state-sponsored terrorism is once again included in the definition.
The policy objectives in the Department of Defense definition, the focus
on the legality in the FBI definition, the aspect of noncombatants in the
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State Department definition, and the re-inclusion of the state as a possible
terrorist in the Homeland Security definition are all important characteris
tics of terrorism. Even the proposed United Nations definition of terrorism
includes these four aspects .
. . . reiterates that criminal acts intended or calculated to pro
voke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons
or particular persons for political purposes are in any circum
stance unjustifiable, whatever the considerations of a political,
philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other na
ture that may be invoked to justify them. (GA Res. 5 1/2 10,
1996) 4
Thus, it appears that the leaders of the world are beginning to find that
elusive definition, after these long decades. 5 However, as with most things
political, compromises must take place. Add to this the alleged inherent
immorality of the terrorist action, and those world leaders with the power
to do so will ensure that their actions are not labeled terror. Thus, it falls
to the social scientist to create a definition of terrorism that lacks moral
imperatives, one that applies to both allies and enemies.

interesting aside here is that this definition would agree ( at least at prima facie)
that both the Palestinian suicide bombers and the assMSination of Sheik Ahmed Yass in
by Israel were terrorist acts.
5 Alternatively, the convergence may never be reached because policy space is ef
fectively infinitely divisible and subject to the constraints of Zeno's Paradox of the
Dichotomy.
4 An
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2.1.2

The Social Scientists

Social science definitions for terrorism are not infrequent. While not the
first political scientist to make an attempt at defining terrorism, Schmid
(1983) offered one of the best early analyses of the myriad definitions. After
examining over 100 definitions in use, reaching back to 193 6, he discovered
they contained more than twenty-two separate elements. Synthesizing six
teen of those elements, Schmid then fashioned his own definition from that
list, emphasizing the five most important aspects of terrorism (Kushner
1998). Terrorism is
. . . an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, em
ployed by secret clandestine individuals, groups, or state ac
tors, for idiosyncratic, criminal, or political reasons, whereby
- in contrast to assassination - the direct targets of violence
are not the main targets. The immediate human victims of
violence are generally chosen randomly or selectively from a
target population, and serve as message generators. Threat

and violence-based communication processes between terrorist
organizations, victims, and main targets, turning it into a tar
get of terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention,
depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is
primarily sought. (Schmid 1983: 2 8)
There are several interesting facets of this definition that need to be
mentioned, especially as Schmid's definition serves as the basis of my own
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definition. First, this definition requires that the action be repeated. In
other words, an act is a terrorist act only if it is a part of a campaign. This
makes logical sense, as terror may be induced by one act, but it takes a
repeat, or a credible threat of a repeat, before goals can be achieved.
Second, according to this definition, states may be guilty of using ter
rorism; that is, they are not automatically excluded from being designated
terrorist. The State Department definition did not include state terrorism
in their definition. Schmid's definition does. Furthermore, Schmid's defi
nition includes both individuals and collectives. Thus, there is less focus
on who does it and more focus on what was done and why. This is impor
tant; focusing on the act allows people to negotiate with the actors, thus
allowing for a non-military solution. Focusing solely on the actors restricts
allowable options (Sederberg 1995).
Third, the range of defined terrorist actions is quite large. They include
reasons beyond just the political. Again, Schmid emphasizes the act and
how it affects the targets. Terrorists can have any of a number of reasons.
For Schmid, the act of terrorism is defined more by the results than by the
ultimate goals.
Fourth, Schmid acknowledges the difference between direct, indirect,
and main targets. Direct targets are those immediately affected by the
terrorist act. Indirect targets are those who are supposed to feel the terror
from the event. The main targets are those who have the power to grant
the goal sought by the actor( s). Thus, the al Qaeda attack on the Ameri
can embassies in Kenya and Tanzania had the embassy workers in Nairobi
and Dar es Salaam as the direct targets. The American embassy employees
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working in vulnerable embassies were the indirect targets. President Clin
ton was the ultimate target, who al Qaeda hoped would remove American

forces from Saudi Arabia.

Finally, as a result, the immediate targets are chosen for what they
represent rather than what they do. From within the representative cate
gories, the targets may be chosen randomly or selectively. Either specific
members of that representative group are targeted, or the terrorist attacks
whoever is there. In other words, the immediate targets are chosen for the
message the action creates. This message comes from the choice of direct
target, their place within the population of the indirect target, and their
relationship to the ultimate target.
While Schmid has created an acceptable working definition of terrorism,
there are some weaknesses involved that others have pointed out, and with
which I concur. Schmid specifies that the acts are perpetrated against
persons, not things. Thus, blowing up the Statue of Liberty or destroying
the Pentagon would not be a terrorist act for Schmid, per se, even if all

other aspects were present. As all actions of the Animal Liberation Front

and the Weather Underground were against property, they would not be

considered terrorist groups by Schmid's definition. And yet their actions

created a feeling of terror in those affected. Inclusion of symbolic objects
would increase the accuracy and applicability of this definition (Ross and
Gurr 1 989).
Moreover, Schmid allows for the direct targets to be chosen either
specifically or randomly. I suggest that the targets are both specific and
random. Returning to the Nairobi and Dar es Salaam bombings, these
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embassy workers were both selected and random. Al Qaeda selected them
from the total pool of all humans because American embassy worker deaths
would cause terror among other American embassy workers. Thus, the in
direct targets were also selected. Once the general category was chosen,
Nairobi was selected because al Qaeda felt they could successfully accom
plish the undertaking. Finally, the workers who were killed were random
members of that endangered, selected community.
Beyond these few changes, Schmid's definition of terrorism stands.
However, it adds things that are irrelevant to ethnonational terrorism. To
see this, let us first define what is meant by ethnonational and then con
clude this chapter with the working definition of ethnonational terrorism.

2.2

Ethnonational

The previous section dealt with creating a substantively acceptable defini
tion of terrorism, the action examined. This section deals with the actors.
As this research uses the Minorities at Risk dataset, the definitions used
for these groups mirrors those used by the Minorities at Risk project. 6

However, for the purposes of this dissertation, I am using the term "eth

nonational" in a way that is slightly different from how the Minorities at
Risk Project defines it. In this research, "ethnonational" will be used as

6 All definitions come from "Types of Minorities at Risk Groups" (Minoritie,s at Risk
2004). All examples come from the MAR dataset, version 1 .03 {2002 data), which was
retrieved using the MARGene program, which can be downloaded from the Minorities
at Risk Project homepage: http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/mar/.
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an umbrella term that includes all indigenous peoples, ethnonationals, and
national minorities as defined by the Minorities at Risk Project.
Using the Minorities at Risk dataset offers one level of constraints even
before analysis can begin. The groups listed are 'at risk' in their states.
That is, to be at risk, the minority "collectively suffers or benefits from,
systematic discriminatory treatment vis-a-vis other groups in a society;
and/or collectively mobilize in defense or promotion of its self-defined in
terests" (Davenport 2003: 5) . Furthermore, the groups must have a popu
lation of either 100,000 or 1% of the population of the state. Thus, small
repressed groups are not included, nor are large unrepressed groups. Thus,
the Sarni of Scandinavia is not included as it does not reach the population
requirements, nor are the Cornish included as they are not systematically
discriminated against.
As mentioned earlier, I unite three of these categories - ethnonationals,
ethnic minorities, and indigenous peoples - into one. I contend this is
appropriate, as these three groups share a similarity at a fundamental
level - their primary motivation. Thus, it makes sense to speak of the

three Minorities at Risk categories as merely three aspects of the same
underlying category.
The first subgroup of ethnonationals is the indigenous peoples. Accord
ing to the Minorities at Risk project, indigenous people are "conquered de
scendants of earlier inhabitants of a region who live mainly in conformity
with traditional social, economic, and cultural customs that are sharply
distinct from those of dominant groups" (Minorities at Risk 2004) . West
ern Europe has few remaining indigenous groups, and none of these groups
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is considered a minority at risk. Examples include the Sarni of Lapland
and the Nentsy of Siberia. On the other hand, the Spanish and French
Basques, while they are "conquered descendants of earlier inhabitants of a
region" are not indigenous peoples by this definition because they do not
currently live traditional lives; they live much as do their neighbors - the
modern Spanish and the modern French. As such, they are classified as
ethnonationalists, the second subgroup.
Ethnonationalists are "regionally concentrated peoples with a history
of organized political autonomy with their own state, traditional ruler, or
regional government, who have supported political movements for auton
omy at some time since 1945" (Minorities at Risk 2004) . Some examples of
Western European ethnonational populations are the Basques (Euskadi )

of France and Spain, the Corsicans and Bretons of France, and the Scots
in the United Kingdom. The Minorities at Risk project includes the Ulster
Catholics in this group, but not without controversy. While fitting other
aspects of the definition, the Catholics in Northern Ireland have not had
political autonomy, traditional ruler, or regional government in Northern
Ireland. They are a segment of the Irish nation who have held little, if any,
real power in Northern Ireland. They are better classified as a national
minority.

The third category is national minority. National minorities are "seg

ments of a trans-state people with a history of organized political autonomy
whose kindred control an adjacent state, but who now constitute a minor
ity in the state in which they reside" (Minorities at Risk 2004) . National
minorities in Western Europe include the South Tyroleans of Italy, and
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the Jurassiens of Switzerland. The South Tyroleans share ethnic culture
with Austria, just across the Brenner Pass. The Jurassiens were French
speaking Roman Catholics in the German-speaking Protestant canton of
Berne. They are kindred with the French-speaking Roman Catholic state
across the border, France.
Why classify these three different groups together? Because they have
a tripartite commonality: they are minorities living on their historic land
not currently able to rule themselves. Because of this commonality, the
fundamental raison d'etre for each is evidently the same - to obtain a
significant measure of autonomy, if not independence.

2 .3

Ethnonational Terrorism

The primary purpose of this chapter was to define the term "ethnonational
terrorism" . Thus far, we have explored several different definitions of ter
rorism and thoroughly defined the term "ethnonational". All that remains
is for us to combine them. Liberally pulling from Schmid's definition, ad

justing some of his wording, and altering it to meet the particular demands
of a terrorism definition centering on ethnonational groups, we have:
Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent
action, employed by groups, for the expressed purpose of in
creased autonomy for their historical homeland, whereby the
direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The imme
diate human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly
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or selectively from a selected target population, and serve as
message generators. Threat-based and violence-based commu
nication travels between the terrorist organizations, its victims,
and its main targets, thus turning the target into a target of
terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention, depending
on whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily
sought.
The only major differences between this definition and the Schmid defini
tion are the specification of the ultimate goals of the campaign (increased
autonomy for their historical homeland) and the inclusion of inanimate,
symbolic tar_gets (e.g. the Louvre and Big Ben).
Three of the f our main aspects of terrorism are also retained in accord
with the laws: the policy goal of the terrorists, the illegality of the action,
and the aspect of the non-combatant. The only missing feature is the
exclusion of the state as a possible terrorist actor, and that was done for
the obvious reason - the state is not an ethnonation, it is the target of
the ethnonational terrorism.
Not all violent events carried out by an ethnonation can be consid
ered a terrorist event. Some conflicts are more intense than terrorism.
The guerilla movements in Nicaragua (the Contras) , Peru ( Sendero Lu

minoso ), and Nepal (Moaists) are examples of groups utilizing techniques

that exceed the definition of terrorism. In each case, rebel armies battle
government troops and territory is actually captured. The violent protests
in France by the Basques are an example of a group using violence without
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making the move to terrorism. While riots have taken place and people in
jured, the movement has, thus far, eschewed the use of planned campaigns
of indiscriminate violence. Furthermore, the recent (November 2005) riot
ing in France by the Muslim minority is not terrorism, as the movement
lacks organization and the level of violence is not great enough. Thus, ter
rorism fits somewhere between these examples. Territory is not captured
and armies are not placed in battle formations in terrorism, but there is
a necessary level of organization and direction given by a leader of the
movement.

2 .4

Chapter Summary

In this chapter, we examined several of the definitions of terrorism for two
reasons. First, it demonstrated the importance, and difficulty, in finding
the proper definition of such a politically- and emotionally-charged word.
Second, it allowed us to see the suitability of my proposed definition of
ethnonational terrorism. While this chapter was not intended to be a

complete and thorough survey of definitions, it did serve as a brief glimpse
into the tortuous intricacies awaiting any scholar in the field of terrorism.
The definition of ethnonational was also covered, and the rationale for
merging the three separate categories from the Minorities at Risk project
into one category for this research was provided. While the final definition
of ethnonational terrorism was substantially based on the definition pr�
posed by Schmid (1988), adjustments for two shortcomings (Ross and Gurr
1989) and for the inherent restrictions of the current topic were made.
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The next chapter discusses the current competing models of the causes
of general violence, ethnic violence, and ethnic terrorism. Chapter Four
creates the model I will be testing in this research. Pulling liberally from
Chapter Three and making appropriate connections, a causal framework
for ethnonational terrorism will be created.
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Chapter 3
Causes of Violence
The guilty shall be recognized
by their marks, so they shall be
seized by the forelocks and the
feet.
Qur'an, Sura Al-Rahman: 41

WHILE

this research focuses specifically on ethnonational terrorism, it

is first necessary to explore causes of ethnic violence in general, as eth

nonational terrorism may be but a subset of ethnic violence in terms of
causes. While Ross ( 1993) makes a good argument regarding the possible

differences between the causes of ethnic violence and the causes of ethnic

terrorism, knowledge of what mobilizes ethnic groups to initiate violence
are fundamental to understanding how they take the step to terrorism.

One can, and many do, artificially divide the causes of ethnic violence into
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four levels of analysis: individual, group, state, and system. The division
is logical in that these four levels speak to a different subset of sources
of factors. This division is artificial as there is much overlap between the
levels. For example, globalization is a systemic factor, but its effects are
on the state, the group and the individual. In this chapter, I will examine
the four levels of analysis as they pertain to the causes of ethnic violence
and terrorism.

3. 1

Individual Level

Sigmund Freud theorized that in every human, there is a conflict between
Eros and Thanatos (Guggenbiihl-Craig 2002: 82) . Eros represents love,
the love we all have for life and for living. Thanatos represents death, our
fascination with it, and our death instinct. For Freud, these two aspects
are two sides of the same coin, two parts of an entire person. Carl Jung
agreed that the death attraction is the "core of our archetypical shadows"
(Guggenbiihl-Craig 2002: 8 2), that each of our ids contains both the sui

cidal maniac and the murderer. W hy else would the major religions of the
world forbid suicide and killing? The leaders of those religions recognized
these destructive instincts.
However, the death instinct is not our sole instinct. We also thirst for
life. Some have cited the survival instinct as the greatest force in life (Lyng
1990: 85 9) . This instinct reaches beyond merely avoiding death. It pushes
us to become immortal. Modern advances in medicine have expanded life
greatly, but immortality - true immortality - is well beyond the reach of
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current medical science. 1 How, then, is immortality gained? First, one can
gain it through bearing offspring. These children continue one's genetic
line and are, in effect, pseudo-immortality. The continuance of the species
seems to be a constant aspect of biological life (Thiele 1999: 7).
Second, one can gain immortality through history. People will often
work hard to make a name for themselves so that history will remember
them. Some rulers keep an eye to how history will judge them (Schlesinger
Jr. 1997: 180; Tugwell 1971: 192), whereas others gain immortality for
their acts of notoriety. Scholars may create academic works and reputations
to survive the generations. 2 The everyman may gain immortality either
through extraordinarily great acts or through extraordinarily horrific acts.
For instance, Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold, the shooters at Columbine
High School, reportedly committed their crime for the fame. According to
Dave Cullen,
One thread running consistently through [their personal jour
nals] is the desire f or glory, the expectation of fame. "Like many
of the school shooters, they seem to be expecting some sort of
notoriety, in addition to wanting the vengeance." (Cullen 1999)
A second example is the ancient Greek Herostratus, known solely be
cause he purposely destroyed the Temple of Artemis. The reason he gave
for destroying the temple, one of the Seven Wonders of the Ancient World,
1True immortality is also beyond the ken of the laws of physics, as it is a violation
of the Second Law of Thermodynamics (Lightman 2000: 63).
2Thucydides, the author of The History of the Peloponnesian War accomplished
this, as did Plato, Galileo, Hobbes, and Einstein.
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is that he wanted the world to never f orget him (Stirnimann 2002: 91}.
Even the Afghan Taliban may have rested their hopes f or eternal fame on
the destruction of pagan cultural artifacts. 3
Finally, eschatology is an important aspect of all religions. For the three
major monotheistic world religions, paradise awaits those who follow their
god's will,4 while damnation and eternal torment will eventually greet those
who live counter to their god's desire. 5 Just what constitutes the will of
god differs not only between religions, but also within them. Furthermore,
certain religions, notably Christianity and Islam, allow those martyred f or
their faith to reach heaven automatically. Crusaders and suicide bombers
regard themselves as martyrs for the faith, thus enuring themselves ever
lasting paradise (Rapoport 1988: 199}. Nor is the wedding of terror to
religion solely a Middle Eastern experience. Millennium cults of the West
and the East have perpetrated their own strain of threat (Ranstorp 1996:
125} .
This is not to suggest that religion is the cause of terrorism. Religion
is merely one of the factors, neither necessary nor sufficient, that combines
3

In this case, they decided to destroy the 1000-year-old Buddha statues built by
Buddhist Afghan ancestors. When faced with offers to purchase the statues, the Taliban
spokesman reportedly said, "We prefer to be remembered as the destroyers of statues,
rather than as the sellers of them" (Stirnimann 2002: 89).
4The three differ on specifics, however. The nature of life in paradise for Muslims
is Mutahsibir (sensual pleasure in sex with virgins, eating, and happiness) in Janah
(Sura 55: 46). For Jews, eternal life is enjoying the radiance of the divine presence
in Gan'eden (Berakhot 1 7a). Finally, for Christians, fellowship, worship, service, and
praise await the holiest in Heaven (Revelation 21).
5 Again, with respect to punishment, the three differ slightly, although all three have
a version of Hell. Islam has eight levels in their Hell (Sura 4: 56; 55: 46), Judaism
has Ge'henna (or She'ol) where the damned burn in a fiery pit (Ezekiel 31:16), and
Christianity has a lake of fire (Revelation 20: 14).
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to create the terrorist. The discussion above merely demonstrates that
the ability to commit a terrorist act exists in us all. The conflict between
Thanatos and Eros, between the death instinct and the drive for immor
tality, are present in us all. Sederberg (1989) points out that the terrorist
is often no different than the "guy next door" . So what makes the terrorist
take the fatal step? Is it pathology? Is it a result of social ills? Or is it
merely normal psychology? Let us look at each of these three reasons in
turn.

3. 1 . 1

Pathology

The common American view of terrorists is that they are 'suicidal' or
amoral psychopaths (McCauley 2002: 5). One can even point to the Re
alist School in International Relations literature as assuming the default
action of humans is towards violence.6 Except for the rare terrorist, pathol
ogy i� not a factor; that is, terrorism is neither a mental disease nor the
result of a mental disease (Ruby 2002: 15; Weatherston and Moran 2003:
698). As explained above, the seeds for terrorism are within each of us.
The plentiful examples of soldiers and policemen willfully killing noncom
batants and of large organizations carrying out heavily planned attacks,
demonstrates that the typical terrorist is not a Theodore Kaczynski holed
up in his backwoods cabin spouting manifestoes to the world. The typical
terrorist is the typical person (McCauley 2002: 6). In fact, the myth of
the pathological terrorist substantially hinders counter-terrorist solutions.
This is especially apparent in Hobbes's (1998 [1651)) Leviathan, where man in the
state of nature is most assuredly violent.
6
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When the terrorist is automatically seen as deranged, there is no thought
of a political solution to the underlying causes. Force is usually the first,
and quite often the only, method used against terrorists (Sederberg 1989:
79). 7
If there is a common subnormal aspect to terrorists, it may be found
in the type of terrorism used. Cruelty has definite causes. For Sederberg,
there are five causes of cruelty: absence of love and approval, need for obe
dience, distance from victims, victimization as a child, and fear (Sederberg
1989) . Of these, two are most pertinent in the discussion of the causes of
terrorism: distance from the victim and fear. Those subjected to terrorist
actions are the "others" , who are automatically different, automatically in
ferior, and, thus, socially removed from "us" (Stirnimann 2002: 97) . Fear
is the stimulus for the fight-flight response, and fear of religious loss is
doubly so (Crittenden 1 999: 14 8; Franck 1 997: 626) .

3. 1 .2

Emotional Expression

Terrorism can also stem from a need to express an emotion, usually hatred
or anger, but often merely frustration. Many newspaper headlines after
the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks asked, "Why do they hate us?"
President Bush's response was, "They don't know us" (McCauley 2002: 7).
Is it that simple, or is there another reason behind the anger? Frank {1988:
2) argues that anger is an emotional tool that allows the weak to keep
7 T he

Madrid Agenda may be the first step in the direction of changing this tendency.
The March 1 1 , 2005 international meeting concluded with recommendations that states
deal with certain underlying risk factors, including poverty, social inequalities, and
strengthening democratic institutions.
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the strong in check. Aristotle held that anger was the reaction to insult.
Behavioral scientists hold that anger is a reaction to pain, frustration, and
despair (McCauley 2002; Umberson, W illiams, and Anderson 2002) . Thus,
the extant literature ties anger into violence and terrorism.
However, even though anger and violence are intimately entwined, an
gry people do not always resort to violence. They express themselves in
different ways depending on their resources and experiences. Persons with
violent experiences are more apt to use violence (Schieman 2000; Throits
1 990; Umberson, Williams, and Anderson 2002). 8

3. 1 . 3

Normal Psychology

Finally, terrorism also stems from normal psychology; that is, terrorists
kill for the same reasons that people have killed throughout time: causes,
family, friends, love, etc. Causes are especially prone to creating violence,
as humans must believe in something more important than life, something
that transcends finite life. According to McCauley (2002: 12), we must be
lieve, for we are sentient and know that we will die. Causes for which we are
willing to fight soon become causes for which we are willing to die and kill.

That is not to say that all people with a cause resort to terrorism. There

is an aspect of the slippery slope here. Rarely does a terrorist wake up
one morning and decide to commit an act of terror. The process is usually

a series of gradual steps, none of which seem fateful, but each caused by
the failure of the previous. Milgram's infamous electro-shock experiment
8

This also suggests a mechanism by which violence begets violence.
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demonstrates the effects of gradualism. Twenty percent of those who were
allowed a free hand in slightly increasing the voltage of the shock eventu
ally delivered the maximum amount. They did so because there was no
sudden jump between a safe shock and a dangerous one (McCauley 2002:
15). The same gradualism can be seen in the Basque terrorist group, Eu

skadi Ta _ Askatasuna (ETA). Originally, the ETA, composed of members of
the Basque nationalist party, espoused democratic ideals and protection of
the Basque language and culture. They gradually shifted to using violence
to achieve their results. Those simple violent measures became assassina
tions by 196 8. Finally, they moved on to terror, including car bombings
shootings, and arson (Shafritz, Gibbons, Jr. , and Scott 1991: 119). Each
individual step is not that great, but the complete journey is disasterous.
More than 7 50 people have died at the hands of the ETA ( "ETA: Basque
Homeland and Freedom" 2004).

3 . 1 .4

Despair

A man with nothing also has nothing to live for. Perhaps the person driven

to terrorism sees no other opportunity available to him. Non-violent outlets
do not exist. Despair reigns. Lack of opportunity comes from two sources:

economic and political.

Modernization and globalization both increase

the economic levels of states and their citizens. If this is true, then why
are the most modern states the ones that experience terrorism the most
(Crenshaw 1981)? While the effects of modernization and globalization
will be explained later, one relevant aspect surfaces here - change. In
societies hit with modernization and globalization, that society is changing
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rapidly. While economic advancement results, it may not result evenly.
In fact, it may further exacerbate the rich-poor divide in the country or
in the world (Malone and Thakur 2003). H igh unemployment rates may
result when a traditional-agricultural society is transformed into a modern
industrial one (Samara 2000: 20). Those who cannot adapt quickly are
left behind. When employment is ethnic-based, modernization can also
exacerbate ethnic tensions (Harrison 1983; Medrano 1984).
One can also lack opportunity in the political realm. This lack of oppor
tunity ostensibly increases the rates of despair and of violence. However,
data does not support this argument at first sight; the United States, ar

guably the most democratic of states, has the highest level of terrorism

(Crenshaw 1981). Furthermore, some political parties in Western Europe

are merely political wings of terrorist groups (Weinberg 1991) . W hy do
these things seem so counter-intuitive? W hy do people living in states
which allow them political expression still resort to violent extra-political
means? First, other factors may be responsible for the high levels of ter

rorism in the United States. When we control for those factors, level of
democracy may become either statistically insignificant or significant as a
retardant. Also, when examining states transitioning to democracy, while
violent crime does rise dramatically, it appears to be a product of disrup

tions in traditional patronage. In other words, significantly altering the
political system significantly changed the rules; those who were enfran

chised under the ancien regime became disenfranchised under the nouveau
(Villarreal 2002) .
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3. 1 . 5

Adolescents and Adolescence

The youth, especially the males, are especially prone to violence ( al-Hasan
1986; Hagan and Foster 2001) . 9 This is true for a variety of reasons.
Adolescent males are not fully developed, physically, emotionally, or sexu
ally. Evolutionary pressures encourage adolescent males to be more violent
(Kanazawa and Still 2000: 444) . Adolescent males are also expected to be
adult males in their behavior and duties. As such, they are under higher
levels of stress, and since they lack experience dealing with stress, they
tend to deal with it through violent means (van Gundy 2 002) . They are
outside the political process, being unable to vote, so they experience de
spair in that realm. Finally, they are also most prone to being unemployed

for a variety of reasons, including lack of work history and low skill levels
(Caspi, et al. 1998). Because of these reasons, they are much more prone
to stress and to despair than are others. Thus, they are much more prone
to violence. If the adolescent male is part of an out group, then the proba
bility for violent actions is even higher (King 1997; Wiltfang and Scarbecz
1990) . This is especially true in those traditional cultures that impose such

pressures on the male. However, females are not immune to the siren song

of terrorism. Females lead terrorist organizations, are members of terrorist

organizations, and are suicide bombers { Pape 2005). Thus, adolescence
should be a greater predictor of terrorism risk than just male adolescence.

This observation does not rule out the existence of female terrorists. To say that
female terrorists do not exist is to ignore the historical record. While it is rare for
women to actually lead terrorist organizations, they are used extensively in combat.
Approximately a fifth of the combatants in Peru's Maoist Sendero Luminoso were fe
male. However, the majority of terrorists (and terrorist leaders) are male (Foreign Policy
Association 2005).
9
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3. 1 .6

Summary

As far as the individual level of analysis, we know that a terrorist is a
normal person. Freud and Jung both point out that the death instinct is a
part of every person. There is a conflict within us all between love (Eros)

and death (Thanatos). The survival instinct quite often fights with the

death instinct. As a result, we seek both love and death in life.
The quest for immortality, only achievable in proxy, compels man to
create both offspring and works survivable through history. Some in the
past have committed deeds of infamy to last the generations, deeds whose
apparent purpose was to garner historical attention. Herostratus's attempt
at immortality through the destruction of the Temple of Artemis, one of

the Seven Wonders of the Ancient World, was almost thwarted by the

Greeks who sought to expunge his name from all records. They failed, and
Herostratus's name survives to this day solely through his malicious act. A

second source of immortality is religion, for it offers paradise for those who

follow the will of their god. Many have pointed to religion as the cause
of terrorism, however it is not religion, per se, that serves as the impetus;
it is the quest for immortality. Religion serves as a possible vehicle for
legitimization or justification for the terrorist actions.

Finally, looking at why normal people take that fatal step into terror

ism, we are left with the same answers for a related question: What is to

live for? Those things that make life worthwhile for us, those things most

important to us, those things for which we are willing to die are also those
things for which we are willing to kill.
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In the final analysis, at least at the individual level, the research sug
gests that the terrorist is no different from the rest of us. In fact, it suggests
that the ability to commit such acts exists in us all, only waiting for the
right circumstances to give birth. W hat might those circumstances be?

Despair. Any circumstance that instills a sense of despair, of hopelessness,

or of major stress begets despair. It is this despair that pushes people
towards violent acts.

3.2

Group Level

If the research on the causes of terrorism in individuals provides us with
little discernment, it is because we are all capable of resorting to terrorism
under certain circumstances. The literature on group-level causes is more
specific. Terrorist groups do seem to exhibit a common pattern in their
birth. There are two aspects that this section addresses: funding, because
terrorism is cheap - not free; and preconditions, as most of the political

science literature focuses on the preconditions of terrorism.

3. 2 . 1

Funding

Terrorism is relatively inexpensive to commit, at least in terms of resources.
A van, some fertilizer and kerosene, and maybe some specific knowledge
that can be found on the Internet, 10 are all that is needed to transform

10 The Animal Liberation Front helpfully provides an online guide on how to commit
certain acts of terror: ''The A.L.F. Primer: A Guide to Direct Action and the Animal
Liberation Front, 2nd ed."
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a willing body into an able one. Sometimes, all it requires is a gun (and
ammunition) and the will to use it against others. However, money does
help, and terrorist groups that are able to raise funds are also able to
continue their existence and to attack better-protected targets (Corsi 1981:
64). This need for resources is not as great as that of the guerillas during
a civil war. For a terrorist, money merely allows them to perpetrate more
costly acts more often. As such, a bankrupt terrorist organization will
not necessarily cease to exist. Diasporas and irredentas do aid terrorist
organizations, but they are not a necessary condition for this reason.
Since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack, financial sources for ter
rorism have come under intense scrutiny. There are three primary sources:
the state, private-illicit sources, and private-legal sources. State funding
of terrorism has dropped off in recent years for two reasons. First, the So
viet Union, a heavy financer of terrorism, ceased to exist (O'Brien 1996).
Second, other states who supported terrorism are trying to join the com
munity of states (Bantekas 2003). These two factors have greatly reduced
the amount of money flowing to terror groups from states.
Private financing by illegal means is a second source of terror fund
ing, with a primary source being drug traffic (Bantekas 2003; Kay 1 999;
Miron and Zwiebel 1995). While opium from Afghanistan and cocaine
from Columbia are the main sources of drugs, drug money comes primarily
from the United States and Europe (Bantekas 2003). This drug money
funds terrorism. N arco-terrorism is not new. The United States has been
heavily involved in the war against the Colombian drug lords since the
early George H. W. Bush administration (Crandall 2001: 100) .
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A new source of terror funds are charities. In the aftermath of the
Cold War, long-subsumed ethnic tensions percolated to the surface once
again. These ethnic and religious groups often formed charities, collecting
moneys from sympathetic people and giving some of it to terrorist groups. 1 1
Bantekas { 2003) related how some charities operated. "Under the guise of
a 'charitable' or 'relief' organization, a terrorist group would openly (to
the particular audience addressed) solicit funding for operations, taking
advantage of the benefits inherent in the legislation on charities" (Bantekas
2003: 322). While the charity phenomenon expanded greatly after the
Cold War, it is hardly new. The Irish have used such tactics for more
than a century, collecting money from the emigre Irish and sending it back
to Ireland to fund the struggle against their British overlords (Rapoport
2002).

3.2.2

Group Preconditions

While funding is not a necessary component according to the literature,

there seem to be some conditions that must be in place for a group to

choose the path of terror. First, there must be a unified group. This group
can be united based on ideology or on culture. Examples of ideological
groups that have used terror in the past include anarchists (e.g. Narodnaya
Many of the major world religions either encourage or require giving alms. The
Baha'i, the Buddhist, and the Hindu encourage charitable giving, but do not specify
the amount {Phillips 2004). The tithe is the Judeo-Christian form, a mandatory 10%
donation to the poor (Leviticus 27:30; Malachi 3:S-10). The zakat is the Islamic form,
a mandatory tax on excess wealth (usually 2.5%) . The Qur'an designates those who
can receive the zakat: fakir, miskin, ami� muallaf, riqab, gharmin, ibnus sabil, and
fisabillillah. The fisabillillah ( also known as sabil Allah) are those who fight for Allah
(Bantekas 2003; Qur'an Sura Al-Muzzammil:20; Qur'an Sura Al-Tauba: 60) .
11

60

Volya and the Second of June Movement), environmentalists (e.g. the
Animal Liberation Front and Earth First), and political (e.g. the Red Army
Faction and the N ovember 17th Revolutionary Organization). H owever,
examples of terrorist groups based on culture are more numerous: the
Basques, the Ulster Catholics, the Corsicans, and the Jurassiens are a
few European examples. What do all of these groups have in common?
They identify themselves as being different from others. That is the basic

requirement of a group, an 'us vs. them' dichotomy (Stirnimann 2003:
97). 12

Taking nationalism as an illustrative example, what creates nationalist

feelings? First of all, to have some sort of nationalist feelings, the peo

ple must classify themselves as a nation; they must perceive themselves
to be a nation. According to political geography theorists, several things

identify a nation. Mellor defines a nation as "comprising people sharing
the same historical experience, a high level of cultural and linguistic unity,
and living in a territory they perceive as their homeland by right" (Mellor
1989: 4) . Anthony S mith, while denying the reality of nations, admits to

their de facto existence, and defines them as "a named human population

possessing a myth of common descent, common historical memories, ele

ments of shared culture, an association with a particular territory, and a

12 T he us-them dichotomy was quite explicit in the days following the September 1 1 ,
2001 attacks on the United States. President Bush, Prime Minister Blair and Osama
bin Laden all defined the conflict, both past and present, in pairs of social, political,
moral, and religious dichotomies (Leudar, Marsland, and Nekvapil 2004).
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sense of solidarity" {Smith 1988: 9) . 13 Thus, nationalism requires a sense
of separateness from the larger group.
Next, what increases the strength of this us-them dichotomy? Two
things: history and repression. For history, the longer a group is together,
the more they see themselves as being together. For nationalism, as men
tioned in above, history is extremely important. Crenshaw { 1981) holds
that members of a nation have a common historical tradition. Smith (1988)
and many others (Calhoun 1993 ; Feeney 2002; Triandafyllidou 1998) con
cur in that groups without a common history (real or perceived) cannot
consider themselves a group; that is, a sense of history is a necessary con
dition.
The second factor that increases the strength of the us-them dichotomy
is repression. There must be some form of repression involved, either real
or perceived. Terrorists need a cause; they need something to drive their
actions. Just being different is not sufficient to compel a people to commit
acts of violence; there must be some sense of repression. This repression
can be either political or economic. Crenshaw ( 1981: 3 83) points out that
political disadvantages both increase the divide between the group and
the state and increase the sense of grievance against the state. In fact,

she places political repression as the first cause in her list, even though

13 Smith's position also avoids the primordialism debate. For Smith, it does not really
matter if the nation is fundamental, only that the people believe it to be. The Irish
nation is a prime example of a created (or re-created) sense of nationhood. It was not
until the Irish renaissance of the mid-nineteenth century that Irish was considered a
nation with its own distinct history and culture separate from that of Great Britain.
As a result, the creators of the Irish nation could be considered Thomas Davis, Charles
Gavin Duffy, and John Blake, the founders of the Young Ireland movement (Feeney
2002: 20).
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she later admits that such a grievance is neither necessary nor sufficient. 14
More recently, Murshed ( 2002) found that certain types of grievances can
result in civil wars. What kinds of grievances are more likely to lead to
civil wars?
[Those] which are related to economic factors: systematic eco
nomic discrimination against groups based on ethnolinguistic
or religious differences. Extreme poverty and poor social con
ditions (including refugee camps) also facilitate conflict by pro
viding more readily available combatants. (Murshed 2002: 3 89)
Just as political repression both increases the definition of the group
and provides a concrete grievance against the state, financial differences
do as well. Medrano ( 1995) lays out two complementing and alternative
theories to determine the effect of concentration on ethnic violence. The
first, Ethnic Competition Theory asserts that ethnic conflict comes from
groups competing for the state's resources (Medrano 1995). With a limited
amount of resources available, the competition breaks out along ethnic lines
if those ethnic lines are apparent. One result of this is that conflict between

ethnic groups should occur more frequently when the groups interact than

when they are separate (Belanger and Pinard 1991; Tilly 1991).
Ethnic competition may also result from occupational desegregation, as
the ethnic groups would then be competing for the same employment posi
tions. When one ethnic group has a prominent history of employment in a
14She does, however, suggest that the perception within the group of such a grievance
is a necessary condition (Crenshaw 1981: 383).
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certain economic sector, it becomes a part of that ethnic group's identity.
When that economic sector experiences desegregation, the original groups
will tend to see the entrants as trespassers and as threats to the group's
economic identity and vitality. This happened in the United States when
European immigrants were displaced in their traditional economic niche by
the internally immigrating African Americans. One result of this economic
displacement was increased ethnic violence against the African Americans
by those who would not accept their incursion. (Olzak 1992)
Ethnic Segregation Theory asserts the opposite - ethnic conflict comes
from one group segregating itself from the others (Medrano 1995) . This
segregation can be physical (movement to ghettoes) or economic (one eth
nonation inhabiting only one employment sector). Economic segregation,
in itself, does not increase the probability that a group will resort to vio
lence. It does, however, increase the sense of separateness felt by the group.
This happens because the group begins to see that employment sector as
a part of the group's identity. Such ethnic segregation based on economic
sectors happened dramatically in Germany after 1950, when the German

state began signing contracts with other states to import labor to drive
the German economy (Friedrichs 1998).
In both of these theories, the conflict arises when the ethnic minority
sees itself as a group separate from the larger state. Interestingly enough,
neither theory requires the ethnic minority to be disadvantaged. In both
cases, the minority may actually be economically advantaged within the
larger state. In this case, they tend to see themselves as being dragged
down by the state, as opposed to being repressed by it. However, as we will
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later see, an economically privileged group does have a lower probability
of resorting to violence, unless that advantage is threatened. 1 5
Furthermore, money is a great motivator for action. Seeing hard-earned
money go to feed 'different' people has the ability to foster a sense of re
sentment. Similarly, seeing one' s children go hungry while a separate na
tionality living nearby succeeds can create the same sense of inj ustice. The

feelings increase in intensity in the presence of relative deprivation (Gurr

1970). In either case, economic disparities are causing a radicalization
within the population. Malone and Thakur (2003) state,
If anything positive can come out of the horrific 9/ 11 terror

attacks, it should be the emergence of a concerted approach to
addressing this bitterness [caused by the North-South dispari

ties], one possible root cause for the support that Osama bin
Laden's advocacy has received on the streets in much of the
developing world, even outside the Islamic bloc of countries.
In his influential work, Gurr combines economic and political repression
in a general explanation of why certain groups rebel against the authority of
the central government. For Gurr, the basic reason is relative depravation;

i.e., the gap between value capabilities and value expectations. For Gurr,

A similar result is found in international conflict literature. W hen one country
has their capability advantage threatened by a relative neighbor, the probability of
them initiating conflict with the challenger increases, especially when that challenger is
different in some fundamental manner. T hus, there was no conflict between the United
States and Great Britain when the former overtook the latter, but there was when
Germany was overtaking France (Houweling and Siccama 1988: 94; Kim and Morrow
1992: 918).
15
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gap growth is fundamental. As long as groups do not have expectations too
far above what they receive, there is no great impetus to rebel. However,
when the group sees the gap between reality and expectations grow greater,
they resolve into action (Gurr 1970).
However, there are conflicting findings in the terrorism literature. Ter
rorists do tend to be middle-class individuals who are neither poorly edu
cated nor poor. Yet, those states in which terrorism thrives contain large
numbers of both the poorly educated and the poor (Blomberg, Hess, and
Weerapana 2004; Bueno de Mesquita 2005a; Krueger and Maleckova 2002;
Russell and Miller 1977). How can we reconcile these differences?

3. 2 . 3

Summary

And so, at the group level, we have that money is not of primary impor
tance as a predictor - conditions are far more important. In terms of
resource constraints, it is true that terrorism is inexpensive to execute.
However, in terms of reaction, terrorism has some rather severe associ
ated costs. Among these possible costs is loss of life, loss of legitimacy,
and loss of support. One class of theorists holds that terrorist groups are
rational actors who, in effect, perform cost-benefit analyses to determine
the advisability of their actions (Ross 1993: 317; Sederberg 1989: 97-101 ).
Thus, terrorists weigh these costs, both actual and probable, to determine
whether their actions are beneficial to them in achieving their goals. Ac
cording to the literature, what factors do they weigh?
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First, the terrorist group must have a raison d'etre, some purpose for
existing as a group. Ideology, culture, history, and repression all combine,
either singly or in larger combinations, to create distinct groups.

The

repression, economic or political, also serves as the impetus for action.
Altering the current order serves as the benefit from action. However, the
action also has associated costs. These costs come in the form of increased
repression by the state and of loss of support from the people.
The terrorists must ensure that they do not make the situation too
much worse. In Uruguay, at that time a liberal democracy, the Tupa

maros ( 1960s) sought concessions from the government. When they did
not receive them, they began a campaign of terror to bring about their
requested concessions. As a direct result of this campaign, the people re
belled against them, the government fell in a military coup d'etat, and the
military dictatorship effectively and efficiently eliminated the group (Gibbs
19 89).
Next, the terrorists need to ensure that the public backlash against
their actions is minor or non-existent - they must win the long-term
battle for the hearts and minds of their people. Actually, they only have
to perceive this to be true. One of the effects of terrorist activities is

that "their acts antagonize previously neutral and disinterested groups and

alienate many of the people on behalf of w hom they claim to act" (Ross and

Gurr 19 89: 409). Sources of this backlash include government propaganda

campaigns, natural public aversion to unrest, lack of effective propaganda
by the terrorist organization, and an unwillingness of the public to bear
the costs of the terror campaign {Ross and Gurr 19 89) .
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Thus, it seems as though the group is more important than the individ
ual level of analysis. Not all groups are disadvantaged either economically
or politically. Not all groups have concrete grievances against the state.
Thus, not all groups experience an increased probability of resorting to
terrorism. Later, I will address how this information can be used to keep
groups from resorting to terrorism, and how it can be used to stop ter
rorist groups currently existing. However, the group must be placed in a
larger system. Just as there are certain characteristics of the groups that
encourage terror, the same is true about certain characteristics of the state.

3.3

State Level

Characteristics of the state have also been found to be important in deter
mining the propensity for terrorist actions (Crenshaw 1981, 1998; Mousseau
2001; Ross 1993) . These characteristics fall into two broad categories:
regime type and state milieu. Regime type refers to the level of democ
racy and autocracy within the state, including how able the regime is to

repress terrorism once it begins. State milieu refers to the demographic
and geographic factors that affect life within the state.

3.3. 1

Regime Type

There are conflicting findings on how regime type affects terrorism. The
theory seems to be as follows. Autocratic regimes are more repressive than
democratic regimes. Thus, groups have a greater chance of being repressed,
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either politically or economically, in an autocratic regime (Crenshaw 1981;
Gurr 1 970). As a result, autocratic regimes should spawn more terrorist
groups; they provide their citizens more reasons to come together against
the government, yet they make available fewer peaceful outlets for them.
Democratic regimes allow for a greater number of ways for the groups to
peacefully express their dissatisfaction with the status quo, and they have
mechanisms that allow for peaceful change (Huntington 1991: 172). Thus,
democracies should have fewer terrorist organizations.
However, autocracies, being more repressive, are better able to control
and stop terrorists from reaching a critical number than are democracies
(Hamilton and Hamilton 1983) . These autocracies reduce the number of
"closed curtains" and reduce the size of the "active operating space" of the
dissident groups (Galam 2003: 141, 143) . Structured autocracies are also
better able to turn the entire apparatus of the state against terror groups
without compromising principles. Democracies value personal liberty over
state control. Because of this, they are less able to stop terrorist groups
from continuing their existence ( Crenshaw 1981) . So, should democracies
have a higher rate or should autocracies? Current theory unequivocally
asserts, yes.
A quick cross tabulation shows that for all minorities at risk in the
world, democracies have a higher incidence of terrorism in comparison to
the number of minority groups than either of the other two types of regimes
(see Table 3. 1) . Furthermore, this difference is statistically significant (x 2

=

3 7.41; p � 0.001) . This finding is in accord with Crenshaw's ( 1981)
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Table 3. 1: Cross tabulation of regime type vs. incidence of terrorism in
Western Europe, 1945-2000.
democracy mid-realm autocracy total
26
23 127
78
terrorism that year
(1. 7)
(1.5)
(4.5)
1343 4719
1720
1656
no terrorism that year
(98.5)
(95.5)
(98.3)
1746
1734
1366 4846
total state- years
Notes : Numbers in parentheses represent column percents. Democracies

are significantly more prone to outbreaks of terrorism than the other two
types of regimes (x2 = 37.41; dF = 2; p � 0. 001) . The regime type data is
from Polity IV (v2002), whereas the terrorism data is from Minorities at
Risk (v 1. 03) . Regimes are democracies if they score + 6 or higher on the
POLITY2 variable; autocracies, - 6 or lower; and mid-realm, b etween -5 and
5, inclusive.
assertion that the permissive structure of a democracy is a necessary con

dition for terrorism (Ross 1 993; Weinberg 1991) . This permissive structure
allows like-minded individuals to come together to form (perhaps violent)
groups. It allows individuals to pass freely through the territory without

being automatically subject to police search. It also allows groups to form

on democratic soil, perhaps to carry out attacks on a neighboring state
as happened with the exiled Spanish Basques leaders in southern France
(Kurlansky 1999) .

Finally, according to current theory, there must be a precipitating event
before a group makes that fateful step to terrorism (Crenshaw 1981; Ross

1993). Crenshaw found that this precipitating event quite often was the

government using unexpected and unusual force to respond to a protest.
According to Crenshaw {1981}, this unexpected event demonstrates to the
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group that the state is no longer adhering to the social contract and that
a boundary line had been crossed in the battle. 16 The event may also
demonstrate that the government is not really as democratic as it purports
to be, thus giving weight to the demands of the group (Bonanate 1979:
197). This event may also show a fundamental weakness in the government,
thus giving the group more esteem in the battle or giving other opponents
of the government an impetus to attempt a coup (Gibbs 1989).

3.3.2

State Milieu

What about demographic and geographic factors? How do they affect
the probability of terrorism within the state? There seem to be several
demographic variables that contribute to the use of terrorism. Level of
urbanization, level of modernization, the pervasiveness of the mass media,
and simple demographics all contribute.
Urbanization. That the level of urbanization is a factor in terrorism is
not in question (Crenshaw 1981; Wilkinson 1977) . Cities offer two things
that terrorists need: a recruitment base and targets. Large urban centers
tend to contain the poor, the downtrodden, and the frustrated (Ehrlich
and Liu 2002: 183). These groups of people are prime candidates for
recruitment because they already feel the relative deprivation, the economic
inequality, and the despair. From buildings to people, urban centers also
offer a multitude of targets that the terrorist organizations use ( Grabosky
1979: 76). Urban centers also offer density and anonymity. Density allows
16 For an extensive discussion on the effects of boundary violations, see Schelling 1960.
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for geometrical and spatial aggregation of both terror-prone persons and
their silent, passive supporters (Funes 1998; Galam 2003). Anonymity

allows individuals to move about and plan with relative impunity. That
urban centers are also centers of conscious anonymity is well-documented
(Sampson 1991: 57, 58). Urban settings also allow juxtaposition of great
wealth and great poverty, thus exacerbating the feelings of deprivation and

despair (Conley 1999; Peterson 1991). 17
Modernization. Terrorism is hardly a new phenomenon. 18 Thus, mod

ernization is not a necessary cause of terrorism. However, it appears to
be an accelerant. Modernity offers a plethora of targets, weapons, and
mass media outlets that terrorists use to their advantage (Johnson 1982).
Modern targets include nuclear power plants. Modern weapons include
airplanes, car bombs, and RPGs. Modern media outlets include television
and the Internet (the media is explored in greater depth below) . Further
more, greater communication, greater mobility, and greater openness, all

things associated with modernity, associate themselves with higher risks of
terrorism ( Crenshaw 1981).
The Mass Media. One requirement for terrorism to work is that the

people need to be terrorized. To accomplish this, the act must be capable of

inducing terror and the knowledge of that act must get to the people. The
17In

a separate study, Tittle and Stafford ( 1992) found that, when taking demographic
variables into consideration, urban residents scored higher than either suburban or rural
residents on indices of anonymity, alienation, and deviance.
18The Zealots (Secarii) was a terrorist group in Palestine around the beginning of
the first millennium. The rulers immediately after the French Revolution of 1789 called
themselves terrorists, while history calls the time of their rule the Reign of Terror. The
Narodnaya Volya was a Russian anarchist group at the turn of the twentieth century.
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first part is the responsibility of the terrorists; the second is the responsi
bility of the media. Without advertising the act, terror is quite difficult to
spread. Thus, the media is, at best, a partial cause of the effectiveness of
terrorism (Bassiouni 1981; Schmid and De Graaf 1982) . This is known to
the rulers of the countries hit by terror events. Margaret Thatcher, Prime
Minister of Great Britain, mentioned the effects of the media on the effec
tiveness of terrorism (Shafritz, Gibbons, and Scott 1991: 257) . This is also
well known to terrorism researchers (Crenshaw 1981; Johnson 1982; Ross
1993). Some researchers have even posited that a solution to the problem
of terrorism is to either reduce the freedom of the media (Slone 2000) or
to encourage the media to police itself through stricter ethics (Held 1997).
However, both of these solutions, with the first being most blatant, show
a willingness of some states to reduce the freedom of their citizens in order
to reduce the effects of terrorism.
Demography. With the above arguments about the individual level of
analysis, we already know how certain individual factors affect the like
lihood of a person resorting to the use of terrorism. The poor, the un
employed, the adolescent all have higher probabilities of using violence.
Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that areas with higher concentra

tions of poverty, unemployment, and adolescents would have higher chances

of breeding terrorism . This conclusion is in line with current theory, as well
(Ehrlich and Liu 2002: 183) .
One thing not yet explored is the effect of the number of other out
groups on group terror propensity. There are two lines of thought. The
first holds that the chance of a state experiencing a terror strike increases
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when there are more terror-prone groups. This is due to the mathematics
of the situation. Mathematics affects the outcomes in two different man
ners, however. First, a greater number of groups in existence reduces the
chance that any one of them will be able to get their problem addressed
through pluralist political means. In other words, there is a limited amount
of resources - time, power, and money - and a greater number of groups
vying for the pie will necessarily reduce the average amount any group will
attain. This, along with the 'otherness' of the other group, increases the
probability of intergroup conflict and violence (Kramer 1994; Krippendorff
1979; Galinski 2002). Second, a greater number of groups necessarily in
creases the number of conflict nexuses between the groups, as the number
of possible interactions increases (Dion 1997).
However, does increasing the number of out-groups always increase the
likelihood of a state experiencing terrorism? Or, is there a certain level
beyond which increasing the number of out groups actually decreases this
probability? Is there a point w here there are so many out groups that
adding an additional has no effect on terror likelihood? In fact, could
adding yet another out-group actually create a fraternity of "out-group
ness" , where the groups begin to work together to achieve their ends within
the political system, and thus reducing the probability of a terror strike in
the state? 19 Interestingly enough, according to research, there is a point
beyond which increasing numbers of out-groups actually reduces the level
of ethnic violence experienced under certain political conditions, namely

190r, could this fraternity work together to achieve the goals using violent methods?
The fact that there is a general increase in pacifism beyond a threshold number of
out-groups suggests that groups who do work together do so using political means at a
greater rate than those who use violent means.
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the state' s level of democracy and economic development (Mousseau 2001;
Rummel 1997) .

3.3.3

Summary

So, what do we really know about which state factors affect the likelihood
of experiencing terrorism? Autocracies have a greater chance of causing
terrorism to flourish but also have a better chance of keeping it under

control. W hile democracies tend not to spawn their own terrorist groups,

they do have a greater problem with controlling. terrorism once it begins.

Furthermore, the openness of the liberal democratic state allows non-native
terrorist groups to organize within their territory.
A free press is positively correlated to terrorism for one fundamental
reason: the press advertises the terror event to the population. T his is one
of the necessary components of successful terrorism. True, there are other
means of transmitting the terror, but the free press does it with ease.
Beyond regime characteristics, we know that several demographic vari
ables are positively correlated with terrorism; among them are poverty and

inequality. T his finding should not be surprising, as these two correlates
are also indicators of what causes groups to resort to terror, and of what

causes individuals to resort to terror. We also know that levels of modern

ization and of urbanization are positively correlated with terrorism.

These latter findings seem to conflict with a body of research in the
literature holding that the well-educated, middle-class members of society
tend to be the terrorists. Neither body of research is incorrect. T his latter
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research either refers to the leaders of the terrorist movements (Hudson
1999) or to specific terrorist groups (Krueger and Maleckova 2003) . Those
driving and directing the movements do tend to be wealthier and better
educated than the foot soldiers of the movement. However, the leaders
must be able to find those members of society willing to risk death in the
name of "the cause." Those willing often fit the former description prof
fered above. However, let it be said that these are not empirical rules.
Exceptions exist. Thus, while relative deprivation may be a force for ter
rorism in some sectors of the world, the rich and the middle class compose
majorities in others {Hudson 1999) .

3 .4

System Level

Beyond the individual, group, and state levels, there are certain factors at
the system level that influence terrorism. There are four major forces in
the world that affect terrorism. These are the new world order, the growing
North-South economic divide, globalization, and other terrorist events.

3.4. 1

The New World Order

The phrase 'new world order' is neither new nor well-defined. New world
orders were created in 1 7 7 6 (American Revolution) , 17 89 (French Revolu
tion) , 191 8 (Treaty of Versailles), 1941 (Neuropa, the Nazi vision of the
new Europe) , 1945 (World Socialism

a la the Soviet Union) , and so forth.

Every time there is a revolution or a major change in the world, the results
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are usually termed a new world order. The new world order of most rele
vance to this current discussion is the one caused by the fall of the Berlin
Wall - the end of the Cold War. This new world order is characterized
by two things: unipolarity on the world scene and a new faith placed in
international organizations like the United Nations.
The Fall of the Soviet Union and the Rise of the Unipolar World. Re
search on the effects of the end of the Cold War on terrorism is not plentiful.
Two related factors come into play here. The first is the direct effects of
the Soviet Union on world-wide terrorism. The second is the effect of po
larity on terrorism. Conspiracy theorists in the West during the Cold War
often placed the blame for outbreaks of terrorism at the feet of the Soviet
Union. However, testing that hypothesis directly required data from the
Soviet Union that it was obviously unwilling to share with researchers in
the West. However, it could be tested indirectly.
Indirect tests, usually searching f or linkages between Super Power diplo
matic crises during the Cold War and terror events, have actually supported
the hypothesis (O'Brien 1996). Furthermore, the decline in terrorist ac
tivities immediately after the end of the Cold War also supported the
contention that the Soviet Union was involved in funding terrorists, the
current increase in terror activity not withstanding {Enders and Sandler
1999).
The United Nations. One of the original purposes of the United Nations
was to bring the countries of the world together so that communication and
cooperation could flourish. W hile the UN record on both of these hoped
for results has been spotty throughout its history, the constituent states
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have been able to cooperate on terrorism only after the September 11, 2 001
terrorist attacks (Ward 2003) . What is the reason for this newfound push
for cooperation?

Prior to 11 September 2 001, international instruments target
ing specific criminal acts were adopted to deal with terrorism,
and Security Council counter-terrorism measures, which were
not mandatory, went unheeded. Post 11 September, the coun

cil adopted Resolution 1373 (2001) under chapter VII of the

charter, setting out certain mandatory measures to prevent
and suppress international terrorism, including reporting to the
Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) on actions taken to im
plement the resolution. (Ward 2003: 289)
In addition to the new mandatory regulations, support organizations were
created and funds were made available to help the states meet the new

regulations. Thus, it was a combination of mandatory regulations, institu

tional support, and available funds (Bantekas 2 003; Rosand 2003).

3.4.2

North-South Divide

As mentioned earlier, at the state level, income disparities have the ability
to produce terrorists. The same appears to be true at the system level. The
poor countries are beginning to feel isolated, frustrated, and 'relatively de

prived', to use Gurr's term. The 'North-South' divide increases the chance

that the individuals in these states resort to terror in order t o create a more
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equitable system {Ehrlich and Liu 2002; Malone and Thakur 2003) . The
developed N orth is beginning to recognize this problem, although steps
taken so far to remedy the situation may be more aggravating to the pro�

lem than helpful {Rogers 1997). In fact, there is some evidence that there
is a second factor currently at work. Because the North-South divide has
existed for so long, the South has an image of the North as economic en
emy. In other words, both the divide and the image must be eliminated
before the divide can be abolished (Herrmann and Fischerkeller 1995).

3 .4.3

Globalization

"Globalisation is a political phenomenon characterised by the weakening
of mediating institutions and the direct confrontation between individuals
and global forces" (Guehenno 1998: 5) . It is characterized by the increase
in interactions between su�governmental units between countries. Two
aspects are important for this study of terrorism: the movement of money
and the movement of images.

International Banking System. As stated earlier, terrorism is inexpen

sive. Bombs cost little when compared to their effects. However, money
allows organizations to thrive and commit more grandiose schemes. For na

tionalistic terror organizations, this funding often comes from expatriates.

Much of the IRA funding came from the Irish in America (Briand 2002).
One of the main foci of the USA PATRIOT Act was to curtail funding of
international terrorist organizations. Furthermore, in the aftermath of the
September 1 1 , 2001 attack, the UN passed several resolutions making it
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more difficult for terrorist organizations to move their funds through the
international banking system (Rosand 2003). The ease in which funds flow
between countries is also a correlate of terrorism (Arquilla, Ronfeldt, and
Zanini 1999; Bantekas 2003 ).

International News Media. The news media is no longer necessarily
a local entity. Nor is it solely a state entity. The news media is now
an international entity. The free international press allows people in one
country to know about events in another. Thus, the reach of terror is
greater ( Arquilla, et al. 1999).
One of the difficulties ethnic groups have seeking independence is that
they are much smaller and less powerful than their containing state. The
international news media helps reduce this difference. If that group is able
to be prominently featured in the press, they are better able to obtain
international support to encourage their state to accede to their demands.
Although this has yet to be tested universally, preliminary case studies
support the conclusion (Burton 1985; Nash 1995).

3.4.4

Summary

The systemic level is the least studied of the four. This is mainly because
it changes less often, and it is more difficult to consciously alter than the
other levels. However, we do know some things about the factors at the
systemic level. First, the period after the Cold War was marked with a
decrease in terrorist activity, because the major state sponsor, the Soviet
Union, no longer existed. Second, we do know that the growing wealth
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disparities between the states are causing a tension in the system that
increases terrorist activity. International banking allows funds to move
from donors to terror groups. Finally, the international media makes more
powerful the activities of the terrorists for the exact reasons that state-level
media does; it involves a greater audience in the actual acts of terror, thus
increasing the probability that international pressure will be brought to
bear on the containing state.

3.5

Chapter Summary

In this chapter, we examined all four levels of analysis with respect to the
factors of general violence, political violence, ethnic violence, and terrorism.
Inclusion of ethnic violence, political violence, and general violence was
done to increase the amount of information available, for the theories on
terrorism are fewer in number than those on ethnic, political, or general
violence. It is also logical to assume that many of those factors influencing
a group to resort to terrorism are the same as those just getting them to
use violence. However, Ross { 1993) makes an excellent point when he notes
that there is no a priori reason to assume they are the same. There may
be a fundamentally different mechanism at work in terrorism than in other
forms of violence. After all, we already know that terrorism and guerilla
war are fundamentally different because of the effects of land acquisition on
tactics. Successful practitioners of guerilla wars have known that terrorism
is anathema to their goals; it turns the people, one of your most important
commodities, against you (Guevara 1998 (1961] ; Zedong 1989 (1961]).
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Chapter 4
The Pressure Model of
Terrorism
All science is either physics or
stamp collecting.
Ernest Rutherford, as quoted in
Birks (1962)

�ss ( 1993) asserts that there exist three basic categorizations of ter
rorism models: structural, psychological, and rational choice. Structural
models focus on the configuration of group-, state-, and system-level forms
and entities and how each affects the propensity of a terrorism outbreak
(Crenshaw 1981; Ross 1993; Ward 2003; Weinberg 1991). Psychological
models focus on the mindsets of the individual and what terrorist actions
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require of the person (Gurr 1970; Ruby 2002; Stirnimann 2002; Weath
erston 2003) . Rational choice models assume people, groups, and states

are single actors who act solely to maximize the utility of their outcomes
(Bueno de Mesquita 2005b, 2005c; Post 2000; Schmid and Graaf 1982). 1

' Of these, the first is best developed in the political science terrorism
literature, as it allows both for easier observation and for greater prescrip
tions. However, any attempt to model a higher level of analysis without
using a lower level will necessarily lead to an incomplete theory. This
is as true in the hard sciences as it is in the social sciences. W ith that
said, however, partial theories do remain helpful. One can use and test
and prescribe from the theory of evolution without fully understanding the

biochemistry underlying it. Most subfields of chemistry make sense even
in the absence of an intimate understanding of atomic and nuclear physics.

However, chemistry is still better understood as a whole if the physical
rules for atomic and subatomic motion are known and understood.
Current theories of terrorism either focus on a single level of analysis or

append causes from two or more levels without providing a mechanism for

such an appending. As such, the terrorism model I propose goes beyond a

simple structural descriptive theory and places its foundation in the actions

of people, thus providing the mechanics for coalescing the individual-level

rules to higher-order aggregations. The Pressure Model of Terrorism does

not necessarily overturn established observations and theories of terrorism,
1 There is a growing literature in which the interaction between the individual ter
rorist and the other levels is being more fully developed, primarily in a rational choice
framework. Ethan Bueno de Mesquita {2005b, 2005c) appears to be serving as the
vanguard of this movement, especially in using formal modeling techniques.
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rather it shows how the four levels fit together and how the individual level
affects and is affected by the other levels - it provides a framework for
understanding how the current theories fit together. As such, it potentially
allows for a greater level of prediction.

4. 1

Struct ural Theories

As structural models are the best developed theories, it behooves us to
examine them, for they share a common set of factor types and a common
set of weaknesses. There is a tendency in the field to categorize the causes
of terrorism into permissive causes and precipitant causes (Crenshaw 1981;
Ross 1993). 2 Permissive causes (a.k.a. necessary causes) are those that al
low terrorism to take place. Precipitant causes (a.k.a. trigger events) are
those that provide the impetus for terrorism to occur. Permissive causes
are steady-state or background conditions, while precipitants are sudden
events. Ross (1993) supplies three permissive causes in his model: geo
graphical location, type of political system, and level of modernization.
Crenshaw (1981) emphasizes modernization, urbanization, social facilita
tion, society's condoning of terrorist actions, lack of political opportunity,

elite dissatisfaction, passivity of the masses, and the government's inability
or unwillingness to prevent terrorism as permissive causes of terrorism. 3

Ernst Haas (1997} also uses this structure to explain outbreaks of nationalism.
things missing from this discussion are poverty and education. Neither Cren
shaw nor Ross suggests that either is linked to terrorism. This is in accord with empirical
evidence from European left-wing terrorist groups (Russell and Miller 1977) and from
Palestinian groups (Krueger and Maleckova 2003}. However, as we will see, it is not
necessarily the poverty level of the state that matters, it is the poverty level of the
2

3 T wo
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The second category of causes, precipitant, is the sudden events that
provide the impetus for a group to initiate the use of terrorism in their cam
paign. Ross {1993) presents seven categories of precipitant causes: social,
cultural, and historical facilitation, organizational split and development,
presence of other forms of unrest, support, counter-terrorist organization
failure, availability of weapons and explosives, and grievances. Crenshaw
{1981) concurs that grievances are the most important precipitant cause,
but lists government use of unexpected extreme force as a close second.
Looking closely at the precipitant causes shows the first weakness of
these structural theories - the precipitant causes are not necessarily point
events. That is, they may also be considered steady -state conditions, es

pecially if the original event did not immediately trigger an outbreak of
terrorism. The Irish have received massive levels of support throughout

the years, and this level of support did allow the IRA to have a terror
ist campaign, but support was not a single event, it was a background
condition (Briand 2002) .
A second weakness of these structural theories is that the grievances

may also be steady-state conditions. The loss of South Tyrol to Italy at the
close of World War I did not result in a terrorist campaign at that time.

South Tyrolean terrorism did not start until 1 961, more than 40 years
after the initial grievance of ethnic separation ( Alcock 1 970; Steininger

2003). Why did it not immediately result in a terror campaign? Why did
the South Tyroleans wait until after separation from Austria, until after
group in relation to the rest of the state. Furthermore, these two studies do not restrict
themselves to ethnonational groups.
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the world depression of the 1930s, until after the Fascists took power and
denationalized them, and until after two failures of an Italian policy of
autonomy for the South Tyrol before they began their terror campaign?
Quite clearly, in this case, the initial grievance was not a trigger event, it
was a background condition.
This is not to say that sudden events cannot lead to groups initiating
terrorism. The ETA was relatively calm until Franco began the forced

Castilianization of Spain, including the Basque homeland in the Hegoalde
(Collins 1990; da Silva 197 5; Laitin and Gomez 1992). It is to say, rather,

that precipitant events may not be as precipitant as the structural mod
elers suggest. Additionally, much of the evidence suggesting the existence

of precipitant causes is completely ex post facto ; that is, only after looking
back at the start of the terror campaign are we able to ascertain the spe

cific precipitant event. Furthermore, little investigation is made of those
precipitant events that did not - the dogs that did not bark. The forced
Castilianization of Spain also affected the Catalans, the Galacians, and
the Roma, yet none of these other ethnonational groups resorted to terror
ism. Also, while France was experiencing general unrest during the 1970s,
their Basques did not begin a terror campaign even though their brethren

across the Pyrenees were deep in the midst of one. 4 This demonstrates
a fundamental weakness in the current reliance on precipitant events to
model terrorism - the unclear difference between precipitant events and
non-precipitant events.

4 However, the French Basques did support the Spanish Basques by hiding their
leadership and by providing a base of support (Council on Foreign Relations 2004).
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The third weakness is that researching precipitant events requires a
bit of selective analysis. The move of the Provisional Irish Republican
Army (PIRA) to terrorism in 197 0 illustrates this point well. The Trou
bles in Northern Ireland began when the Catholic civil rights marches were
violently rebuffed by the entrenched Protestants - or did they? The Pro
visional IRA initiated its terror campaign in response to the Official IRA's
failure to act in the face of increasingly violent attacks on Catholics in
Derry, or did they? Was the precipitating event the Battle of the Bogside
or the Burntollet Ambush? Was there even a single precipitating event, or
did the terror campaign come about as a result of a steady, gradual, step
wise increase in violence? A read of the history of Ireland during this time
period supports the contention that the Provisional IRA terror campaign
was merely the next step in the escalating level of civil violence. ( Coogan
2002; Feeney 2002)
Finally, even though Ross ( 1993) decries the absence of a theoretical
structure for terrorism, he continues the trend by offering only a superfi
cial model - one that provides surface-level observables without a single

underlying theory to tie all of the hypothesized factors together. While he

does offer a series of rationales for the factors he selects, he does not string

them together in a coherent manner with a general explanation of why
certain factors are more important than others. While not a weakness of
the use of precipitant events in a theory, per se, it does underline the need
to provide a framework from which the different factors can be gleaned a
priori, rather than after the fact.
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Clearly, a more general model needs to be created - one that reduces
reiiance on precipitant (or trigger) events as causes. The new model must
base itself, first and foremost, on the individual, as the individual is the
one committing the terror acts. The model I create below does just this.
At this point, certain presuppositions need to be explicitly stated. The
proposed theory rests on a weak rational actor model -. people act as
though they are rationally acting to maximize their benefits. This does
not necessarily mean that people consciously calculate the best action with
perfect knowledge of all alternatives. It merely holds that they act as
though they do. Part of the calculus for maximizing the outcome for any
actor is cost-benefit analysis - one action is preferred to a second if the
difference between the benefit and the cost f or the first action is greater
than for the second. This does not assume that all people place the same
value on the same values; salience most assuredly varies from person to
person and from time to time (Gurr 1970; Hechter 1986; Walt 1999).

4.2

The Pressure Model of Terrorism

The proposed model offers a mechanism for how factors in one level of
analysis affect those in another. It also places the locus of action at the
individual level. To use a physics analogy, the individuals are the particles
and the rules under which they operate are the forces. Forces in physics
depend on the particles, just as the movement of the particles depends
on the forces involved. This physical science analogy can be clearly seen
in both the agent-structure debate in International Relations (Carlesnaes
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1992; Dessler 1989; Wendt 1987) and in constructivist theory, which asserts
that people are a product of their environments just as they alter their
environments - one cannot know about one without knowing about the
other (Kivimaki 2001; Price 2004).
In physics, the particle is the actor - everything is defined in terms of
the particle and what it can do. If I wish to continue this physics analogy
for my model, my theory should be constructed in a similar vein. And that
is what I do, starting with the individual actor - the particle.

4. 2 . 1

Pressure

Psychology studies the individual (the particle) and attempts to uncover
the rules under which the individual acts (the associated forces). In the psy
chology literature, the fundamental basis of action is the stimulus-response
dyad (Freedheim 2003; Gardiner 1974). A neutral actor receives an exter
nal impetus and produces an associated response based on that stimulus.
Different stimuli may produce different responses. Identical stimuli, under
identical circumstances, produce identical responses for a given actor. 5 A
single stimulus produces a biological imperative for action, a pressure to
act. A greater number of coherent stimuli create a higher action pressure,
while incoherent stimuli do not necessarily combine to increase the pressure
to act. A greater action pressure increases the probability that an action
5This forms the basis for rationality of actions in all types of life, not just in humans.
Plants behave predictably because the rules governing their responses are well known.
As one increases complexity in the studied organism, one also increases the complexity
of the behavioral rules. The number of items to be considered in a cost-benefit analysis
grows as the complexity of the organism grows.
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is taken. This last statement can be understood in terms of cost-benefit
analysis. A higher action pressure increases the internal costs of not acting,
thus increasing the benefit payoff merely for acting. If the pressure to act
continues to increase, it will eventually increase to the level of overcoming
the other associated costs - resulting in an action.
To tie this in to terrorism, the stimuli are the external experiences of the
person. Each stimulus encourages the person to act in one way or another,
depending on that single stimulus. As individuals have different sets of
experiences, the preferred action may differ from person to person, but all
responses are from the same set of possible responses. Greater coherence
among the stimuli - the more often the person receives the same stimulus
or similar stimuli suggesting the same action - increases the likelihood
that the person will react. Thus, being pulled over once by the police for
no apparent reason elicits a much smaller motive for action than repeated
infringements. An economy that enters recession repeatedly increases the
pressure of the individuals to act against the government with a greater
probability than an economy that slightly drops into recession rarely. A
state that passes ethnicity-based exclusionary laws repeatedly increases
the action pressure of those excluded more than in a state with a long,

continuous history of strong civil liberties.

Thus, at the individual level, the amount of action pressure present is

directly, and positively, related to the probability of the individual acting.

The probability of action can be reduced by increasing the costs associated
with a specific action, but eventually action will result if the action pressure
continues to increase; according to weU-established psychological theory,
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everyone has a breaking point, just as any balloon will burst if enough air
is pumped into it (Biderman 1960; Farber, Harlow, and West 1957).
Regimes that do not allow the pressure to gradually reduce itself in myr
iad ways increase the likeJihood that the balloon of pressure will violently
burst. This suggests that established democracies, with well-established
political processes, have a lower probability of experiencing the bursting
balloon phenomenon. The pressure to act by the people is kept small in
comparison to the rupture point of the political system.

4. 2 . 2

Force

The physical concept of force also has an analogy in the Pressure Model of
Terrorism. According to physicists and chemists, force is more fundamen
tal than pressure; that is, pressure is usually defined in terms of force mean pressure,

P, is the amount of force applied per unit of area, as shown

in Equation 4. 1. This is equivalent to defining force in terms of pressure
and area. In terrorism terms, if we define force as the total amount of force

applied to a regime to change, then it is clear that the mean pressure in
Equation 4.2 refers to the action pressure described above and the area in
Equation 4.2 refers to the number of people affected by the action pres

sure. Thus pressure corresponds to the effects of the individual, while force
-· corres.ponds to the effects of that pressure on the aggregate grouping.

p -

F
A
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(4. 1 )

F - PxA

(4.2)

F -

(4.3)
frPopulation

There is no reason to believe that the action pressure will be constant
across the population. Thus, the total force on the regime to change is
merely the sum of the action pressures felt by the individual persons ruled
by that regime (Equation 4.3). Whether or not the regime actually changes
depends on its own cost-benefit analysis of the events as to whether an
action will net a reduction in oppositional force or not. That is why a
populous state has such a high level of inertia; large states have more
citizens to consider in their decisional calculi.
One final note before moving on to examining the consequences of the
model - the distribution of action pressures. Areas of higher pressure
behave differently than areas of lower pressure. In meteorology, areas of
high pressure result in few clouds and relatively extreme temperatures,
whereas areas of low pressure result in many clouds and relatively mod
erate temperatures. Determining the average barometric pressure for the
entire state helps little in the way of forecasting the weather. Only when
the pressure for a smaller geographical region is known can a reasonably
accurate forecast be made. The same is true of action pressure. Knowing
the average pressure of action for an entire state tells little by way of be
ing able to predict an outcome. However, knowing regional average action
pressures allows better forecasting. If all of the action pressure exists in a
small area in the state, the chance of regional action is much greater than
if that pressure were uniformly distributed.
93

For instance, and without calculation, it is apparent that the United
Kingdom in the 1970s had a relatively low average pressure of action. The
Cornish were content. The Welsh were content. The English were content.
Even the Scots were content. The only area of high action pressure was
Northern Ireland, specifically the urban centers of Belfast, Derry, and Por
tadown. If we only looked at the average for the entire state, there would
be little expectation that a terrorist campaign could have occurred. It is
only when we increase the resolution of our scrutiny that we can identify
the areas that would be of higher probability of terrorism - the Northern
Ireland urban centers. In short, terrorist activity is fundamentally a local
phenomenon, even though that local phenomenon is affected by broader

- in a geographic sense - factors at both the state and the system level.

4.3

Theoretical Consequences

The above model offers several consequences, most of which are described

in the literature. However, some of the consequences d9 conflict with some

areas of the existing literature. The major strength of the theory is that

it gives a unified, behavioralist explanation for group-, state-, and system
level factors.

4.3. 1

Group-level Consequences

Ethnic Competition. Medrano {1994) provides overviews of the two com
peting theories of ethnic competition: Ethnic Competition Theory and
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Ethnic Segregation Theory. The first states that conflict levels will in
crease if identifiable ethnic groups compete for the same economic and
political opportunities. The latter holds that ethnic conflict will increase
when the ethnic groups are kept separate as they will have a greater chance

of forming a solid identity that they are better able to put at opposition

to the "other" . They" cannot both be true in every case, as they contradict

each other to a certain extent. The Ethnic Segregation Theory suggests

that mixing the competing ethnic groups should reduce the number and

extent of ethnic conflict, whereas the Ethnic Competition T heory suggests

the opposite (Hechter 1999; Olzak 1992; Tilly 1991) . The Pressure Model

of Terrorism agrees with Ethnic Segregation Theory. To see this, let us
examine the Ethnic Competition Theory in light of the proposed model.

The key concept in the PMT is action pressure - the pressure an
individual feels to act in response to a series of external stimuli, especially to
perceived inequalities. A greater inequality, especially on the more salient
issues, increases the probability that an action will be taken to correct that
inequality. These inequalities can be political, economic, or judicial. The
greater the number of these inequalities felt by an individual, the higher
the chance that individual will act. Moving from the individual level to

the group level, a group with a higher average action pressure will have a
greater probability of acting in response to those accumulated inequities.

The Ethnic Competition Theory asserts that when groups are mixed

and competing for the same limited resources violent conflict has a higher
probability of erupting. The PMT disagrees with this conclusion. W hen
ethnic groups compete for the same resources on a local level, mixing of
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the ethnic groups occurs. That is, they interact with each other to a
much greater extent than they would were they separate ( Jenkins 1986;
cf Belanger and Pinard 1991). This increased interaction decreases the

probability that like-minded individuals with higher than average action
pressures will come together. Thus, while small numbers of individuals may

have high action pressures in the Ethnic Competition Theory, they are less
likely to form a group. The actions performed to reduce the pressure to
act will tend to be individual actions and not group actions. Furthermore,
increased mixing of ethnic groups dilutes the total pressure of action. With

out the close aggregation of similar individuals with high action pressures, a
conflict campaign has a much lower probability of starting. This conclusion

is in agreement with Galam {2003) and others (Crenshaw 1981; Douglass
and Zulaika 1990; Funes 1998; Ross 1993) , who demonstrate that terrorist

groups (or any illicit group, for that matter) require large contiguous areas
of support to operate.
This is not to say that neighborhoods are too small to create such
groups. On the contrary, the evidence is quite clear that neighborhoods
are of sufficient size to allow clustering to occur. The Troubles of North

ern Ireland centered on the ethnic neighborhoods - both Protestant and

Catholic. The parades of the Orange Order and their associated groups

purposely wended their way through the Catholic neighborhoods of Porta
down, Londonderry, and Belfast (Coogan 2002) .

The Ethnic Segregation Theory holds that separating ethnic groups in
creases the chance of violent action between them (Friedrichs 1998; Hechter
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1 978; Medrano 1 994) . The Pressure Model of Terrorism supports this as
sertion. Concentrating an ethnic group allows any action pressure to be
common to the entire group. Thus, if one member has a high pressure to
act as a result of some inequality, there is a much higher likelihood that

many around him do as well. Thus, the entire region will tend to have a

higher action pressure. Regions with higher action pressures tend to be
more conflict-prone.
Relative Deprivation. Gurr (1970) explains that the primary reason
men rebel is that they perceive an increasing difference between what they
have and what they think they deserve. 6 This is moderated or exacerbated
through the salience level of the issue. Issues closer to the core of the

person have a higher salience than those further away. Thus, incursions

on a person's religion have a higher salience in much of the world than do
incursions on driving rights. Support for this comes from the fact that no
terrorist organization has yet to be founded on a call for driving rights,
yet there are many who call for religious freedom for themselves (or a
crusade against others) . Furthermore, according to Gurr, this increasing
difference between expected and actual is all that counts, not what causes
the difference to increase. Using the terms of the P MT, relative deprivation

increases action pressure. The difference between the expected levels and

the real levels directly correspond to the pressure a person feels to act to

reduce the level. The salience of the issue acts as a multiplier in that highly

The theory of relative deprivation did not begin with Gurr, however. Davis {1959}
and Runciman { 1966} both based their earlier work on Stouffer, et al. {1950}, which
was an in-depth examination of the effects of entering the Army from civilian life.
6
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salie�t issues are more effective at increasing the pressure, while less salient
issues require a much higher relative difference to effect a change.

4.3.2

State-Level Consequences

Democracies. One of the paradoxes about current research is that democ
racies are supposed to both have lower rates of terrorism than autocracies
and higher rates of terrorism than autocracies. Democracies are to have
lower levels of terrorism than autocracies because there are many other
options for change in society than violent action. The Social Contract and
the Rule of Law also retard violent actions in a democracy, as does polit
ical socialization. 7 Democracies are also supposed to have higher levels of
terrorism than non-democracies because democracies are more open, thus
allowing for terrorist groups to freely travel through the state, and because
democracies are less likely to be able to fully suppress a terrorist group
because of democratic norms and structures in the state (Gurr 1988, 1990;
Ross 1993).
The Pressure Model of Terrorism allows for and explains these conflict
ing tendencies in democracies while keeping the actions tied to the actors.
The democracy in itself does not increase the level of action pressure. It
only affects the cost-benefit calculus taken by the individuals. The demo
cratic judicial structures of the state reduce the cost of action because the
7Crenshaw

(1981 } and others (Gurr 1979, 1988, 1990; Ross 1993; Turk 1982} note
this pacifistic effect of democracies, yet they conclude that democracies should still have
higher levels of terrorism within its boundaries.
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state follows a set of well-defined procedures resulting in a well-known up
per penalty for the action. The highest penalty in a liberal democracy is
the loss of an individual life. Autocracies can inflict much higher levels
of punishment, including communal capital punishment. Saddam Hus
sein's chemical action against the Kurds and the Shi'ites demonstrates this
clearly as do the bulldozer responses of Israel against the Palestinian sui
cide bombers (Pape 2005). 8 Higher costs to action require a higher action
pressure before actions seem cost effective.
The openness of a liberal democracy also allows for those individuals
with higher levels of action pressure to find each other more easily, thus
possibly creating a localized region of high pressure. Repressive autoc
racies can either keep their citizens from interacting to any great degree,
thus directly restricting freedom of association, or they can seed the pop
ulation with government informers, thus indirectly restricting freedom of
association through a chilling action. According to the model, freedom of
association is a positive correlation to terrorist activity, as found in lib
eral democracies (Bueno de Mesquita 2005a). However, so are inefficient
restrictions on it, such as found in anocracies. Strong, highly organized
autocratic regimes can effectively keep domestic terror cells from forming.
Democracies and anocracies cannot (Crenshaw 1981 ; Galam 2003; Ross
1993).

8 While the example of Israel does seem to contradict the assertion that liberal democ

racies cannot impose communal punishment, the categorization of Israel as a liberal
democracy is problematic. While they are a liberal democracy within Israel proper, the
occupation of the Palestinian territories is not within the tradition of liberal democracies
(Pape 2005).
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Any healthy political system has mechanisms in place for interest ag
gregation (Almond 1 95 8, 1966; Shambaugh 1996). The political openness
of democracies allows for interest groups and political parties to serve this
function. In fact, in the state with the highest level of terrorism, interest
groups flourish. 9 How does the PMT explain this paradox? Quite simply
these interest groups serve to unite those with similar positions in society.
That is, they allow those feeling high pressure to act to come together, thus
increasing the regional level of pressure. 10 Higher levels of regional pressure
lead to higher probabilities of violent conflict. Thus, while it appears that
interest groups and political parties serve as retardants on violent conflict,
that is only true for as long as they are able to reduce the action pressure
on the individuals within the group. Thus, an interest group that fails to
get any of its most salient problems resolved has a much higher chance of
resorting to terrorism.
Furthermore, should the action pressure gradient within the group be
come great enough, i.e. the differences between two factions within the
group increase to too great a level, a schism may occur. Such splits result

in two internally-cohesive groups, one using legal-political means to achieve
their goals, the other using illicit-extra-political means. This has been ob

served (Douglass and Zulaika 1 990; Lacquer 1 97 7; Ross 1 991 ; Weinberg
1 991) . Such a split has been seen in the reactions of Hamas and Islamic
Jihad in response to Israel's overtures toward the PLO (Bueno de Mesquita
9 That

would be the United States.
the term "region" refers to a group of people connected in some manner, the
geographical definition of region remains the most important factor. However, with the
increasing importance of the Internet, virtual connections will become more important
in the future. We are already seeing evidence of this (Galam 2003).
1 0 While
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2005a) . Such a split also occurred at the start of The Troubles in Northern
Ireland. The membership of the "Official" (or "Original" ) IRA felt differ
ent amounts of pressure to act. When the leadership of the IRA failed to
act in a manner consistent with the wishes of several members, those mem
bers split off in 196 9 to form their own group - the Provisional IRA. It is
also evident that the split had more than just a passing influence on the
latter group's move towards terrorism {Coogan 2002; Feeney 2002; Murray
and Tonge 2005). 11
For this reason, the creation of a political party out of a terrorist or
ganization may actually increase the violence of the terrorist organization,
rather than decrease it, as the schism removes the more moderate faction
from the group. 12 A similar result would naturally occur when the state
uses a conciliation strategy; those more prone to use the political process
would accept the offer, whereas the more extreme element would reject it
out of hand, thus creating a political schism and a group more intent on
using terror {Bueno de Mesquita 2005a).
Thus, while democracies do not, per se, increase the action pressure on
a group, the structures in a democracy reduce the cost of the associated
1 1 Furthermore,

two additional splinterings occurred in IRA history. The Continuity
IRA and the Real IRA both splintered from the Provisional IRA. The Continuity IRA
formed in 1994 as a response to the Provisional IRA entering into a ceasefire with the
British. The Real IRA formed in 1998 as a reaction to the Provisional IRA entering
into the negotiations that resulted in the Good Friday Accords of 1998. Both of these
two splinter factions were more violent than the Provisional IRA of the time ( Coogan
2002; Feeney 2002; O'Ballance 1981; Stevenson 1996).
1 2 For a general exploration of these effects already in the literature, see Weinberg
(1991). For specific examples, see Coogan (2002) for the Catholics of Northern Ireland,
Jenkins (1986) for the Jurassiens of Switzerland and Douglass and Zulaika ( 1990) for
the Basques of Spain.
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Table 4.1: Cross tabulation of regime type vs. incidence of terrorism in
Western Europe, 1945-2000.
democracy mid-realm autocracy
terrorism that year
26
23
78
(4.5)
(1.5)
(1.7)
no terrorism that year
1720
1656
1343
(98 . 3)
(98.5)
(95.5)
total state-years
1734
1746
1366

total
127
4719

4846

Notes: Numbers in parentheses represent column percents. Democracies
are significantly more prone to outbreaks of terrorism than the other two
types of regimes (x 2 = 37.41; dF = 2; p � 0.001). The regime type data is
from Polity IV (v2002), whereas the terrorism data is from Minorities at
Risk (vl .03). Regimes are democracies if they score +6 or higher on the
POLITY2 variable; autocracies, -6 or lower; and mid-realm, between -5 and
5, inclusive.
action. It is this reduced cost that explains why democracies have a higher
incidence rate of terrorist acts than other regime types (Table 4.1).

4.3.3

System-Level Effects

Globalization. What effects should globalization have on terrorism propen

sity according to the Pressure Model of Terrorism? Where democratic
structures and norms only reduced the costs associated with action, glob
alization both raises the action pressure and reduces the associated costs.
It increases the pressure to act by increasing apparent economic inequali
ties, employment stresses, and cultural and religious pressures. It reduces
costs by increasing the flow of ideas, persons, and money. Why?
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Globalization is the increase of linkages between sub-state and non
state actors (Cha 2000).13 It is not an event, but a trend. Some liken it
to medievalism, in that state sovereignty is no longer an absolute and that
overlapping domains of dominion and spheres of suzerainty exist (Kobrin
1998) . The primary effect of globalization is change. People are faced with
new ideas. They must deal with new employment emphases. They must
confront new incursions into their core (Kellner 2002). The state is unable
to fully moderate these incursions as another effect of globalization is the
flattening of the state system, That is, the number of institutions between
the individual and the system are effectively reduced, thus the state is
unable to shield the individual from the vagaries of the world (Farazmand
1999).
For economists, globalization is the process by which the goal of a
completely integrated world market is achieved. It is driven by private
interests, not state actors (Julius 1997). The effect on the state and its
citizens vary depending on the costs of integration and the wealth of the
state. When integration costs are high, that is when the costs of trans
porting manufactured goods across state borders are high; each state has
extensive manufacturing and industry to meet domestic needs. A utarky
is possible in this stage. At a certain critical transportation cost, how

ever, a core-periphery system forms. Those states at the periphery suffer
a decline in manufacturing production because they are unable to reduce

their transportation costs to compete with those states at the core. Core
states flourish because they are capable of transporting cheaply enough
13Interdependence, on the other hand, is the increase in linkages between state actors.
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to overcome their (possibly) higher manufacturing costs to economically
compete with periphery states. Reducing the transportation costs further
inverts this; extremely low transportation costs allow the poorer states to
compete in a more favorable environment, 14 thus resulting in manufactur
ing and employment losses for the core states (Axford 1995; Krugman and
Venables 1995). Evidence of this third stage of globalization is clear. The
cun:ent trend in outsourcing American jobs to third-world countries is a
result of inexpensive transportation costs. Transportation does not neces
sarily refer to physically transporting an item from one place to another.
It also refers to the virtual transportation of goods and services. 15
That is globalization. That also explains why it increases the stress
on individuals.

During the second phase, the wealth gap between the

periphery and the core increases. During the third phase, the core states
lose their market share. Thus, in both stages states feel economic pressures.
What does the PMT say about globalization? If the state feels economic
pressure, so too does its citizens. According to the theory, should that
pressure be distributed unif ormly across the citizens, not much will happen.
The citizens may call for the ouster of the current leadership. They may
protest the unequal distribution of wealth in the world. But, as there are
no pockets of intense action pressure, terrorism will not occur. 16

14 The periphery states' very low manufacturing costs are primarily due to low ambient

income levels in the states.
15 0utsourcing computer support calls to India is an example of virtual transportation.
16If, however, the core-periphery income divide becomes too extreme, large pockets of
high action pressure form in opposition to the state system. As this research concerns
itself only with ethnic terrorism against states, this is beyond the scope of this work.
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However, if certain identifiable groups receive the lion's share of the
pressure, they will likely act. When those identifiable groups are an iden
tifiable ethnic group, this economic stress will be identified as a "concrete
grievance" against the state ( Crenshaw 1981). Such evidence comes from
Latin America scholars who correlated economic trends with increased
state instability and political violence (Booth 1991; Jenkins and Bond
2001; Lindenberg 1990) . However, this finding is not merely a feature of
Latin American political systems; economic stress, especially when it oc
curs along ethnic lines, is a major factor in causing terrorism (Krippendorff
1979).
The history of Sardinian independence demonstrates this point well.
The history of the unification of Italy was the story of the prosperous north
repressing the impoverished south - Sardinia included (Gooch 2001) .
Thus, even though the Italian state offered Sardinia industry and man
ufacturing enterprises upon which to found the economic strength of Italy,
those industries were environmentally dangerous, those manufacturing j obs
were always fewer than promised, and the profits from those businesses
went to continental Italy - not insular Sardinia. The result of this disil
lusionment with capitalist Italy was the growing connection between the
Sardinian separatists and the socialist Red Brigades in the 1970s. The

result was a short-lived campaign of terror in Sardinia during the years
1977-7 8 (Krippendorff 1979) . The Sardinian example demonstrates eco

nomic differentials between one identifiable group and a second can serve
as a catalyst for violent action.
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Thus, the effects of globalization on the individual both increase �he
action pressures felt and decrease the costs of acting. The increases come
from changes to the economic structure, increases in unemployment, and
cultural pressures. The decreases come from open borders allowing funds,
weapons, and people to be easily transferred.

4.4

Chapt�r Summary

This chapter formulated the Pressure Model of Terrorism and explored
some of its consequences vis-a-vis the existing literature. Quite simply,
the model is a rational choice model containing a mechanism to explain
the actions of the aggregating levels - group, state, and system - in
terms of the individual level. In other words, while other researchers have
provided rationale as to what affects the probability of terrorism at the
different levels, this model ties them all together in a simpler manner,
while providing predictions that go beyond what we already have.
The basis of the model is the pressure of action felt by the individual.
A higher action pressure produces a greater cost of not acting, which in
creases the probability of the individual acting. The pressure created in a
person depends on the salience of the stimuli and the coherence of multiple
stimuli. Stimuli add vectorially; that is, stimuli pressuring along the same
dimension sum. Those acting in opposing directions or in other directions
do not.
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The group is, in many ways, the individual writ large. Group actions
are due to individual actions. When the average action pressure in a group

exceeds the costs of acting, the group will act as a whole. This fact, in itself,

produces two results. First, when a group splits, if there is a correlation

between individual action pressure ( what rational choice modelers call the
individual's ideal point) and the group in which that individual ends up
( what is termed the action point of the group), the result will be one

moderate group and one extreme group - a higher probability of terrorist

action. The schism between the Official IRA and the Provisional IRA
reflect this. 1 7

The effects of the state' s regime type (state level) and the effects of the
current trend of globalization (system level) become more apparent when

examined at the individual level. According to the PMT, democracies

should have higher levels of terrorist activities than non-democracies for
two reasons: democracies reduce the cost of action, primarily through their

devotion to the Rule of Law; and democracies have institutionalized ways
in which individuals can freely associate, thus allowing a greater ability for

like-minded individuals to congregate.

G lobalization both increases the pressure on the individual and de

creases many of the associated costs of acting. Employment, economic,

and ethnic stress all increase the pressure to act, while open borders allow

groups and funds to meet each other.
1 7 0ther

examples of a similar phenomenon include the partitioning of the Jurassien
partisans into three different groups (FD, RJ, and FLJ), the 'political to extra-political'
movements (and back again) of the ETA, and the effects of the creation of the Sendero
Luminoso on the Peruvian Communist Party (PCP).
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The Pressure Model of Terrorism provides the mechanism for how
causes at one level of analysis affect behaviors at another. Specifically,
it provides a path of action between the individual level and the aggregate
levels. W here this chapter laid out the model, the next chapter proposes
several testable hypotheses from this chapter's discussion and tests those
hypotheses. In Chapter Six, I will actually test those propositions created
as a result of the Pressure Model of Terrorism.
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Chapter 5
Hypotheses , Methods, Data,
and Statistical Models
The effort t o understand the
universe is one of the very few
things that lifts human life a
little above the level of farce,
and gives it some of the grace of
tragedy.
Steven Weinberg

THE previous chapter presented the Pressure Model of Terrorism as an
explanation of the linkages between the four levels of analysis, showing
how the effects at the aggregate levels are due to the factors affecting the
individual level. The previous chapter also briefly sketched a few scientific
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(in the Popperian sense) hypotheses. 1 This chapter specifically presents
those hypotheses with their underlying logic of justification. This model
relies on previous studies of the individual level explicitly. I assume that
the previous research is appropriate. Thus, this model bases its hypotheses
on those previous finding. Hypotheses in each of the other three levels are
presented in this chapter.
However, while the hypotheses are a logical result of the theory, they
still must be tested. This analysis necessitates gathering data and utiliz
ing appropriate statistical methods to glean the needed results. The re
mainder of this chapter deals with the difficulties inherent in this analysis.
These difficulties categorize themselves into data dilemmas and statistical
predicaments. The former deal with idiosyncratic problems concerning the
datasets chosen. These include partial datasets, overlapping measures, and
proxy variables. The latter deal with determining which statistical model
is most appropriate in this sphere, and, in the absence of a clearly supe
rior model, establishing appropriate solutions. At first blush, event history
analysis would seem the perfect statistical model for this data structure.

However, there are enough unmet assumptions that another method must
be used. Using several quasi-appropriate methods produces results that

are more robust - and that is the fundamental goal of research.

1 According to Karl Popper, a hypothesis is scientific if it is falsifiable (testable),
empirical (measurable), and non-specific (Popper 1 959).
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5.1

Hypotheses and Rationale

5. 1 . 1

Group Level

Ethnic concentration.

The two competing theories are Ethnic Concen

tration and Ethnic Segregation (Medrano 1994) . The Pressure Model of
Terrorism supports the latter theory. A greater level of compactness cre
ates a greater feeling of unity within the group. It also allows those with
similar goals and identities to congregate and become an identity. .Both of
these cause a greater chance for the ethnic group to unite to fight for in
dependence. Nations with a small population density or nations that have
been diluted by state encouragement for mobility will be less able to pull
themselves together as a cohesive unit. Nations with a large concentration
of members will also more easily define themselves as a part of that nation.
The dichotomous MAR2 variable GC 2 measures whether or not the group
is spatially contiguous (Davenport 2003). 3
H a1 : Regionally compact groups will have a higher likelihood of using
terrorism.

2 For the sake of brevity, all variables taken from the Minorities at Risk dataset
using MARGene vl .03, are labeled by their Minorities at Risk variable name and the
abbreviation MAR.
3
Specifically, GC2 measures if "a spatially contiguous region larger than an urban
area that is part of the country, in which 25% or more of the minority resides and in
which the minority constitutes the predominant proportion of the population" is present
(Davenport 2003: 16). A '1' indicates yes, while a '2' indicates no. Recoding this vari
able to a dichotomous �1 variable measuring compactness {'1' indicates compactness,
'O' indicates no compactness) made interpretation more intuitive.
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Relative deprivation. Gurr (1970) hypothesized that men rebel because
of relative deprivation - the difference between what a person believes
he or she deserves and what he or she actually receives. For purposes of
this research, relative deprivation will be measured in terms of economic
differentials between the ethnic group and the state at large.
One way of measuring this is to find the actual average incomes for the
state and for the nation, and then compare them. However, this is quite
problematic; such information is rarely available for even the most indus
trialized countries, and even more rarely for the lesser-developed countries.
The MAR variable ECDIFXX measures the economic differential between
the minority group and the state (Davenport 2003). Possible values for
the ECDIFXX variable range from -2 (a strong economic advantage) to 4
(an extreme economic disadvantage). According to extant theory, a value
further from O indicates a greater probability towards using terrorist tac
tics for two reasons: a greater disparity causes a greater division between
the nation and the state, and a greater disparity indicates the nation is
either disadvantaged (and thus probably feeling repressed) or advantaged
(and thus feeling as though they are 'carrying' the rest of the state) (Cren
shaw 1981). However, even though the literature does not specify that

economically disadvantaged groups are more likely to use violence than

economically advantaged groups, the Pressure Model of Terrorism does.
Groups discriminated against feel the pressure to act to right this wrong.
Economically advantaged groups will only rise up when their advantages
are threatened.
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H a2 : Groups that are economically disadvantaged will have a higher like
lihood of resorting to terrorism.

H a3 : Groups that lose their economic advantages will have a higher like
lihood of resorting to terrorism.

Ethnic definition. One necessary aspect of the group that makes it a
group are the differences between 'it' and the 'other' (Mellor 1989) . These
difference do not even have to be real; perceived differences are sufficient
to create a feeling of ' out-group-ness'. As every group in this study is
already determined to b e a group, either in reality or merely in perception,
this may b e superfluous. However, MAR allows a measurement beyond a

simple dichotomous variable. It measures the distance between the group's
and the state's customs. A separate set of customs is a strong aspect

of belonging. Those individuals with a set of common customs tend to

identify themselves as belonging to a group (Mellor 1989) . The MAR

variable ETHDIFXX measures both the strength of the ethnic group's
cultural identity and the degree of difference between it and the state.

Possible values range from O to 10, with O indicating no difference, and
10 indicating a significant difference in language, custom, beliefs, and race
(Davenport 2003) .

H a4 : Groups with a culture more separate from the containing state will
have a higher likelihood of using terrorism.

Prior use of terror. It seems obvious that a group who had used ter
rorist tactics in the past would be more highly predisposed to using them
1 13

in the future. However, how does this fit in the model? Prior use of ter
rorism will either reduce the cost of a new use of terrorism or increase the
action pressure. It will reduce the cost if the organizational structure still
exists or if the individuals involved had committed the past action. That
is, there would be no need to recreate the necessary contacts to get the
terrorism materiel. Also, the line between not-killing and killing will have
already been breeched by those certain individuals. The Thanatos instinct
will already be active and prominent for them (Guggenbiihl-Craig 2002).
The way in which previous terrorism use increases action pressure is if the
past, and the past's heroes, can be used as paragons. "Michael Collins
stood up for the Irish against the British overlords using terrorism," one
can hear the Continuity IRA recruiter say ; "It is time for us to follow in
his illustrious footsteps."
Ha5 : Ethnic groups with a history of using terrorism will have a higher
likelihood of using it again.

5.1.2

State Level

Level of democracy. While the current literature seems rather contradictory
on this aspect, the Pressure Model of Terrorism clarifies the conflicting
roles state democracy plays. Succinctly, democracies do not increase the
action pressure, they only reduce the action costs. Thus, there is an effect
based on both the bare fact that the state is a democracy and the level of
structural democracy in the state.
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Testing both of these statements at once is not as difficult as first ap
pears. Five variables are used to test these hypotheses. All five come from
the Polity IV dataset, which provides an aggregate measure of the level
of system democracy in the state based on three component indicators:
competitiveness of political participation, openness and competition of ex
ecutive recruitment, and the constraints on the chief executive (Marshall
and Jaggers 2002: 13). This is not a measure of democratic norms within
the state, nor is it a measure of personal liberties. It is a measure of how
democratic the structures of the state are. The first three variables used
are dichotomous variables indicating whether the state is democratic ( +6
or greater on the PO LITY2 variable in the Polity IV dataset), autocratic
(-6 or less), or other (Hegre 2000; Jaggers and Gurr 1995; Marshall and
Jaggers 2002). 4 The fourth variable is the level of democratic structures in
the regime.
With this formulation, it is expected that the democracy dichotomous
variable will have a negative coefficient with respect to autocracy (in agree

ment with Benoit 1996), while the level of democracy should have a positive

coefficient. This indicates that democracies, ceteris paribus, should have a
lower level of terrorism simply because they are democracies; however, a

greater level of democracy within the democratic state - i.e., the greater
4 The

normal convention, at least according to the Polity project, is to term those
states which are neither democratic nor autocratic as anocratic (Marshall and Jaggers
2002). There is some question as to whether this is appropriate, as anocratic states
are defined in the literature as having little or no structure, as incoherent regimes
(Davenport 1999; Eckstein and Gurr 1975; Zanger 2000). Some of these states, however,
have lasted several decades without appreciable shift. Japan, South Africa, and Liberia
all remained in this scoring region for seven decades each. I prefer to term them either as
'other' or as 'middle realm' states. Neither of these terms caries with it any preconceived
notion about those states other than that they are neither democratic nor autocratic.
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the number of democratic institutions a state possesses - should produce
a higher chance of terrorism within the state. That is, while a democratic
state has a lower chance of spawning a terrorist group, all things being

equal, once a group starts, the more democratic state is less able to stop
the terrorism.
Furthermore, a change in the level of democracy in the state should
also be a harbinger of increased terrorist activity. Crenshaw (1981) notes
that when democratic states crack down on the terrorist groups, they are
exposing themselves as being not as democratic as they purport to be.
This lowers the legitimacy of the state and may raise the legitimacy of the

group.
H s1 : Groups existing in a democracy will have a lower likelihood of using
terrorism.

H 82 : Groups existing in a state with a higher level of democracy will have
a higher likelihood of using terrorism.

H s3 : Groups existing in democratic states moving away from democracy
will have a higher likelihood of using terrorism.

Economic strength. Poor states have problems controlling their terri

tories. Wealthier states have a more content population (Gurr 1993) . The
first suggests that poor states impose lower action costs on their citizens.

The second suggests that wealthier states tend to have lower action pres

sure because their citizens are comfortable with their station in life. If we
measure state wealth using GDP per capita, we can expect states with a
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lower GDP per capita will have a higher probability of having an ethnic
group become a terrorist group. Thus, citizens in a state with decreasing
GDP per capita will have a higher pressure to change this, perhaps by
becoming terrorist to bring about regime change.

H 84 : Groups existing in states with a decreasing GDP per capita will have
a higher likelihood of using terrorism.
Urban level. Cities offer two things that terrorists need: a recruit
ment base and targets. Large urban centers tend to contain the poor, the
downtrodden, and the frustrated (Conley 1999; Ehrlich and Liu 2002; Ross
1993). These people have high pressure to act, thus urbanization should be
positively correlated with terrorism propensity. Urban centers also contain
targets: office buildings, national museums, and people (Wilkinson 19 7 7) .
For this reason, too, level of urbanity should be positively correlated with
terrorism.

H 85 : A greater level of urbanization in a state increases the probability
that a group will resort to terrorism.
Unemployment and the adolescent: According to the Pressure Model of
Terrorism, those who .are unemployed suffer from an increased action pres
sure to right their condition. However, it would not be the unemployment
rate, per se, that increases the action pressure, it would be the increas
ing of the unemployment rates. Humans are very adept at adapting to

117

their surroundings, including economic hardships. 5 Furthermore, different
states seem to have different 'background' unemployment levels. For ex
ample, the current 10% unemployment level in Spain is definitely tolerable
for the Spanish as their average rate over the past decade is slightly above
this figure. However, that same unemployment rate in Zambia would be
a welcome respite against their current 50% rate, and it would be deves

tating to the United States, where it would constitute a doubling of the
current unemployment rate ( CIA 2005). Thus, it is not the current level
of hardships, that really matter. however, when those hardships increase,
humans feel the pressure to right the situation (Wiley 1992).

H86 : Increasing unemployment rates positively correlate with terrorism
rates.
Finally, as explained earlier, the youth, especially young males, are
especially prone to violence. This is due to many reasons, including imma
turity, high stress levels, lack of economic equality, and biological pressures.
The age group most at risk of these pressures is the 15-24-year-old group
(Hagan and Foster 2001). The youth form a pool from which action pres
sure can grow. As such, the youth percentage is the variable of interest,
not the change.
Hs7 : Higher rate of the youth (15-24) in a state positively correlates with
higher probabilities of terrorism.

5 Nietzsche

posited the existence of two motivating forces in us: a will to power and
a will to survive. It is this will to survive that allows animals (including humans) to
adapt to environmental circumstances easily (Norris 1980).
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5 . 1 .3

System Level

Globalization. Of all the concepts presented herein, globalization is the

most difficult with which to deal. There is no single specific definition to
use. There are no long term <:1atasets of which to avail myself. 6 Both of
these present prominent obstacles. Thus, I must determine a fair proxy
measure for globalization. Such a measure must be increasing. It should
also increase at an increasing rate. As my globalization proxy, I chose to
use total trade in the state. T his proxy is reasonable for two reasons. First,
it meets the functional form required above. Second, globalization is first,
and foremost, a trade-driven process. Thus, the correlation between trade
and globalization should be extremely high (Julius 1997; Krugman and
Venables 1995).
Hn : Higher levels of globalization in the state produce higher probabilities
of terrorism.

5 . 1 .4

Terrorism

Dependent variable: The final variable in need of operationalization is the

dependent variable, terrorism. The Minorities at Risk project variable REB
measures the highest level of violent protest in a nation during the specified
year, unfortunately it only is coded from 1990 onward. The MAR project
also has the variable REBEL, coded back to 1945; unfortunately, it is only
coded every five years. However, the value recorded is the highest level of
6

The most promising globalization dataset, A. T. Kearney, only has indicators going
back to 1995 and full indices going back to 2003.
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rebellion during those five years. Thus, REBEL values O and 1 indicate
no terrorism campaign took place during that five-year period (Davenport
2003). Any other REBEL value indicates a campaign could have taken
place. Furthermore, as the MAR definition of terrorism is more liberal
and inclusive than the one I used, relying on the REBEL variable to help
narrow down the years I had to examine would not introduce error. 7
For each five-year span with a REBEL value greater than 1, I examined
newspaper reports, performed Lexis-Nexis searches, explored Keesing's
Record of World Events, parsed the International Crisis Behavior dataset,
and culled the necessary information from region-specific history books to
determine if a terror campaign, as defined in this research, actually did
occur for each of those five years and, if so, when.

5.2

Full Model Equation
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to private correspondence with Graduate Assistant Carter Johnson, the
MAR project defines terrorism as violence that at least partially targets civilians.
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Statistical Concerns

The following section deals with statistical concerns, including the sources
of the datasets employed, the problem of different temporal domains for
the datasets, the merging of two trade datasets, and the statistical models
utilized in the test.

5.3. 1

Datasets Used

The Minorities at Risk dataset (2002) provides information on politically
active communal groups with populations in excess of 100,000 or in excess

of 1% of the state's population. The current number of such groups in

Western Europe is 13. However, as this research only examines ethnona

tional groups, the Roma must be excluded from the list. And, as they are

minority groups in three separate states (France, Spain, and Italy) ; this
reduces the number of examined groups to 10.
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The Polity IV (Marshall and Jaggers 2002) project focuses on the state,
not the ethnic groups, with the primary focus being the formal structure

of the government, specifically the numbers and levels of democratic and
authoritarian structures in the state. While the proponents of the demo
cratic peace thesis split their emphasis between the importance of demo
cratic structures and of democratic norms, this research must focus on the
structures. The Freedom House dataset could have been used to measure
level of freedom in the individual states, and thus indirectly the demo
cratic norms in the state; however, it only covers the years 1972 through
the present time. As such, too many degrees of freedom would have been
lost.
The remainder of the dataset uses data from several sources. The World

Bank (2003) provides the economic data - the GDP in constant 1995 USD

and the population figures. The United Nations (various years) provided
the percent of people aged 15-24, and the urban percentage. The OECD
(1 972, 1993, 2 004) provides the unemployment data. Barbieri's Interna

tional Trade Database ( 1 996, 1998) provides the data on trade between

1 945 and 1992, while Eurostat (2005) provides trade figures for 1 990-2000.

It needs to be acknowledged that these data sources are all not primary

data sources, either. The International Labor Organization (ILO) gave
the unemployment numbers to the UN, while the ultimate sources of the

population figures were the individual states. Moreover, the Minorities at

Risk, Polity IV, and Barbieri's data come from several sources. That is not
to say that secondary sources are necessarily inferior to primary sources,
but it does need to be acknowledged. Confidence in the MAR data and the
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Polity IV data should generally be high, as they followed strict guidelines
in creating the datasets specifically for the use of others. 8 Barbieri created
her dataset for her dissertation work at Binghamton University. Thus, the
Barbieri trade data is slightly more suspect than the other data, but that
matters little in this research as it is only used as a proxy variable for the
level of globalization in the state. The ramifications are discussed further
later.

5 .3.2

Availability

Unfortunately, not all of the data was fully available between the years 1945
and 2000. Unemployment figures only go back to 1959, urban percent to

1950, and GDP per capita to 1960. To solve this problem, three sets of

models were run. The first included only those variables available to 1945.
The second added urban population, thus restricting the temporal domain
to 1950-2000. The third model added the change in GDP per capita and
the change in the unemployment rate, resulting in restricting the temporal
domain even more. Of the three models, even with the reduced time period,
the last model should produce the best results, both in terms of significance
and in terms of predictability. This is simply because the first two models
suffer from specification bias.

While this may appear true on the surface, there are some inconsistencies in the
Minorities at Risk coding, especially for the ethnic differentials index. In some cases,
the differential for minority A in state B is different from the ethnic differential for
minority B in state A. India and Pakistan quickly spring to mind. To account for these
discrepancies, I examined the data closely to ensure that these problems did not exist
in this subset of states.
8

123

5.3.3

Data Interpolation

Beyond abbreviated temporal domains, not all of the variables were per
fectly dense. I used linear interpolation when either the time period be
tween values was three years or less or the underlying variable was not
expected to change significantly from year to year. Thus, percentage of
youth was interpolated as was urban percentage. Other acts of interpo
lation were taken by the individual agencies providing the data. Thus,
the World Bank used population figures provided by the individual state
census bureaus and interpolated them using a complex formula that took
into consideration the actual census figures, the birth and death rates, and
the migration rates.

5.3.4

Trade Figures

Data for total national trade comes from two sources, Barbieri's trade
database ( 1945-1992) and Eurostat ( 1990-2000). The overlap allows the
disparate trade measures to be used in conjunction. Calculating the aver

age ratio between the datasets during the overlapping time period offers

the most straightforward manner in which to join the datasets (Mallows
and Vardi 1982). Figure 5.1 shows how Barbieri's trade data and the ratio
adjusted Eurostat data compare. As the trade variable is solely acting as
a proxy variable for globalization, it has external validity in this role, as
the pace of globalization has increased exponentially over the years.
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Figure 5. 1: Comparison of Barbieri's trade data with ratio-adjusted Euro
stat data for the states under consideration.
Notes : Comparison of mean annual trade in study states supports the
contention that the ratio-adjusted Eurostat data are comparable. Ratio =
1.2 5 8 x 109 ; Standard deviation of the ratio is 3. 60 x 107 (0.29%).
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5.3.5

Statistical Models

Two basic types of statistical models are often utilized in such research: bi
nary dependent variable model and event history analysis. The first model
uses the entire dataset, whereas the second only uses the information until
the group initiates terrorism. The first uses calendar time, whereas event
history analysis uses analysis time - the elapsed time between when the
group became at risk and the current time. Thus, the piece of information
of utmost importance is the timing of the trigger event. However, accord
ing to the model, trigger events, while they may exist, are neither unique
nor predictive. That is, it is impossible to tell before hand if an event is
an actual trigger event. Thus, event history analysis cannot be fully used.
Full Binary Dependent Variable Mode ls. Binary dependent variable
(BDV) models use the entire dataset, including those years after a group
uses terrorism. To achieve a greater degree of accuracy, I used a population
averaged panel data generalized estimation equation model. The family
and link functions for the logit model were the standard binomial and

logit for the logit model (the canonical link for the binomial family), bi

nomial and probit for the probit model, and binomial and complementary
log-log for the complementary log-log model. The use of GEE over a stan
dard time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) generalized linear model (GLM)
logit or probit is that it allows one a freer hand in choosing the corre
lation structure. 9 For all three models, independent, exchangeable, and
The generalized estimation equation (GEE) methods also do not make the same
as.sumptions as do the generalized linear model (GLM) methods. The GLM assumes
independence among the records. GLM also assumes no correlation with the panels.
The sandwich estimators only adjust the standard errors; they do not adjust the biased
9
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autoregressive- I correlation structures were examined to determine which
produced the best fit as determined by model significance. 1 0 In all three
cases, the autoregressive-I correlation structure correction was expected
to produce superior results, a priori, because of the inherent serial correla
tion in many of the variables and because of the memory of human groups
(Hardin and Hilbe 2003). 1 1

Using three different BDV models that supposedly measure the same
thing allows me to test their suitability as models. As logit and probit
functions differ only in the thickness of their tails, they should produce
similar statistical findings vis-a-vis direction and statistical significance ( see
Figure 5. 2). The coefficients should differ by a factor of approximately 1. 7 0,
as well. If not, then the applicability of the two symmetric models is called
into question (Long and Freese 2003). There is, however, no statistical test
to determine how far from 1. 70 is too far. Furthermore, since both are
symmetrical about ,\

=

0.50, events that rarely occur (such as terrorism)

estimates of the coefficients. GEEs do not make these assumptions. Correlation within
the panels and across the panels is easily managed, as it is a part of the estimating
equation. GEEs are also robust to misspecification of the correlation matrix. Because
of these reasons, the GEE is a better choice than the GLM (Hardin and Hilbe 2003).
10 An unstructured correlation structure would have offered the best comparison, but
the models would not converge under the unstructured structure as there were too many
parameters to estimate with the size of the dataset.
11 The three correlation structures for the model with all variables (and years 19602000} produced Wald x2 statistics of 288.268 (independent} , no convergence (exchange
able}, and 2028.43 (ARl} for the logit; 3907.34 (independent), no convergence (ex
changeable} , and 6060.77 (ARl} for the probit; and 827.60 (independent), 53,340.83
(exchangeable} , and 6386.82 (ARI } for the complementary log-log. In no cases did
the unstructured correlation structure produce estimates due to divergence. Examining
the correlation structure produced in each statistical model, it was obvious that there
should be little difference between results using an independent structure and an ARl
structure, because the first off-diagonal elements in the ARl structure were close to zero
in all cases (logit: 0.0447; probit: 0.0203; complementary log-log: 0.0917).
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Figure 5.2: Comparison of the logit, probit, and complementary log-log
graphs.
Note: The horizontal scale for the logit curve is diminished by a factor of
1.65 to emphasize the similarities between the two curves.
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will not be modeled well by either. The complementary log-log function is
asymmetric; as such, it models rare-event data better than either the logit
or the probit. As such, the complementary log-log function is the superior
model for this data.
Those familiar, even in passing, with ordinary least squares regression
are also familiar with R2 as a measure of predictive ability of the model.
Unfortunately, there is no true R2 for any binary dependent variable mod
els. In lieu of the R2 , some authors use prediction accuracy. However, as
shown by Hosmer and Lemeshow ( 1989), even properly specified models
can score low on tests of accuracy. They proposed their own test based on

deciles of risk categories.

Were I looking to create a scoring index with a score over .,\ = 0. 50 in
dicating the group will use terrorism, this would be an appropriate method

to assess model fit. There are two problems with this. First, there is no
a priori

reason to believe that the cutpoint, .,\, is 0. 50; the appropriate

choice of the cutpoint is a function of the costs associated with false pos

itives and true negatives which can be determined through a calibration
process (Venkatraman and Begg 1996) . Second, since this model merely fo
cuses on the effects of certain covariates on the propensity to use terrorism,

determining the cutoff point is largely irrelevant. As such, a better solution

is to fit a receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve (DeLong, DeLong

and Clarke-Pearson 1988; Hosmer and Lemeshow 1989) . The value of the
area under the ROC curve is the probability that a group using terrorism

scores higher on the test than a group that does not (Obuchowski 2003).
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In other words, the ROC curve shows how well the test reflects the factors
that increase the probability of groups resorting to terrorism.
Partial Binary Dependent Variable Models. There is a variant of the
above statistical model that may also shed some light on the factors con
tributing to terrorism. The partial model only uses the data prior to a
group using terrorism. Thus, it better answers the question what caused
the group to make the leap (or to slide a bit more). However, the main
drawback to using such a model is the loss in degrees of freedom.

5 .4

Chapter Summary

This chapter started by laying out the hypotheses to be tested and the
rationale behind them. Thirteen hypotheses were proposed (as summarized
in Table 5. 1). Each was designed to test the Pressure Model of Terrorism
and its conclusions. After the hypotheses were presented, I provided the
full model and a brief discussion of the datasets used in this research and
certain problems encountered while using them.

Finally, this chapter examined two types of binary dependent variable
models to handle the data. The full binary dependent variable model is
a simple logit-type model that uses the entire dataset to calculate the
estimates of the coefficients. The partial binary dependent variable model
is similar in form to the full model, but only examines the data until the
group uses terrorism. In both cases, a logit, a probit, and a complementary
log-log model will be run. This allows both a better determination of
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Table 5. 1: A schematic summary of the hypotheses proposed in this re
search enterprise.
Effect on
Variable
Probability of Terrorism
Group Level:
Group Concentration
Negative Economic Differentials
Changed Positive Economic Differential
Previous Use of Terrorism by Group
Ethnic Differentials

State Level:
Democratic State
Higher Level of Democracy in State
Autocratization of a Democracy
Decreasing GDP per capita of the State
Urban Level
Increasing Unemployment Rate
Young Male Percent

System Level:
Globalization (Total Trade)

Increase
Increase
Increase
Increase
Increase
Decrease
Increase
Increase
Increase
Increase
Increase
Increase
Increase
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the suitability of the logit and probit, and a better determination of the
robustness of the results.
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Chapter 6
The Results
The most exciting phrase to
hear in science, the one that
heralds new discoveries, is not
'Eureka! ' (I found it!) , but
'That's funny . . . '
Isaac Asimov

IN

the first section of this chapter, I motivate my choice of statistical

model. In the second section of this chapter, the initial results for all
three models are presented. However, as the complementary log-log model
is theoretically better able to model the terrorism events, it is used to
explore the data.
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6.1

Motivation

Before we can delve into the results, two things must first be discussed in
detail - the use of the complementary log-log link over the more popular
logit and probit link functions, and the use of population-averaged general
ized estimating equations (PA-GEE) over the more popular subject-specific
generalized linear models. Both are issues of appropriateness to the data
and to the questions at hand.
The logit is the popular link function of the social sciences. This is
due to a combination of two factors - relative ease of interpretation and
tradition. The actual formula for the logit link function is T/

= ln(,B'x /

(1

- ,B'x) ) . In other words, the logit is just the logarithm of the odds-ratio for
the probability of an event occurring to the probability of the event not
occurring. Thus, the exponential of the coefficients estimated by a logit
regression are interpreted as higher (or lower) odds that the event will occur
given an increase in the value if the covariate. Thus, interpretation of the
coefficients is all but trivial, especially if one speaks of odds ratios or of the

underlying metric as opposed to probabilities. Furthermore, interpretation
is made easier when one realizes that the estimated coefficients of the logit
regression correspond to the effects of the covariates; that is, a positive
logit coefficient implies that increasing the value of the covariate results in
an increased probability that the even will occur.
The probit is the popular link function of the health and natural sci
ences for about the same two reasons. The equation for the probit link is
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rJ

=

4>- 1 (/3'x), which is just the inverse Gaussian of the linear combina

tion of the covariates with the coefficients estimated by the optimization
routine. While the coefficients of a probit regression are not as easily inter
preted as the logit coefficients, the fundamental interpretation remains the
same. If the coefficient is positive, then increasing the covariate increases
the probability that the event will occur. If the probit coefficient is nega
tive, then the probability decreases as the covariate value increases. Both
back-of-envelope interpretations are the same as that of the logit.
These two also share something else in common - shape. Both the logit
and the probit probability curves are of approximately the same shape
(see Figure 6. 1). In fact, when the independent variable is scaled by a
factor of 1. 65 for the logit, as was done in the graph (Figure 6. 1), the two
curves are virtually indistinguishable. 1 Thus, one can, a priori, expect that
separate logit and probit regressions should produce coefficient estimates
and standard error estimates that differ by approximately 1. 65, with the
logit coefficients being larger (Long 1997; Long and Freese 2003). 2
The logit and the probit also share one characteristic with many other
probability distributions - they are point-symmetric. Being point-symmetric
means many things, not the least of which is that the graph passes through

the point {O, 0. 50) ; that is, when the linear combination of the covariates

(/3'x) is zero, then the probability of the event occurring is 50 percent. It

also means that the probability of a failure at {J'x is equal to the proba

bility of a success at -/3'x. Furthermore, the rate of change in a success
1 To say that the logit is "fat in the tails," as is often done, is to imply that Paris
Hilton is also fat in the tail.
2In experience, this ratio tends to be close� to 1. 70 (Long and Freese 2003).
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Figure 6. 1: Comparison plot of the logit curve vs. the probit curve.
Note: The horizontal scale for the logit curve is diminished by a factor of
1.65 to emphasize the similarities between the two curves.
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( or a failure) is also symmetric. Thus, when the researcher fits the data
with a logit or a probit link function, they are assuming that the effects
of the covariates are symmetric about the .,\

=

0. 50 mark, whether or not

the data warrant such assumptions. If one wishes to model data in which
successes or failure are comparatively infrequent, symmetric distributions
must be avoided. This is as true for the logit and probit as for the Cauchy
and other symmetric distributions - it is a function of the symmetry, not
merely the link formula (Long and Freese 2003).
Several asymmetric distributions exist. 3 To more properly model rare
( or infrequent) event data, one should employ one of these link functions.
While many such link functions exist, few are implemented in current sta
tistical software packages, thus, while many would work, few are accessible

to the researcher. The most popular distribution, as based on its imple

mentation level, is the complementary log-log. The complementary log-log
link function is

'f/

= ln(-ln( l - µ)) ,

where In is the natural logarithm func

tion and µ is the expected value of the linear combination of the covariates
- as before, µ

= {3'x.

As one can see from the graph (Figure 6.2) , the complementary log

log function is asymmetric and does not pass through (0, 0.50) as do the

logit and probit functions. In fact, the complementary log-log function

produces a higher probability of success later than does either the logit

or the probit. As a result, rare and infrequent events are better modeled
using the complementary log-log function (King 1998; Long 1 997).
3 More

importantly, some asymmetric link functions are available in the popular
statistical packages.
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Figure 6.2: Comparison plot of the logit/probit curves vs. the complemen
tary log-log curve.
Note: The horizontal scale for the logit curve is diminished by a factor of
1 .65 to emphasize the similarities between the two curves.
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In terms of interpretation, the strains imposed on the researcher using
this link function are virtually non-existent. The coefficients are as inter
pretable in a general sense as are those of the logit and the probit. The raw
coefficients have exactly the same interpretation - a positive coefficient
implies the probability that the event occurred increases with higher co
variate values, and decreases with lower covariate values - the same as for
the logit and probit links. The calculation of the probabilities proceeds as
before, as well, with only the probability equation changing slightly. Where
the probability function for the logit is
for the probit is

1r

1r

/ ( 1 + exp(,B'x)) and

= 1 - exp(-exp(,B'x)) . In all cases,

1) as usual (Hardin and Hilbe 2003).

6. 1 . 1

= exp(,B'x)

= <I>(,B'x) , the probability function associated with the

complementary log-log is

=

1r

1r

= Pr(y

Population-Averaged or Subject-Specific?

The next issue is the use of a population-averaged model over the more cus
tomary subject-specific models. The two primary types of subject-specific
models are the fixed effects and the random effects models. The following
discussion pulls heavily from Hardin and Hilbe { 2003) and Zorn (200 1) .
The fixed effects model comes in two essentially-equivalent forms - the
conditional and the unconditional. The unconditional fixed effects model

explicitly models the different intercepts for each of the groups by includ

ing an indicator variable for each separate panel in the data set. For large
numbers of panels, this results in a drastic reduction in the usable degrees

13 9

of freedom. The conditional fixed effects model utilizes a different likeli
hood equation in the estimation process. The primary advantage is that
there is no need to include an indicator variable for each panel, thus the
loss in degrees of freedom is substantially less severe than under an un
conditional fixed effects model. However, the common drawback to using
any fixed effects model is its inability to successfully handle time invariant
and rarely-changing covariates. In the case of time invariant covariates,
the fixed effects model is unable to provide any coefficient estimates. The
effects of those covariates are subsumed in the panel indicator variable.
In the case of rarely-changing variables, the fixed effects model brutally
inflates the estimated standard errors to the point that the coefficient es
timates are of little value. As the proposed model has both time invariant
and rarely-changing variables, the fixed effects model is an entirely inap
propriate choice.
The random effects model does not suffer from the same problems as
do the fixed effects models. Both time-invariant and rarely-changing co
variates are readily estimated using a random effects model. 4 However,

the random effects model has two large drawbacks. First, it assumes that

there is no correlation between the included covariates and the random
intercept term. Second, as most random effects programs use quadrature
to estimate the coefficients, the random effect model is especially sensitive
to the number of quadrature points chosen (Hardin and Hilbe 2003). In

4It is more appropriate to call this model a random intercept model, as only the
intercept term is allowed to vary across panels. A full random effects model utilizes
multi-level modeling (MLM) techniques. The �umptions for MLM are similar to
those of the random coefficient model. The drawbacks to a full random effects multi
level model are those of a random coefficient model plus application of those Maumptions
to the several levels of the model.
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the PMT model, the assumption of no correlation between the covariates
�nd the random intercept is questionable. At the very least, it is an un
necessary restriction to force on the model, as other methods are available.
Second, the models I estimated using the random effects model were all
sensitive to the number of quadrature points chosen. As such, it is hard to
put too much faith in the results.
The fixed and the random effects models also share one last common
feature. As subject-specific models, they focus more on the panels than
on the marginal effects of the covariates. 5 In other words, subject-specific
methods answer: "What is the effect of increasing covariate X in state
Y on the probability of event T occurring in state Y?'' In other words, it
compares within the state across years. The population-averaged approach
examines the effects of the covariates across the panels across years. Thus,
the question it answers is "What is the effect of increasing covariate X
on the probability of event T occurring?" It focuses specifically on the
marginal effects of the covariates (Hardin and Hilbe 2003).
Finally, before the statistical results can be discussed, it is necessary
to discuss separation and quasi-separation. Complete separation occurs
when the model is able to divide the data into two groups that perfectly

match with reality. Quasi-complete separation occurs when the line of

separation passes through data points belonging to two groups. The third
5 There

is a further problem using subject-specific models, but only in the way in
which they are implemented in current statistical packages. They are estimated using
generalized linear models (GLM) as opposed to the more-general generalized estimating
equations (GEE) . The former make the assumption that each observation is uncorrelated
with any other observation in the dataset. The GEE allows for specific modeling of this
correlation structure. As a result, the coefficients are not biased (Hardin and Hilbe
2003; Liang and Zeger 1986).
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mutually exclusive and exhaustive condition is overlap. Separation, both
complete and quasi-complete, causes severe problems with the iterative
routines used to maximize the likelihood functions. As all three statistical
models use maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) routines, separation, if
it exists in the data, would be a problem. There are two principal causes of
separation. The first is micronumerosity - small-n datasets. The second
is the existence of a perfect predictor variable (or set of variables). The first
can be solved by increasing the amount of data available for the analysis.
The second is not a problem, per se, but it does constitute an annoyance
for estimation (Albert and Anderson 1984; Santner and Duffy 1986).
In this model, and for this data, the group concentration variable ex
hibited evidence of complete separation. Those groups in this dataset that
were not regionally concentrated did not resort to terrorism. Whether this
finding holds in general or was merely an artifact of the current dataset,
only further studies can determine. However, the fact remains that the
separation issues must be dealt with. Simply removing the group concen
tration variable from the model introduces severe specification bias.6 Keep
ing it in the model eliminates all chances that the model can be estimated.

There are two solutions of which I am aware. The first uses a penalized
likelihood correction to the standard binomial G LM score function instead
of the traditional likelihood function (Zorn 2005: 157). The second creates
a taxonometric structure. The drawback to the first is that the correction
is relatively new and not fully supported either in the literature or in the
6

It is severe simply because that covariate is known to affect the dependent variable.
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statistical software programs. The drawback to the second is that it pro
duces a more complex-looking function. In the spirit of do-what-you-can,
I use the second method.
Beyond the issue of separation, there is the previously-discussed issue
of temporally truncated variables. Because of the different time spans
available in the data, three models had to be run for each link transforma

tion. The three models corresponded to 1946-2000, when the first seven

variables could be used; 1950-2000, when percent urban could be added;

and 1960-2000, when unemployment rate and gross domestic product per
capita could be added. One interesting point is that, while none of the last
three variables were significant in any of the models, their inclusion did
make the models themselves more significant and better predictive. Thus,

the three variables remained in the final model.
Contemporaneous correlation, where events in one group affect events
in a separate group, is often a concern when dealing with cross-sectional

data. There are two ways in which this could occur in these models. First,

the correlation may be between kindred ethnic groups; that is, a single
ethnic group exists as a minority at risk in two neighboring states. In

this research, because of the small number of ,cross-border kindred ethnic
groups involved (only the Basques fit into this group), and because the

sole kindred group used terror in one state, but not the other, there is no

reason to test for it.

The second aspect centers on the state. Is there a correlation between
the groups within a state? Again, within this limited dataset, the answer
apparently is no. The only state that had two different ethnic groups use
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terrorism was France, and there was no reported connection between the
two ethnic groups. In fact, there was much more connection between the
Spanish Basques and the Provisional IRA, especially in terms of exchang
ing materiel and funds. Because of these two reasons, I concluded that
contemporaneous correlation is also not an issue.

6.2

The Initial Analysis

Discussing the results from each of the three statistical models separately
would be redundant, as conclusions from each are similar. However, the
differences among the tables provide an interesting insight into the data
structures themselves. While the three links - logit, probit, and comple
mentary log-log - usually produce similar results, the subtle differences
among these functions is sufficient to warrant an in-depth discussion. As
such, I discuss each of the models presently.

6. 2 . 1

The Logit Regression Model

Table 6.1 presents the results of the logit regression. The three models
run reflect the results of incomplete data. The first seven variables were
available from 1946 until 2000, whereas the other variables had a reduced
availability. Specifically, the urban percent was available only from 1950
onward, and the unemployment rate and the GDP per capita were available
from 1960. As a rule, this does not seem to have altered the significance of
the variables. In other words, with one exception, the added variables seem ·
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Table 6. 1: The results of the logit regression for the three temporal models
examined here.
1946-2000 1950-2000 1960-2000
5.909***
5.439***
5.509** *
(1.115)
(1.609)
(1.489)
Percent of you th in state
1. 825***
1. 875***
2.075***
(0. 537)
(0.514)
(0. 533)
Negative economic differentials
2.155***
2.092***
2. 583***
{0.507)
(0.531)
(0.530)
Ethnic differences
- 1. 349**
- 1.918*** - 1.743*
(0. 494)
(0.750)
(0. 567)
#
205
1.130***
1.
Level of democracy
- 1. 400*
(0.293)
(0.746)
(0. 693)
0. 411
0.270*
0. 300*
Change in level of democracy
{ 0.127)
(0.134)
(0. 285)
2.76
3.92
Total trade for state
4.43*
(2.14)
(1. 91)
(2.51)
- 0. 016
0.024
Percent urban
(0.082)
(0.081)
0.126
Change in unemployment rate
(0.246)
- 0. 001
Change in GDP per capita
(0. 001)
- 46.142***
- 21.089
Intercept
- 16. 447*
Previous use of terror

Wald x2 Statistic (G-2)

Number of Groups (G)
Number of Observations (N)
ROC: Area Under Curve

(8.370)
61.38 ***

7
315
0.942

(15.835)

33.43***
7
301
0.950

(12.444)

2028.43***
10
342
0.983

Notes : Assuming that the group is geographically concentrated and that

the state is a democracy. Because of changing political factors, French
groups were eliminated from the first two and the Spanish groups from all
temporal periods. Autoregressive ARI correlation structure used in each
model. Total trade for the state is scaled by a factor of 1 0- 12 • Standard
errors are robust, grouped on ethnonational group. Significance notation:
# p � 0.10; * p � 0.05; ** p � 0.01; *** p � 0.001 for two-tailed tests.
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to either be describing a different dimension of risk or they are completely
uncorrelated with an increased risk.
Without doubt, previous use of terror is the most important factor
in predicting future use of terror. For those groups that previously used
terrorism, they had more than a 2 30-time increase in the probability of
using terrorism again. This includes not only a year-to-year use of terror; it
includes a distant past use of terror, such as in the cases of the Basques and
the Irish. This finding underscores the importance of stopping terrorism
before it begins.
The percent of youth in the state is also highly indicative of the risk of
the group resorting to terrorism. Increasing the percentage of youth by one
percentage point increases the risk of terrorism by 600%. In all three time
periods, this held true. Thus, a state with a base terrorism rate, based on
the other factors, of 1% will have a 6% chance of experiencing terrorism if
there is an increase in adolescent population by just one percent.
The level of economic differentials between the ethnic group and the

rest of the state's population is also a strong indicator of increased risk

of a terrorist attack. Increasing those economic differentials by one level
increases the risk of a terrorist attack by a factor of more than eight.
The effects of ethnic differences do not correspond to the hypothesis put
forth. According to this model, increasing the ethnic differences actually
reduces the risk of a terrorist attack. This conflicts with common sense. I
will discuss possible reasons for this when I discuss the complementary log
log model, but it suffices here to mention that the MAR project constructed
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this variable as a summary measure of four other variables - language,
race, customs, and beliefs (religion) . Thus, one would hope that breaking
this summary measure into its four component measures would more clearly
show the effects in each of those aspects of ethnicity.
Both the level and the change in level of democracy in the state behaved
differently depending on which variables were included in the analysis. For
the analysis including the fewest number of variables, both were statisti
cally significant. In the other two time periods, one or the other - but
not both - were statistically significant. 7 In the last two columns of Table
6. 1, we can see that the p-value for the non-significant level of democ
racy ( 1950-2000) is 0.094. The p-value of the change in democracy level
( 1960-2000) is 0. 149.
The more interesting problem is the change in sign of the change in
democracy-level variable. In the first two time periods, the sign was nega
tive - a higher level of democracy in the state produces a lower probability
of a terrorist attack. In the last time period, the sign was positive - a
higher level of democracy in the state produces a higher probability of a
terrorist attack. At this point, I will only draw attention to this finding.
As with the counter-intuitive effects of ethnic differentials, I will postpone
further discussion of this result until the complementary log-log model.
Suffice it to say, this is one of those "That's funny. . . " moments.
In only the last model ( 1960-2000) is the level of trade, an indicator
variable for globalization, statistically significant. This is not too surprising
7 The

issue of multicollinearity is moot. The highest variance inflation factor (VIF)
for the model was 4.22 - far from worrying.
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as the level of globalization and its effects were not great until the 1970s
(see Figure 5.1). However, the direction of the relationship does support
the hypothesis that globalization does contribute to the level of terrorism in
the state. The shape of the function is the key. Replacing the exponential
rate of increase with a constant or with a linearly increasing function does
not produce a statistically significant result.
The effects of the remaining three variables, percent urban, change in
unemployment rate, and change in GDP per capita are not statistically
significant.8 However, later in this research I alter the change in GDP per
capita variable to test for the effects of recessions on the probability of a
terrorist strike and come to a finding already known in the extant literature
- to a point (Blomberg, Hess, and Weerapana 2004; Bueno de Mesquita
2005c).
The Wald statistics for the three models indicate high levels of signif
icance for the models. But, how good is the model? Using Hosmer and
Lemeshow's (2000) criteria for the area under the ROC curve, all three
models produce excellent discrimination between terrorist groups and non
terrorist groups. 9 Thus, not only is the model statistically significant, but
it describes the data very effectively.
1 also included the unemployment rate and the GDP per capita in the model, but
these were not statistically significant either.
9 1 later discuss the importance of the area under the ROC curve and its application
as a measure of model goodness of fit. I postpone this discussion until after each model
is discussed in detail.
8
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6.2.2

The Probit Regression Model

The results of the probit model (Table 6 . 2) are extremely similar to those
of the logit model. This should not surprise us in the least, as there is
little difference between the logit and the probit graphs under the correct
transformations (see Figure 6. 1). In fact, the only noticeable difference
between the logit and the probit models is the statistical significance of
the globalization indicator variable. This is just a reflection of the general
inapplicability of these two symmetric regression models in dealing with
these data and these variables.
All three models are statistically significant when using probit regres
sion, as was the case with the logit regression. The areas under the ROC
curve cannot differentiate between these two regression models either, as
the differences are well within the associated standard errors.

6. 2.3

The Complementary Log-Log Regression Model

The third statistical regression model I use is the complementary log-log
model. In this case, I prefer the complementary log-log model as it is not
symmetric; that is, it better describes and models rare events, such as

terrorism. The results of the complementary log-log regression are similar
to the other two binary dependent variable regression run. However, there
are some significant differences that I would like to discuss here. The first
is the change in the statistical significance of the level of democracy in the
state. The second is the change in significance in the effects of changing
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Table 6. 2: The results of the probit regression for the three temporal models
examined here.
1 946-2000 1 950-2000 1 960-2000
Previous use of terror
2. 891 ***
2. 470***
2. 464***
{ 0. 61 1)
{ 0. 696)
{ 0.696)
1 . 022***
Percent of youth in state
0. 855***
0. 884***
{ 0. 242)
{0.255)
{ 0. 238)
Negative economic differentials
1 . 084***
0. 998***
1 . 348***
{0. 1 82)
{ 0.276)
{ 0. 229)
Ethnic differences
- 0. 91 8*** - 0.91 4**
- 0.685** *
{ 0.240)
{ 0. 295)
{0. 21 1 )
Level of democracy
- 0. 601 *
- 0. 540#
0. 645***
{0. 265)
{0. 306)
{0. 1 83)
Change in level of democracy
0. 1 21 *
0. 1 87
0. 1 30**
{
{ 0. 049)
{ 0. 050)
0. 1 22)
1 . 60
Total trade for state
1 . 26
1 . 99
{ 1 . 26)
{ 1 . 00)
{ 1 . 32)
Percent urban
0. 001
-0. 020
{0.028)
{0. 029)
Change in unemployment rate
-0. 1 1 0
{ 0. 1 02)
Change in GDP per capita
- 0. 0006
{0. 0004)
Intercept
- 8. 089*
- 9. 1 45
- 22. 606***

Wald x2 Statistic (G-2)
Number of Groups ( G)
Number of Observations (N)
ROC: Area Under Curve

(3.973)
354.84***

7
31 5
0. 946

(6.629)
33.83***

7
301
0. 947

(5.002)

6060.11···
10
342
0. 983

Notes : Assuming that the group is geographically concentrated and that
the state is a democracy. Because of changing political factors, French
groups were eliminated from the first two and the Spanish groups from all
temporal periods. Autoregressive ARl correlation structure used in each
model. Total trade for the state is scaled by a factor of 1 0- 12 • Standard
errors are robust, grouped on ethnonational group. Significance notation:
# p � 0. 1 0; * p � 0. 05; ** p � 0. 01 ; *** p � 0.001 for two-tailed tests.
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that level of democracy. The third is the effect of globalization on the
probability of a group using terrorism (Table 6.3).
In the previous two statistical models, the effects of the level of democ
racy changed in statistical significance based on the temporal domain ex
amined. In the complementary log-log model, such is not the case. In all
three time periods, increasing the level of democracy in the state increases
the probability of a terrorist attack. The level of democracy in the state
follows a pattern similar to the logit and the probit models - the rela
tionship is negative in the first two time periods, and positive in the last.
Here, however, the relationship is not statistically significant in the first
two time periods. This is due mainly to the reduced time period; that is,
the effect of democracy is strongest in the 1960-2000 period than in the
longer time periods. The inclusion of the three additional variables alters
neither the statistical significance nor the directional effect of the level of
democracy on the probability of a group using terrorism.
The second interesting point in the complementary log-log models is
that the effect of changing the level of democracy is more consistent across
the time periods. In the logit and the probit models, the statistical sig
nificance depended on the time period examined. In the complementary
log-log model, the effects changing the level of democracy do not change in

either significance nor in direction - they are statistically significant and
are positive. A state with a higher level of democracy will have a higher
probability of being the home of a terrorist group. Thus, explaining the
change in significance is no longer needed. While the effects of including
or not including the French groups may have been seen in the logit and
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Table 6. 3 : The results of the complementary log-log regression for the three
temporal models examined here.
Previous use of terror
Percent of youth in state
Negative economic differentials
Ethnic differences
Level of democracy
Change in level of democracy
Total trade for state
Percent urban
Change in unemployment rate
Change in GDP per capita
Intercept
Wald x2 Statistic (G- 2)
Number of Groups {G)
Number of Observations (N)
ROC: Area Under Curve

1 946-2000 1 950-2000 1 960-2000
4.633 ***
4.499 ***
4 .518 ***
{ 1 . 1 1 3)
( 0. 73 5 )
( 1 .334)
1 .520 ***
1 .526 ***
1 .480***
( 0.358 )
( 0.2 77)
( 0.363)
***
***
1 .595
1 . 790
1 .840 ***
{0.42 4)
(0.383)
( 0.266 )
***
**
- 1 .519
- 1 .292
- 0.934 ***
(0.472 )
( 0.294)
(0.366)
-0.091
0.930***
- 0. 195
( 0.45 3)
( 0. 1 79 )
( 0.447)
0.09 7 **
0.502 **
0.094 ***
(0.021 )
( 0.033)
( 0.1 7 1 )
*
*
2.40
3.57
3. 87***
{ 1 . 18)
{ 1 .02 )
{ 1 .68 )
0.035
0.004
( 0.052 )
( 0.075 )
- 0.037
( 0. 140 )
- 0.001
( 0.001 )
*
***
***
- 23.489
- 2 7 .989
- 37 . 1 1 2
( 12. 8 1 7)
(7. 626)
(8. 560)
.
···
*
*. .
2
.
72 .87
5524. 0
6386.82
7
10
7
301
342
315
0.9 7 2
0.981
0.96 1

Notes: Assuming that the group is geographically concentrated and that

the state is a democracy. Because of changing political factors, French
groups were eliminated from the first two and the Spanish groups from all
temporal periods. Autoregressive ARI correlation structure used in each
model. Total trade for the state is scaled by a factor of 1 0 - 1 2 • Standard
errors are robust, grouped on ethnonational group. Significance notation:
# p � 0. 10; * p � 0.05; ** p � 0.01 ; *** p � 0.001 for two-tailed tests.
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probit models, there appears to be no difference in the complementary log
log model. In other words, the three French groups, the Corsicans, the
Basques, and the Bretons, appear to behave in a manner consistent with
the other Western European ethnic groups.
A third interesting change in this set of models is the constancy in
the statistical significance of the effects of globalization. In both the logit
and the probit models, either the significance of the effects of globalization
changed based on the time period examined (logit) or the effects were
not statistically significant (probit). In the complementary log-log model,
globalization is a statistically significant factor in predicting the move to
terrorism by the group in each of the time periods. In fact, in the 1960-2000
period, it is highly significant (p � 0. 00 1).
Table 6.4 compares the three statistical models with all variables (i.e.
from 1960-2000). As only the 1960-2000 models include all of the variables,
it suffers least from model misspecification. Thus, of the three sets, it
best reflects the underlying processes governing the ethnonational terrorism
factors. It also allows a comparison across statistical models more easily.
From this comparison, we can see that the complementary log-log model
best describes the data. The Wald statistic is higher for the complementary

log-log model than for the other two.

In addition, the areas under the ROC curve for the three models are not
statistically different from one another. Moreover, as an added bonus, more
of the variables of interest are statistically significant in the complementary
log-log model than in either of the other two. However, for five of the
variables, it makes little difference to which statistical model we refer, as
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Table 6. 4: A summary of the results of the logit, probit, and complementary log-log regression for the 1960-2000 time period examined here.
Previous use of terror
Percent of youth in state
Negative economic differentials
Ethnic differences
Level of democracy
Change in level of democracy
Total trade for state
Percent urban
Change in unemployment rate
Change in GDP per capita
Intercept
Wald x2 Statistic (G-2 )
ROC: Area Under Curve

Probit Cloglog
Logit
***
2. 891*** 4.5 1 8***
5. 90 9
(0. 7 35)
(1. 115)
(0. 611)
***
***
0
2.0 75
1.526 ***
1. 22
(0.514)
(0.2 7 7)
(0. 2 3 8)
***
***
1. 348
2.5 83
1. 840 ***
(0.530)
(0. 266)
(0. 2 7 6)
**
- 1. 349
-0. 6 85 *** -0. 934***
(0. 494)
(0. 211)
(0. 2 94)
1. 130*** 0. 654*** 0. 930 ***
(0. 2 93)
(0. 1 83)
(0. 1 7 9)
0. 411
0. 1 87
0.50 2**
(0. 2 85)
(0. 122)
(0. 1 7 1)
*
4. 43
1. 99
3. 87 ***
(2. 14)
{ 1. 3 2)
{ 1.02)
-0.016
0.004
-0.020
(0.0 82)
(0.02 8)
(0.052)
-0. 126
-0. 110
-0.0 3 7
(0. 246)
(0. 102)
(0. 140)
-0.001
-0.0006 -0.00 1
(0.001)
(0.0004) (0.001)
***
6
- 4 . 142 - 22. 606*** - 3 7. 112 ***

(12. 444)
(5.002 )
( 7.626)
202 8 .43*.. 6060. 7 7 ••• 6386 . 82 ***
0. 983
0. 983
0. 981

Notes : Assuming that the group is geographically concentrated and that

the state is a democracy. Because of changing political factors, French
groups were eliminated from the first two and the Spanish groups from all
temporal periods. Autoregressive ARl correlation structure used in each
model. Total trade for the state is scaled by a factor of 10- 1 2 . Standard
errors are robust, grouped on ethnonational group. Significance notation:
# p ::; 0. 10; .* p ::; 0.05; ** p ::; 0.01; *** p ::; 0.001 for two-tailed tests.
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they all express the same results. As such, the remainder of this section
deals exclusively with the complementary log-log model. Specifically, the
next section more-fully presents the statistical background required to have
a better understanding of the results.

6.3

Statistical Backfill

There are two aspects to whether or not a model is an appropriate de
scription of the data - significance and fit. Model significance can be
measured using the Wald test. The complementary log-log model has a
Wald test statistic of x2 (10) = 202 8.43, which is significant at any rea

sonable level. Other tests of model significance exist. The Bland and
Altman limits-of-agreement test the predicted and the actual measures.

The limits-of-agreement test gives an average difference of -0.000, with a
standard deviation of 0.204. As the average difference is not significantly
different from zero, the model is significant (Bland and Altman 1986).10
The second aspect to determining the appropriateness of a model is the
goodness of fit of that model. As with model significance, there are several
ways to measure goodness of fit. As discussed in the previous chapter, the

10 However, another measure of model significance does not agree with these two.
The Lin concordance correlation coefficient both measures the amount of correlation
between the predicted and the actual values and the amount of clustering of the data.
The statistic, Pc , is then compared to 1.00 using a standard z-test. For this model,
the coefficient is Pc = 0.881 (s.e. = 0.012; p � 0.0005). Thus, as the two values are
statistically distinct, the model does not fit the data well. However, the value to testing
of the Lin concordance correlation coefficient measure is muted by the fact that Lin
proposed it as a comparison of continuous data (Lin 1989). The terrorism variable is
dichotomous, thus the measure of data clustering is incorrect. AB of now, there is no
correction for dichotomous data of which I am aware.
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most appropriate way for the answers this research is trying to determine
is the receiver operating characteristic curve.
A graphical representation of an analytic for the suitability of the pro
posed model is the receiver operating characteristic curve (Figure 6. 3).
Receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves graph the relative propor
tion of true positives (sensitivity) against those of false positives (1 specificity). Each point on the curve corresponds to a different cut point
(..X). As mentioned earlier, accuracy tests tend to select a cut point of A

= 0. 50, however there is usually no

a priori reason for that selection. The

final choice of a cut point is a function of the relative costs of doing some
thing when you should not vs. not doing something when you should all
moderated by the actual prevalence of the event. Equation 6.1 shows the
formula for calculating the optimal cut point, where d is the prevalence of
terrorism, and the costs are for false positives (CFP ), true negatives (CTN ),
false negatives (CFN ), and true positives (Crp ). The calculation produces
the slope of the ROC curve at that optimal cut point. In general, the less
expensive it is to do something and the more expensive it is to have the
'disease', the greater the optimal slope of the ROC curve and, thus, the

lower the optimal cut point.

8ROC =
8FPF

(1 - d ) ( CFP - CTN )
d

CFN - CTP

(6.1)

However, even without calculating the optimal cut point, the ROC
curve provides a convenient measure of fit for the model tested. The area
under the ROC curve is the probability that a group resorting to terror
156

1 .0

0 .8

0 .6
-�

."ui
i

C:

Q)
(/)

0 .4

0.2

0.0

L

0.0

0 .2

Area under curve

=

0 .4
0 .6
False Positives ( 1 - Specificity')

0 .8

1 .0

0 .98 1 4 se(area) = 0 .0082

Figure 6.3: Parametric and non-parametric receiver operating characteris
tic curve for the full complementary log-log model.
Notes : The parametric curve (solid) assumes binormal distribution of the
specificity and the sensitivity measures. The non-parametric curve {thick)
makes no such assumption.

1 57

will score higher on the model than a group not resorting to terrorism
(Obuchowski 2003). Thus, for this model, a terror-using group will have a
98.1% chance of scoring higher than a non-terror-using group. This is an
extremely good fit. Hosmer and Lemeshow state that anything above 0.70
is considered acceptable discrimination; above 0.80, excellent; and above
0.90, outstanding. 1 1 Furthermore, anything above 0.90 is likely to suffer
from either separation or quasi-separation (Hosmer and Lemeshow 2000:
162). Neither is a problem with this model as estimated.

6.3.1

Further Interpretation of Results

As all three models have similar fits (all three areas under the ROC curve
are not statistically dissimilar), and as the complementary log-log function
better models rare event data like this, the following interpretation will
rely on the complementary log-log model.
Beyond doubt, the more important predictor of terrorist events is past
terrorist events. Having a past incident of terrorism increases the proba
bility of resorting to terrorism by a factor of approximately 800. 1 2 Thus, it
is even more imperative that groups are stopped from using terrorism. An
interesting result occurs when the partial model is run. 13 The coefficient
1 1 Moreover, as a point of reference, if the area under the ROC curve is 0.50, there is
absolutely no discrimination. In other words, one might as well flip a coin as run the
test.
12 This is the ratio of the probability a group will use terrorism if it has used it in the
past (0.2336) to the probability a group will use terrorism if it has not (0.0029), holding
all other variables at their means.
13 The full models use all data records until 2000, whereas the partial model only uses
the records until the group initiates terrorism.
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of the previous use of terror variable for the full model is 4. 518 (see Table
6.4), whereas for the partial model it is 5.693 (s.e.

=

6.72 9; p

=

0. 3 98) .

The coefficient lost statistical significance. Why? Two possible reasons:
First, the cost reduction attained when terror was used in the distant past
is not as great as the cost reduction within the same campaign. Thus, the
increase in action pressure due to a harkening to the past is not statisti
cally significant at this level. The second reason may simply be the small
number of groups examined who had a past history of terrorism. Only two
groups have a history of organized terror campaigns prior to the Second
World War - the Irish and the Spanish Basques.
Thus, the importance of the previous use of terrorism variable may be
due less to the historical factors and more to the ease of continued terror
campaigns. In other words, the costs of terrorism are significantly lower
when it was last used a month ago than when it was last used a century
ago.
Several other factors correlate quite highly with terrorism use; however,
not all are in the direction predicted by the hypotheses. A higher percent
age of youth in the state does correlate with an increase in terror activity.

Increasing the percentage of youth in a state by 1 % results in an increase

in terror probability by nearly a factor of five. 14 Thus, the assertion that
the youth tend to be the source of both the terror impetus and the terror
population is definitely supported by the data.

14 Holding all other variables at their means, changing the youth percent from 15% to
16% increases the probability of terror use from 0.0019 to 0.0089. This corresponds to
a ratio of 4.63.

15 9

Unemployment, however, is not a satisfactory predictor variable. In
none of the three statistical models above did an increase in unem ploy
ment rate correspond to an increase in terrorism probability. It is interest
ing to note that the unemployment rate, itself, is a statistically significant
predictor (b

=

0. 1 7 9; p

=

0.065). This finding, in conjunction with the

results concerning the effects of a changing unemployment rate both sup
port the hypothesis, however only in a weak sense. Unemployment does
have an effect on terrorism, but this data and these models are unable to
fully expose that relationship. It appears as though higher unemployment
rates are correlated with higher levels of terrorism. It also appears that
increasing unemployment rates reinforce that correlation (albeit weakly).
It would be interesting to discover if the relationship is strengthened with
the inclusion of more groups and regions or if it is just an inherently weak
relationship.
As cities are sources of economic differences, despair, poverty, recruits,
and targets, the level of urbanization in the state should also be correlated
with terrorism activity. According to the models, ceteris paribus, it is not.

A separate model run showed that increases in urbanization are correlated
with increased terror probability, but only at the p

corresponds to acceptance at the a

=

0. 1 7 level. This

= 0 . 10 level for a one-tailed test. 15

Why

did this variable not achieve statistical significance as the model suggests?
First, the other factors explaining why higher urban rates should produce
higher levels of terrorism are already present in the model. Second, it
is important to note that the sign of the coefficient is in the predicted
15While not customary, such levels of significance are being used in top journals (see,
for example, Clark and Nordstrom 2005).
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direction in the complementary log-log model, the coefficient merely failed
to achieve significance. Third, the general trend in the world is toward
greater levels of urbanization. Thus, the lack of statistical significance
may simply be due to high levels of correlation between it and another
naturally-increasing variable. In short, this could just simply be a small-n
problem (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994).
Moving from individual-level to group-level factors, the hypothesis re
garding economic differentials was strongly supported. A greater level of
economic differential between the ethnic group and the state produces a
higher chance of that group resorting to terrorism (Figure 6.4). Unfortu
nately, because of the region chosen, I could investigate neither the effects
of economic advantages nor the effects of losing economic advantages. Fur
thermore, because none of the states changed the ethnic group in power
during the period of this study, I also could not investigate the effects of
increasing negative economic differentials on the probability of resorting to
terrorism. However, the PMT suggests that positive economic differentials
should have a pacifying effect, while both the loss of advantages and the
increase of disadvantages should result in a higher probability of a group
becoming terrorist.
Concluding the group-level hypotheses, the data did not support the
contention that greater ethnic differences should result in higher chances
of terrorism. In fact, the results suggest that greater levels of ethnic dif
ferences result in a reduction in probability by a factor of almost four. 16

16 T he coefficient on the ethnic differentials variable corresponds to a probability of
0.2594, which is approximately 1/3.854, hence the pacifying effect.
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Table 6. 5: Results of replacing the ethnic differentials variable . with its
component measures.
Language
Customs
Beliefs

Coefficient
1. 46 7
- 1. 610
0. 951

Std Err
0. 223
1.392
0. 760

z-score
6 . 57***
- 1. 16
1. 25

Notes : While race is a component of the ethnic differentials index, it did
not vary across the data, thus it had to be dropped from consideration. The
coefficients are logit coefficients. The standard errors are robust standard
errors. The correlation structure is autoregressive-I.
What is it about ethnic separation that produces a retardant effect on
terrorism? Closer examination of the different components of ethnic sep
arateness produces some interesting conclusions (Table 6. 5) . Only one of
the components achieved statistical significance - language differences. A
different language spoken by the ethnic group results in a seven-fold in
crease in the probability that group will use terror. While the effect of
religion is obvious in the actions of the IRA, religion is not a significant
predictor of terrorism activity - at least for ethnonational groups in this
sample.
Religion was important in a few of the cases. The '!roubles began

shortly after the civil rights march of the Roman Catholics was violently
rebuffed by Protestant civilians who wanted to keep the status quo. Also, it

is also evident that religion and language both played a role in causing the
Jurassiens to fight to separate from Canton Berne. The Jurassiens were a
French-speaking, Roman Catholic group whose home region was annexed
to Canton Berne, a German-speaking, Protestant canton. However, the
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problems of religion do not extend to the other groups under consideration.
The South Tyroleans are of the same religion as Italy, as are the Sardinians.
The Basques and Catalans are both as Catholic as Spain. Scotland differs
from Great Britain only in Presbyterian vs. Anglican sects, while Corsica
and Brittany match France's religion.
Next, as expected from the theory and from the literature, the level of
democracy is positively correlated with the probability of a group using
terrorism. Before the models above were calculated, a preliminary model
was run which included a variable signifying if the state was democratic.
The result was that the data did not support the contention that a demo
cratic state has a lower chance of spawning terror groups (b

=

=

-2. 50; p

0. 194). Furthermore, in the original model, the level of democracy was

not statistically significant (b

=

0. 101 ; p

=

0. 547), although increasing

levels were correlated with higher probabilities (b

=

0. 3 82 ; p

=

0.007).1 7

In focusing on only the democracies, it became possible to determine if
the level of democracy was a factor. It was (Figure 6. 5) . The Polity IV
democracy scale runs from O to 10. A one unit increase in that scale cor

responds to a three-fold increase in terrorism probability according to the
model (although increases, per se, are only statistically significant in the
complementary log-log model).
These conclusions fit well with the PMT and with conclusions made by
Crenshaw ( 1981), Ross (1993), and Sederberg { 1989). A democratic state
may reduce the action pressure, but a more democratic state will also be
17 Results similar to the reported model were found for the remainder of the variables,
as well, except that percent urban almost attained significance (b = 0.092; p = 0.053).
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unable to quash terrorist groups once they form. It would be interesting
to determine if actual increases in democracy are correlated with increased
terrorism or if just higher levels are. 18
Neither gross domestic product per capita nor change in GDP per capita
are statistically significant. Furthermore, the selection of neither has a
substantive effect on the model results. The difference in GDP per capita
was included to examine the effects of personal wealth on terrorism. It
apparently has no effect at this point. Poor states and rich states, in
creasing GDP per capita and decreasing GDP per capita have the same
effect on terrorism - none. However, if we replace the change in GDP
per capita variable with a dichotomous variable measuring whether the
GDP per capita dropped, something interesting happens. It is significant
(b = 0.906; p � 0.00 1 ). In other words, it is more the fact that the GDP
per capita is in decline than by how much it is declining that is impor
tant. A declining GDP per capita co�responds to a three-fold increase in
the probability of terrorism in the state. 1 9 Thus there is evidence that a
poorly-performing state, at least in the economic realm, does create an
impetus for a terrorist response.
This may also explain the uniform increases in terrorism probability
across states. Recessions tend to be contagious, especially in this age of
globalism. Thus, a recession in one state will shortly increase the probabil
ity of a terrorist group acting in a different state. This result may explain
18 Alas,

this must await a larger and more heterogeneous dataset for testing. The
Western European dataset does not include a sufficient number of cases where the level
of democracy in the state changes.
19 A similar result holds if a 1 % increase is used as the cutoff, although not for a 2%
increase.
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much of Midlarsky, Crenshaw, and Yoshida's discovery of the '1contagion
of international terrorism" ( 1980) .
The final hypothesis dealt with globalism. As no reliable direct mea
sures of globalism were available, I used total interstate trade as a proxy.
The coefficient on the total trade variable was statistically significant. Fur
thermore, it was in the correct direction. Thus, the model literally supports
the contention that a higher level of trade in the state results in a greater
probability of a group using terrorism. The exponential shape of the trade
curve is important in this analysis. Simply using the year or the log of
the total trade as a proxy, both of which are linear or near linear, would
not have mimicked the assumed shape of the globalization curve. In fact,
replacing total trade with either the year or the log of the total trade re
sulted in a coefficient and a model that was less significant. Thus, while
total trade may not be an actual measure of globalization, it does have
the necessary properties. Thus, if we do assume trade is an appropriate
proxy for globalization, we can conclude that globalization does positively
(or negatively, depending on your point of view) affect probabilities for
outbreaks of terrorism.
Thus, as a whole, the model does appear to have performed quite well
with this dataset. However, as is always the case, including more groups
will make the final analysis more accurate and more reflective of reality.
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6.4

Event History Models

Before I move on to investigating the effects of political shifts on terrorist
groups, I would like to determine if event history analysis would work with
the data as it now stands. The first thing to do is examine the baseline
hazard to determine if it fits one of the available distributions. The baseline
hazard is a function of time and not of the groups. Thus, it is the hazard the
each group feels as a result of existing. All other hazards that depend on

group and state factors add to this baseline rate. Using the Nelson-Aalen

cumulative hazard estimator and smoothing it using the Epanechinikov-

2 smoothing kernel, we see the shape of the underlying hazard function
from 1960 until 1987 (Figure 6.6). Using the Epanechinikov-2 smoothing

function allowed the curve to better reflect the data, while at the same
time reducing major inter- year fluctuations ( Cleves, Gould, and Gutierrez
2004; Hosmer and Lemeshow 1999).
The smoothed hazard function follows no known distributional form.
Further work using survival time analysis must re-parameterize the times

when the group enters risk. That is, simply using the end of World War II
as an entry point for each of the groups does not produce acceptable results.

One may suggest that the entry event should be the year the group lost
independence. This may work for groups losing their independence in the

last century like the South Tyroleans or the Sardinians, but most of the

ethnonations in Western Europe lost their independence centuries in the
past. The Irish lost it in the twelfth century with the violent influx of

the English; the Scots in 1603, when J ames VI of Scotland united the two
168

0.08

0.06

g
:E
ro
.0
0

it

ro
::::,
C
C

0.04

<!

Q)
Cl)

ro

co

0.02

0 .00
1 960

1 965

1 975

1 970

1 980

1 985

1 990

Figure 6.6: The smoothed hazard function estimate using non-parametric
means and an Epanechinikov-2 smoothing kernel.

1 69

crowns. The Basques lost it in the sixteenth century when the Spanish and
French divided the Euskal Herria, while the Catalans never really lost it;
it just faded away. The Corsicans lost it in the nineteenth century to the
Genoese, the British, and the French, while the Bretons lost it centuries
earlier. Thus, selecting the year the group lost independence would not
help either.
One interesting consequence of the baseline hazard function as modeled,
it does support Midlarsky, Crenshaw, and Yoshida's (1 980) contention that
international terrorism is contagious - that terror attacks in one state in
fluence terrorism in others. Were the graph more flat, it would indicate that
underlying probability of a group using terror did not change throughout
time. However, as there are definite peaks and valleys, there is evidence of
a cyclic impetus. In fact, according to the graph, major bouts of terrorism

transmission happened at approximate nine- year intervals, starting in the
early 1 960s and repeating in the late1 960s, mid-1 970s and 1 980s. The sec
ond hump in the graph corresponds to the 1 974-1 975 European recession
brought on by the OPEC crisis, thus further supporting the contention
that regional recessions are also a harbinger of terrorism.

6.5

Political Changes

One avenue of exploration this model affords at this point is an investiga
tion into whether or not political changes in the state encourage terrorism
or are encouraged by terrorism. Political changes can be operationalized

in two ways: a fundamental change in the government, such as through a
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Table 6. 6: The effects of changes in governmental leadership on terrorism
propensity.
Party Orientation Change, Previous Year
Party Orientation Change, Current Year
Party Orientation Change, Next Year

Together Separate
- 0. 2 81
- 0. 46 3
(0. 3 5 7)
(0.42 7)
**
- 0. 832
- 0. 6 98*
(0. 2 85)
(0. 2 83)
- 1. 254# - 1. 17 0#
(0.64 7)
· (0.662)

Notes : Numbers are logit coefficients. Numbers in parentheses are robust

standard errors. The final column is a summary of the effects of each
variable added separately to the model. Significance notation: # p � 0. 10;
* p � 0. 05; ** p � 0.01; *** p :::; 0. 00 1.
constitutional change or a coup d'etat; or a minor change in government
leadership, such as a change in the government's political orientation be

tween left and right or vice-versa. I parsed the electoral records of each
of the five states under investigation and created indicator variables for
each of these two events. I then added them to the full model above. As
the major government changes were too few to be of statistical use in this
study, I only modeled the political party changes in government. 20
What are the effects on terrorism probability in the presence of a

changed government? According to the results (Table 6.6), changing the
government this year has no discernable effect on the probability of a ter
rorist attack. On average, the effect is to reduce it by a quarter, but the
results are not statistically significant at the usual levels. When consider
ing government changes in that year, the effects on terrorism probability
20 Again, a larger and more diverse dataset would allow this hypothesis to be tested.

17 1

are significant. A change in political party reduces the probability of a
terror attack by approximately half.
Finally, when considering the effects of changing the party in power on
the probability of terrorism in the previous year, the effect is to reduce its
probability by a factor of approximately 69%. Unfortunately, the causal
arrow for this conclusion points in the wrong direction. As the change in
government occurs after the terrorist attack, the conclusion must concern
the effects of a terrorist attack on the probability of turning out the cur
rent government. Thus, we can conclude that, in the presence of a terrorist
attack, the probability of the government being voted out of office is ap
proximately 31%. This is incredibly strong evidence for the "rally around
the flag" effect (see, for example, Norrander and W ilcox 1993; Oneal and
Bryan 1995).
With this conclusion, it becomes more obvious that the Spanish So
cialist party victory in the election taking place shortly after the al Qaeda
attack in Madrid on March 11, 2004 occurred in spite of the terrorist attack
and not because of it. Jose Mara Aznar and his conservative Partido Popu

lar were having other difficulties with the electorate, especially supporting

the US war in Iraq and their handling of the Madrid terrorist attack (Chari
2004; Moret 2004; Romero 2004). 21

21 Chari (2004) specifically found that it was not the terrorist attack, per se, that
caused the downfall of the Aznar government, but was rather the perception that he
manipulated the situation for political gains.
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6.6

State Graphs

Before concluding this chapter, let us look at probability graphs for two
of the groups under investigation: the Ulster Catholics and the Scots.
These two were chosen as representative samples of the groups, as the
Ulster Catholics had a history of terror use throughout the entire time
period, while the Scots did not. As they share a common containing state,
comparing them should show some of the strengths of the model.

6.6. 1

The Ulster Catholics (United Kingdom)

The prediction plot (Figure 6. 7) reflects well the underlying propensity

for the Ulster Catholics to resort to terror, even without utilizing and
accounting for Irish history. To see this, let us examine a little Northern
Irish history.
T he first incarnation of the Irish Republican Army was a terrorist or
ganization fighting for independence from Britain in the early twentieth
century. Their terror campaign, which started in 1919, succeeded. But
only partially. Britain partitioned Ireland in 1 921, granting independence

to Catholic southern Ireland, but only allowing home rule in the north.

That is, southern Ireland gained independence, but those counties in the
north of Ireland, deemed too Protestant and industrial to join Catholic,
agrarian southern Ireland, remained connected to the United Kingdom.
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Figure 6.7: The predicted probability of the Ulster Catholics using terror
in the United Kingdom, 1960-2000.
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The Catholics in Northern Ireland were discriminated against in employ

ment, housing, and political power. That is how it remained until 1967,
when the civil rights movement began (Feeney 200 3).

The Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA) formed in
1967 as a reaction to the continued discrimination against the Catholics in
Northern Ireland. Liberal use of gerrymandering ensured Protestant super
majorities in the British Parliament, and liberal use of the Royal Union
Constabulary ensured the personal protection of the Stormont ( the North

ern Ireland Assembly). The fateful decision to hold a civil rights march
in 1969 brought about a counter-demonstration from the Protestants, who

did not want to lose their advantages. The marching, both the Catholic
civil rights marches and the Orangemen counter-marches, quickly culmi
nated that summer in the Londonderry Catholic neighborhood of Bogside,

where the demonstrators and the Royal Union Constabulary clashed in
what became known as the Battle of Bogside.
At this point, the Irish Republican Army did nothing to assist the
Catholics in Northern Ireland. Their hesitation could be ascribed to either
a desire to continue the political process or a desire to allow events to

unfold naturally to bring about the socialist revolution. Whatever the

reason, a group within the IRA decided to do something direct to assist

the Catholics in Northern Ireland. The splinter called itself the Provisional

IRA, to distance itself from the Original (or Official) IRA. The Provisional

IRA began its campaign of terror in order to finish expelling the British
from Ireland and to return all of Ireland to Irish hands. The Irish flag
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from this time period emphasized the desire for a united Ireland. The tri
color had colors representing both the Catholic (green} and the Protestant
(Orange) aspects of what was to be a united Ireland (Feeney 200 3) .
The Provisional IRA terror campaign continued for almost three decades,
only ending in 1998 with the Good Friday Agreement. Those three decades
were filled with car bombs, assassinations, non-combatant casualties, cease
fires, and broken cease fires. The total number of people killed by the Pro
visional IRA during The Troubles is placed at around 1800 - 700 civilians
and 1100 British soldiers, RUC officers or unionist terrorists. However, as
shocking as these statistics are, loyalist paramilitary organizations and the
British Security forces were responsible for over a thousand civilian deaths
(Sutton 2002).
The graph of terror probability closely follows several aspects of the
above history (Figure 6. 7) . The onset of the terrorism in 196 9 is preceded
by a sudden increase in terror probability between 1960 and 1965. The
probability remains level except for a quick increase in 196 8- 6 9. The actual
onset of terrorism occurs at this point. While the split in the IRA was

not a part of the model, it was definitely a factor in using terrorism. The

probability remains high, reaching near-certainty during the 1 980s. During
the 1 980s, the Provisional IRA began hunger strikes, signed the Anglo
Irish agreement, suffered the unionist backlash and the associated increase
in violence, and detonated bombs during a service at the Enniskillen War
Memorial (1987) and at Herrod's in downtown London ( 1983 ) .
Finally, the Good Friday Agreement of 1998 correspond t o a low point
on the graph. The model does seem to have some predictive ability, at least
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with respect to the Ulster Catholics. The times of high probability on the
model correspond to times in real life when the Irish were embroiled in a
terror campaign. The timing of the Good Friday Agreement corresponds

to a low point in the probability graph. Perhaps the Agreement succeeded
where others failed simply because the underlying pressure for terrorism
was low enough at that point, whereas it was much too high to allow the
1985 Anglo-Irish A greement to succeed.

6.6.2

Scots (United Kingdom)

The underlying propensity for the Scots to resort to terror is also well
reflected in the prediction plot (Figure 6. 8). To see this, let us examine a
little Scottish history.
On March 2 8, 1707, the Scottish Parliament dissolved, and the Treaty
of Union between Scotland and England went into effect shortly thereafter.
Almost three centuries passed until the Scots were able to once again en
joy their own independent Parliament when Queen Elizabeth II officially
inaugurated it on July 1, 1999. This was the second attempt at
greater

gr anting

levels of autonomy, with a promise of self-rule, to the Scots since

World War II. The first time was in 197 9. That attempt failed because
of the political wangling by the Scottish nationalists in Parliament, the

economic crises of the 1970s, and the resulting loss of popularity in the
Labour party (Harvie 2004; Pittock 2001).
But the failures of the Labour party in the 1970s led to the successes

of the Conservatives in the British Parliament. The prospering economy
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throughout England and Wales kept the Labour party from regaining
power until Major lost it in the 1 997 election. However, the prosperity
of the 1 980s did not immediately reach to the Highlands. W ith Scotland's
economic emphases on its traditional industries of coal, steel, and ship

building, the Scots felt the intense pressure of increased unemployment.

Consequently, two things resulted: First, the Conservative government in
Parliament, recognizing the problems inherent in unemployed Scots, began

offering economic incentives to giant electronics firms like IBM, NEC, and
JVC to entice them to come and build factories in Scotland.22 Second, it
showed the Scots, traditional supporters of the Labour party, that they
could not wait for the rest of Britain to vote Labour; they would have to
have their own parliament (Pittock 2003; Somerset Fry 1985).
The economic incentives were a success. The resulting "Silicon Glen"
reduced unemployment and increased prosperity in Scotland. The creation
of the Scottish Parliament, however, happened neither as quickly nor as
easily. By the time the Conservative government allowed the referendum
in 1 997, the question was not if it would pass, but by how much. The
results showed the British Parliament just how important self-rule was to
the Scots - 75% of the voting Scots voted in favor of creating the Scottish
Parliament, and 63% voted in favor of granting it taxing ability {Halliday

1990; Patterson 1998; Payne 2002). However, through all of this, while

nationalist parties existed in Scotland ( the Scottish Nationalist Party, for

example), none resorted to terror campaigns to achieve their ends. Their
actions remained well within the pale. A quick glance at the plot of terror

22By 1 996, the Silicon Glen produced 35% of Europe's PCs and 12% of the world's
semiconductors (Hargrave 1985).
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probability over the years for Scotland {Figure 6.8) shows that a significant
underlying push for terrorism never existed, simply because the conditions
never got bad enough to create an action pressure high enough to overcome
the natural aversion towards terrorism.

6. 7

Chapter Summary

This chapter started with a look at the statistical models needed to ad
equately test the hypotheses of the previous chapter. As the dependent
variable was binary, OLS could not be used without severe violations of
its assumptions. As such, three binary dependent variable models pre
sented themselves: the logit, the probit, and the complementary log-log.
As all three produced similar results, each could be used to explore the
relationship between terrorism and the selected factors. A second aspect
of the data implied that an autoregressive-1 correction needed to be used
to remedy the serial correlation inherent in some of the variables, most
notably the gross domestic product per capita, the level of democracy in
the state, and the urban percentage. The current values for each of these
variables definitely depends on the previous values. This is what the ARl
modification corrects.
All of the models behaved in' similar manners; that is, the same vari
ables tended to be statistically significant in each. This demonstrates the
robustness of the findings. No significant coefficient changed directions,
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although one non-significant coefficient did. 23 Furthermore, the constant
term remained highly significant and highly negative, thus lending evidence
to the claim that there is an inherent aversion to the use of terrorism in
the world.
All significant variables were in the predicted direction except for the
ethnic differences index. Closer examination of this finding revealed that, of
the four components comprising the index, only one of them was significant
and in the hypothesized direction: language differences. In other words,
groups speaking a different language than the surrounding state are more
likely to use terrorism - perhaps this is a reflection of an inability to
communication.
Once again, the evidence supports the finding that a more democratic
state is more likely to experience domestic terrorism. While the models
were unable to speak to the effects of democracy, per se, they were able to
suggest that the act of increasing the level of democracy in a state leads
to this conclusion. That is, instead of just finding states with higher levels
of democracy are more at risk, the models found that increasing the level
within the state also increases the risk.
So, should we conclude that creating democracies in the world will in
crease the virulence of terror groups? Not necessarily. There is a definite
correlation between the level of democracy in the state and other vari
ables in the model, specifically GDP per capita, trade level, and economic
differentials. In each of these cases, the effects of increasing the level of
23The percent urban variable changed direction, however in each model the standard
error was greater than the coefficient itself.
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democracy or simply creating a democracy may reduce the total terror
probability.
Thus, with the agreement of so many of the variables with the model,
the model and the theory performed quite well given the small sample size.
The two vignettes compared the events in real life with the predictions of
the model. The fit was remarkable. Not only was the onset of terror
ism in Northern Ireland reflected in the model, but so was the failure of
the Angl� Irish Accords of 1985 and the later success of the Good Friday
Agreement of 1997. The action pressure towards terrorism was just too
high to be overcome by the treaty in 1985. However, by 1997, the pressure
had dropped to a level that allowed for a successful peace agreement.
The next, and final, chapter revisits the initial question around which
this work centered itself. The concluding remarks suggest some policies
governments may take to reduce the probability of a domestic group re
sorting to terror in their state. As the model so clearly evidenced, it is
much easier to stop a group from initially using terror than it is to stop a
group that is already using it.
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Chapter 7
Denouement
Prediction is very difficult,
especially about the future.
Niels Bohr

WHERE does this leave us? As with most stories, the answers are found
in the opening lines. Here, we start, once again, questioning why some
ethnonations resort to using terrorism, while others do not. In each case,
and at first glance, it appears as though an idiographic approach would
be more appropriate, as each group ostensibly starts using terrorism for a
different reason. However, the advance of the discipline encourages us to
move beyond treating each state and ethnonation as if it were a world unto
itself and to find the common causes and factors among them. In short,
science encourages a nomothetic approach. Let us begin this chapter with
a few vignettes, proceed through the lessons we can apply to public policy,
and conclude with a call to arms.
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7.0. 1

The J urassiens

The Congress of Vienna of 1815 formally ended the Napoleonic era for
France and for Europe. It also settled the frontiers of Switzerland, in
cluding the internal ones - the Helvetic Republic was one of Napoleon's
puppet states. Inside Switzerland, the redrawn borders did not necessarily
conformed to either language distinctions or to religious distinctions. As a
result, the Jurassiens, formerly of Canton Basie, became members of Can
ton Berne; that is, the francophone Roman Catholics originally citizens of
Catholic Basie became citizens of the germanophonic, Protestant Canton
Berne at the stroke of a Viennese pen (Nicolson 200 1; Viault 1990).
However, it was not until the Bernese legislature rejected the appoint
ment of a Jurassien to the Bureau of Public Works that the Jurassiens
formed their first political movement with a goal of achieving either greater
autonomy or separation from Canton Berne. The movement culminated
in a popular referendum in 195 9 to create a new canton. It barely failed
to pass, with 52% voting against and 48% voting in favor. However, far
from stopping the movement, the failure at the polls induced them to con
tinue agitating for autonomy. The failure of the referendum brought about
the formation of three political parties: the Rassemblement jurassien (RJ)
supported separation, the Force democratique (FD) supported continued
union with Canton Berne, and the Movement for the Unity of the Jura
{MUF) supported a unified Jura with a greater degree of autonomy within
Canton Berne. Later, the RJ split into a group dedicated to continuing
the political process and a group dedicated to achieving their goals by any
means necessary. The latter group, the Front de liberation jurassien (rLJ),
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was responsible for attacks on Bernese and Swiss infrastructure ( J. Jenkins

1986 ) .

A second referendum was placed before the voters in 1974. In the

Bernese Jura, the results were very similar to the earlier referendum, 52%
against and 48 % in favor. However, the vote was most assuredly polar

ized based on geography; those districts in southern Jura tended to vote
against separation, while those in northern Jura tended to vote in favor

of it. 1 As a result of this obvious polarization, a series of referenda were
held to determine which districts would separate from Berne and become
part of the new Canton Jura. On January 1, 1979, the Swiss legislature

granted recognition to the newest canton in Switzerland, composed of those
northern districts supporting separation in the latest poll (J. Jenkins 1986;

Steinberg 1996) .

However, this did not end the story of Jurassien separatism. The actual
terror campaign began after the creation of the new canton. The primary
actors were the same, as were their goals. The only change was in location.
Now, the separatist activity took place in southern Jura, the section still

a part of C anton Berne. The RJ still sought to separate the southern

Jura from Berne. The FD still wished continued connection to Berne.

T he MUF still sought to unite all of Jura under one canton, no matter

which one. And, even more importantly, the FLJ still violently agitated

for independence from Canton Berne. While the FLJ had been content to

merely agitate for separation, which consisted of public demonstrations and

1This difference based on geography was not surprising, for the south had more
contact with the rest of Berne than did the north. As a result, the Bernese culture and
people had invaded the southern Jura (J. Jenkins 1986).

185

a few riots, in the early 1990s, they initiated a short-lived terror campaign.
The only result, thus far, of that terrorist campaign was a referendum
for the village of Vellera to leave Canton Berne and join Canton Jura.
The referendum passed overwhelmingly. Interestingly enough, at the time,
Vellera had a population of 70 {Minorities at Risk 2000; Steinberg 1996).
Switzerland is, and was, an extremely stable democratic state - ar
guably the most stable in Western Europe. Switzerland also has a large
level of citizen involvement in legislation, being the only state that has reg
ular federal-level referenda. And yet, some Jurassiens resorted to a cam
paign of terrorism to right the wrongs of generations past. When compared
to what other ethnonations have experienced (and currently experience) ,
the Jurassiens seem to have little expectation to initiate a terror campaign,
especially in light of the strong political tradition in Switzerland. And yet,
they have. Why?

7.0.2

The Sardinians

The tale of Sardinian separatism is rooted in the very formation of the
Italian state. While Victor Immanuel II was nominally king of Sardinia,
his was a Piedmont monarchy from the north of Italy. And while the two
lands were politically unified, the prejudice against the south as backward,
corrupt, and violent kept them from being culturally unified. In fact, the
entire unification of Italy - the Risorgimento - was a series of battles in
which the north repressed, suppressed, and oppressed the south. Those in
Sicily, Naples and the Papal States, were taken by force and placed under
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the banner of the new Kingdom of Italy. Those in Sardinia, already a part
of the original Kingdom, had no option but to accept the solutions the
Piedmont monarchy created (Ammendola 2003; Morrogh 2003; Smith and
Smith 1980).
A combination of the historical corruption of the rulers in Rome, the
feelings of superiority expressed by the northerners as shown in the maxim
"Africa begins south of Rome" , the internal colonization of Sardinia by
the prosperous north, and the repression of the Sardinian language all
exacerbated the feelings of separateness felt by the insular Sardinians. The
Kingdom of Italy, and the later Republic of Italy, have both promised
increased economic investment in Sardinia, however the industries given to
Sardinia polluted the environment, and the number of jobs never seemed
to be as great as what was promised (Krippendorff 1979; Roberts 2003).
And yet, the Sardinians, existing in one of the least stable democracies
in Europe, 2 have yet to resort to a campaign of terrorism to right the wrongs
of generations past. Even when the Sardinian separatist party joined the
Italian Red Brigades in the 1970s, they did not resort to a terrorist cam
paign. When compared to what other ethnonations have experienced, the
Sardinians seem to have every expectation to initiate a terror campaign,
and yet they have not. Why?
T hat is, least stable in terms of the frequent votes of no confidence and frequent
government dissolutions in the Italian Parliament.
2
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7.0.3

The Spanish Basques

The Euskal Herria straddles the Pyrenees, divided between Spain and
France. The seven provinces - four in Spain and three in France are still considered by the Basques to be one nation - inseparable.3 Both
states instituted centralization campaigns to bring the disparate parts of
each under firmer control of the central government. Both states discrimi
nated against the Basques, both in terms of culture and of language. And
yet, only the southern Basques have resorted to a terror campaign; the
French Basques have not. Why?

7.0.4

The Answers?

In each of the three above cases, the answer may lie in the state itself.
However, while the French Basques have been quiet, neither the Bretons
nor the Corsicans can claim this. And, while the Spanish Basques have
resorted to terrorism, neither the Catalans nor the Galicians have.4 What
makes one ethnic group resort to terror, while another does not? This

question was the raison d'etre of this research. And while the answers to
this question are far from complete, the mechanism behind group actions
toward terrorism is better understood. In understanding that mechanism,
we are able to better predict which groups will resort to terrorism and
dissuade them from doing so. Considering that it is much less expensive,
A form of separatist graffiti is "4 + 3 = 1" (Kurlansky 1999).
4 This may change in the next few years, as a Galician separatist group detonated
a car bomb in the central plaza of Santiago de Compostela, Spain on July 23, 2005
(Goodman 2005).
3
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both in terms of resources and lives, to keep terrorism from happening
than it is to stop it once it has begun, emphasis should be on prevention.
However, the current emphasis is on punishment after the fact. 5

7. 1

The Mechanism

We began this journey with several separate descriptive theories of terror
ism. These theories described many mechanisms for what caused groups to
engage in terrorism. Each level of analysis had its own set of factors. Cren
shaw {1981) suggested that concrete grievances, modernization, democracy,
urbanization, history, elite dissatisfaction, and mass passivity all contribute
to increasing the probability that a state will experience terrorism. But
why? She provided excellent rationale for why each one would be a pre
condition, but she lacked a fundamental theory tying it all together.
Similarly, Ross {1993) provided a descriptive theory of terrorism, es
pecially with respect to the structural causes. He cited modernization,
geography, urbanization, regime type, grievances, support, weapons avail
ability, and presence of other forms of unrest as factors leading to terrorism.
However, he offered nothing to tie all of these factors together. While his
explanation as to why these factors affected the propensity towards terror
ism, he offered nothing fundamental to tie everything together. While this
performs acceptably in determining some factors that can be affected to
5 This

may be slowly changing, as the first Madrid Conference on Terrorism, March
2005, concluded with a call to reduce the causes of terrorism, not just punishment of
terrorists. In fact, many of the presenters warned that the War on Terror may create
more terrorists than it eliminates ( Annan 2005).
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alter the probability of a terrorist outbreak, it does nothing to explain the
underlying why.
This is the primary strength of this research piece. I offered a theory
of terrorism that was more fundamental than descriptive. The underlying
mechanism lay exposed. The reasons for terrorist outbreaks I placed at the
feet of human beings and not at the feet of the intangible 'group', 'state',
or 'state system'. Those factors at higher levels of analysis we can now
trace back to the individuals through a process of aggregation - the state
system consists of states, the states consist of various groups, and those
groups are composed of individuals. Factors affecting the individual filter
their way to the top of the pyramid through the associated pressure of the
group to act in a way that mimics its members.
At the individual level, the person feels a pressure to act when they
experience a reality at odds with what they perceive as being just. Using
the vocabulary of rational choice, the individual feels a pressure to act
when their ideal point differs too much from the setting in which they
exist. A greater disparity between these two creates a greater impetus for

action - or reaction. Thus, Gurr's ( 1970) finding that relative deprivation
is an excellent indicator of future political violence is supported. Relative
deprivation is merely the idealized distance between the individual's ideal

point and their real point - between what they feel they should have and
what they actually have.
This aggregates upward to the group level. At the group level, the
actions of that group are based primarily on the action point of that group.
This group action point is based on the ideal points of each of the group's
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members, appropriately weighted to take into consideration the individual's
standing within the group. For a group with the majority of the members
with ideal points located near the 'political' end of the spectrum, the group
will tend to be less likely to resort to terrorism; i.e. the group leadership
will feel less pressure to use extra-political means and more pressure to use
political means to solve the problems. For a group with an action point
located near the 'extra-political' end of the spectrum, the leadership feels
a pressure to resort to violence.
Thus, Crenshaw's assertions that concrete grievances against the state
contribute to increased terrorist activity is explained. When an individ
ual has a grievance against the state, his or her ideal point is at greater
odds with the real point than in the absence of such a grievance. When
individuals aggregate to form the group, this grievance is present in the
group members, thus moving the group's ideal point more toward the extra
political end, especially in the presence of state repression or absence of
political avenues which the groups can utilize to achieve their goals.
At the state level, the actions of those in power affect the individual's
real point and the costs associated with acting on those felt pressures.
Thus, the near-universal finding that democracies are both the creators and
the targets of more terrorists than other regime types is neatly explained,
even though democracies allow for increased political activity and have
lower levels of repression than autocracies. Democracies reduce the cost
of action; they are subject to the Rule of Law. Being subject to the Rule
of Law reduces the state's ability to eradicate the entire terrorist group.
In authoritarian regimes, entire groups can be exterminated. Such is not
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permissible in a liberal democracy. The ultimate penalty for a terrorist in
a democracy constrained by the Rule of Law is his or her execution. In

dictatorial regimes, the ultimate penalty is the execution of the terrorist,

his or her family, perhaps economic sanctions against the village, perhaps
bulldozing of the terrorist's family's house, etc. T here are no theoretical
limits to the punishment handed down by strong authoritarian regimes
against terrorists. There are in democracies. 6
Moreover, democracies tend to have freedom of association enshrined
in their traditions and constitutions. This increases the probability that
like-minded people will come together to form their group. Authoritarian

regimes tend to reduce the ability of its citizens to come together. If a
group cannot form, or if the costs are too high to allow its formation, it
cannot become a terrorist group.
Ross's finding that failures of counter-terrorism efforts increase the

probability of a terrorist attack is upheld in this theory. The effect of
a successful counter-terrorist strategy is to either increase the cost of act

ing or to reduce the pressure to act. W hen the strategy fails, the opposite

obviously occurred. In addition to the indication of decreased action costs

and increased action pressure, there is the explicit immediate decrease in

action cost due to the actual collapse of the counter-terrorism structures
and the resultant vacuum.

An additional finding, not fully accounted for by Gurr {1970) , Cren
shaw {1981) , or Ross {1993) , but alluded to in each, is that states without
The exception to this rule seems to be democratic Israel, which had a long-standing
policy of bulldozing the homes of suicide terrorists.
6
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full control over their territory are also at increased risk of creating or ex
periencing terrorism. This can be explained by the associated reduced cost
of action. If the state does not control its entire territory, the group can
operate with impunity, reducing the cost of existence to almost nothing.
This is an important finding because there are several areas of the world
not under control of a state. These include the failed state of Somalia and
vast stretches of the Sahara Desert. In the latter case, the Bush admin
istration "believes the Sahara desert is a vast ungoverned wasteland and,
hence, a haven for terrorists" (Fellows 2005). 7
The system level, especially in terms of globalization, strongly influ
ences the individual. Midlarsky, Crenshaw, and Yoshida (1980) suggested
that terrorism in one state affects the probability of terrorism in a sec
ond state through the processes of diffusion and contagion. While they
asserted that it was "difficult to identify indigenous sources of terrorism,"
they did find that there were connections on the system level between
terrorist groups (Midlarsky, Crenshaw, and Yoshida 1980: 263). While
their analysis used only seven years, and while sweeping conclusions based
on such a small time span cannot be made with any enormous level of
confidence, their conclusion fits nicely in the pressure model. While their
findings suggested that the cost of terrorist action is reduced by other
groups resorting to terrorism - a conclusion not in opposition to the the
ory - they also suggest that there is some underlying system-level factor
7In

fact, the Bush administration sent 1 ,000 personnel to take part in an anti-terrorist
training exercise. "The exercise's fictional scenario involved a terrorist group being
chased across national borders from Mauritania in the west, through to Mali, Niger and
finally Chad" (Fellows 2005).
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not accounted for by their theory. In other words, terrorism can be con
tagious in their sense of the word, or the milieu in which everyone exists
could be affecting the base probability a group resorts to terrorism. Their
research supports both interpretations. The pressure model also supports
both interpretations. Figure 6. 6 demonstrates that the base probability of
a terrorist event has dramatically fluctuated over the years, reaching a high
in the late 1960s and a low in the early 1980s. The timing of the peaks,
however, is less important than the existence of those peaks.

Beyond the general increase or decrease in base terror probability, the
system level produces some dynamics that directly affect the individual
and his or her action pressure.

The most important of them are due

to the effects of globalization. "Globalisation is a political phenomenon
characterised by the weakening of mediating institutions and the direct
confrontation between individuals and global forces" {Guehenno 1998: 5) .
That is, globalization increases the exposure of the individual to system
level forces and reduces the ability of the state to protect that individual.

While this is true economically, it is also true culturally. With the in

crease in a global culture, especially a democratic culture as defined by

the liberal, democratic West and as spread through the new global media,

ethnonations may easily feel as though their culture was being sacrificed
on the altar of economic advancement for the few . . And, as globalization

reduces the state's ability to mitigate these issues, globalization increases
the threat felt by the ethnic groups to their way of life.
Globalization is also characterized by rapid modernization and eco
nomic changes. The shift in many advanced industrial states away from

194

expensive industry and toward less expensive service-sector employment
may increase the average income in that state, but that increase comes at
the expense of industrial workers losing their jobs in well-paid positions.
Sometimes, these industrial jobs are traditionally held by one ethnic group,
as in the case of the Scots and the Basques. In such cases, the economic dif
ferentials become conflated with the ethnic differentials, with both factors
increasing the probability the group will resort to terrorism.
In each of these three cases, the effects of the system-level factor directly
affect the individual level in predictable and explainable ways. There is
no need to create a new theory to deal with the system-level and the
effects of globalization on terrorism; the effects are already explained in
the model proposed. The only theory needed is a theory on the behavior
of humans, which we call psychology. T hus, terrorism is the manifestation
of psychology - writ large.

7.2

Future Perfect Tense

This research, at least from a policy standpoint, is timely. Each significant
factor is being affected by current global trends. Globalization continues
to increase at an exponential rate. The number of adolescents in the world
grows constantly, and they constitute the largest segment of the population
in several African states. 8 Population growth rates continue to stress the
available resources. US foreign policy explicitly advocates democratization
8 In

Djibouti, those under 16 constitute almost half of the population, the median
age in Nigeria is 19, and over 53% of Africans are under age 19 (CIA 2005; Gibbs 2004).
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(Bush 2005) and there are currently more democracies than autocracies in
the world (Freedom House 2005). 9
We are currently at a nexus, a critical juncture in history. With all of
these trends conspiring together, there is little doubt that the prevalence of
terrorist activity will grow at an ever-increasing rate unless action is taken
to deal with the underlying causes of terrorism. Repression tends to not
work (Mason and Krane 1989; Sederberg 1995). And yet, conciliation is
frowned upon by political leaders even though state leaders have success
fully used it in the past - most notably in Northern Ireland (Bueno de
Mesquita 2005c; Sederberg 1995; Stevenson 1996). Charges of 'appease
ment' and specters of 'Munich' haunt most attempts to try to understand
the terrorists. The principal result is a knee-jerk reaction to terror strikes.
The US War on Terror is the quintessential response to a terrorist
attack - punishment. Even security scholars would tend to agree with
the response in theory (although not necessarily in practice). Posen (2003)
suggests that the appropriate strategy in dealing with terror groups is to

reduce the groups in terms of both population and support, until only

"desperate groups of exhausted stragglers, with few resources and little

hope of success" remain to commit the acts of terror (Posen 2003: 393) .

However, there is a growing body of research, and a growing number
of researchers, who hold that such tactics do nothing to stem the tide of
terrorism. Lesser {1999) , writing for the conservative think-tank RAND,
concluded his research with four core strategies the United States should
For the year 2004, Freedom House had the number of free states at 88 and the
number of not free states at 49 (Freedom House 2005).
9
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use to minimize its risk of again being attacked by terrorists. Retaliation
is the fourth, and he only suggests its use when the other three fail. W hat
was his first core strategy? It is to reduce the systemic causes of terrorism.
While he spends little time on what these systemic causes may be, this
research provides three important ones: globalization, negative economic
differentials, and adolescence. The primary negative effect of globalization
is rapid change. People are faced with new ideas. They must deal with
new employment emphases. T hey must confront new incursions into their
very self {Kellner 2002). With respect to terrorism, globalization results
in a greater probability in a group using terrorism. This is due to the
individuals in the group experiencing a higher pressure to act.
The need to act flows from two areas. First, the group may feel a dis
connect from its traditions. W hile not a result of globalization, the South
Tyroleans violently reacted when the Italian government began to elimi
nate their traditions {Alcock 1970; Steininger 2003). The Spanish Basques
reacted similarly when Franco instituted his policy of forced Castileaniza
tion (Collins 1990; da Silva 1975; Laitin and Gomez 1992). Globalization
has a similar effect on indigenous culture {Cha 2000; Kellner 2002; Krug
man and Venables 1995) .
Second, the group may feel discriminated against because their tradi
tional industries may need to lay off workers in order to remain profitable.
They may even have to close if they cannot compete in the new mar
ketplace. The Scots felt economically discriminated against when their
traditional iron, coal, and automotive industries began closing their doors
because of economic pressure brought about by the increase in trade among
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the states. It was only after large tax breaks were given to other industries
that the unemployment rate in Scotland dropped {Pittock 2003). Similarly,
the Basques felt discriminated against when economic shifts negatively
impacted the prosperous heavy industry in the Basque region { Medrano
1994).
To counteract the negative results of globalization, efforts must be made
by the state to reduce the resultant effects. First, the state must refrain
from repressing ethnic expression in any way. Repression only accentuates
the ethnic divisions in the state. In fact, the state may actually wish
to encourage ethnic expression. While one may feel that expressing the
difference between ethnic groups in a state will result in higher rates of
terrorism because of the accentuated differences, this research shows that
higher levels of ethnic differences do not correspond to higher probabilities
of terrorist actions. In fact, they correspond to lower probabilities.
Also, to deal with the employment shifts, the state must encourage
re-education and retraining in the areas hardest hit by the globalization
inspired unemployment. Following the example of Britain with Scotland

may significantly reduce the effects of globalization. In the 1980s, Margaret

Thatcher, the prime minister of Great Britain, instituted several economic

reforms and increased the economic aid to areas of Scotland hardest hit by
unemployment and the 1 980s recession (Pittock 2003) .
One further possible result of globalization is an increase in the eco
nomic differentials between the ethnonation and the containing state. Whether
caused by globalization or not, these economic differentials are the second
powerful indicator of future terrorist activity. A greater level of economic
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differences between the group and the rest of the state leads to a greater
level of terrorism in that state perpetrated by that group. Any policy
which reduces the differences will reduce the probability the groups will
resort to terrorism.
There does not need to be any tradeoff between state actions to amelio
rate the effects of globalization and of economic differentials. In fact, such
actions tend to complement each other. For an example, see the British
actions vis-a-vis the Scottish economy. A further example is that of the

Spanish in the Hegoalde. When the Basque traditional heavy industries
of coal and steel began to encounter economic problems, the Spanish gov

ernment did nothing. This was over and above the nothing they did to

counteract the modernization that threatened Basque fueros, rights, and

traditions (Ben-Ami 1991). The differences between the outcomes are stag
gering.
There are other possible actions the state could perform if eliminating
terrorism is their ultimate goal. As the number of youth in a state is a
strongly positive correlate of terrorism, state policy to reduce this number
would also reduce the risk of terrorism. Perhaps the most effective thing
a state can do to reduce the number of youth in the state is to encourage

economic development, as economically developed states tend to have lower
birth rates, and thus a lower adolescent population (Crenshaw, Ameen, and
Christenson 1997). But this economic development needs to be uniform
across the ethnonational groups in the state; otherwise the probability of
terrorism will increase due to the increasing economic differentials. The
amount of income redistribution necessary would be staggering in many
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states. The very issue of redistribution of wealth conjures up images of
communism. Some may even consider redistribution as just a euphemism
for paying off the terrorists. Thus, while the answer to reducing terrorism
is apparent, the actual necessary political steps are fraught with political
landmines.
Perhaps the existence of youth need not dramatically increase the prob
ability of terrorism in the state. Perhaps the state can implement long-term
policies which ease the transition through this hormonal age. Shepherding
the youth, giving them outlets for their evolutionary aggression, and so
cializing them into society and society's duties, rights, and responsibilities
better can all work to reduce the effects of adolescents on terrorism. In
addition, the state can institute policies for pre-adolescents that will also
ultimately reduce their propensity for violence. Such policies may also re
duce other negatives in the state. Studies have shown that health risks,
depression, and dropping out of school. Each of these has the immediate
effects on that adolescent; however, each also has long-term effects. Not
completing school reduces a person's earning potential and employability,
thus increasing the economic disparities between that individual and sur
rounding individuals. Increased levels of depression increases feelings of
despair and hopelessness, and, thus, may increase violent feelings. (Hagan
and Foster 2001 ; Harris 1948}.
Lastly, a state could also reduce the level of democracy to combat ter
rorism. 1 0 Both the higher levels of democracy and increasing levels of
10 There seems to be a tendency for states to do just this. In the aftermath of a
severe terrorist attack, the government feels compelled to reduce civil liberties to make
capturing and prosecuting terrorist suspects easier. This is not only true of the United
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democracy are correlates of terrorism. However, as the level of democracy
is also highly correlated with economic development, the actual results may
not be as predicted by the model, as democracy apparently affects other
correlates of terrorism (Arat 1988; Przeworski and Neto 1997) . While Fas
cist Italy was quite capable of keeping their ethnonations from coalescing
into effective groups, and while Franco's lessening of his controls resulted in
an increased level of terrorist activity from the ETA, I am acutely uncom
fortable suggesting public policy to reduce democracy levels in the state.
This is especially true because the number of states in the study is small (n
= 5) . What is it about democracy that produced this result? Democracy's
adherence to the Rule of Law and its love with freedom of expression and
association allow terrorism to flourish within its borders.
Political changes in the government do have a slight calming effect on
terrorist activity, however not at a statistically significant level. In the year
following a political orientation change in the state, the average probability
of a terrorist attack dropped slightly. The change indicates that the terror
ist attacks are partially in response to policies of political parties. 1 1 Should
a party be removed from power, the average probability of a terrorist at
tack drops slightly. However, it is unclear at this juncture if this finding is

States after September 1 1 , 2001 (e.g. the USA PATRIOT Act), the United Kingdom
instituted several policies designed to enable them to capture IRA suspects much easier.
These policies included arrest and detention without trial of people suspected of being
members of terrorist groups in Northern Ireland (Coogan 2002).
1 1 At this point, there is no evidence that liberal-terconservative changes cause a differ
ent response from terrorist groups than conservative-to-liberal changes. This, however,
is an interesting question that must await an enlarged dataset.
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a statistical artifact due to the small sample size or if its statistical signif
icance will increase with a larger dataset. 1 2 Furthermore, disaggregating
the data to something more precise than annual measures may also help
ascertain the true relationship between terrorism and political changes in
the state.

7 .3

All Good Things . . .

So, where does this leave us? A list of policies that states should implement
to reduce the probability of domestic terrorism is not the same as states
supporting this list. The current War on Terror will likely solve nothing.
In fact, many academics feel it will only create more terrorists - much in
the same vein as did the shelling of the hills overlooking Beirut by the USS
New Jersey. 13 But there is hope that this outdated paradigm is shifting to
something more capable of returning terrorists to the political realm.
On March 11, 2004, a group perpetrated a major terrorist attack on
Madrid. Initially, the government blamed the ETA; however, it turned out
to be the work of al Qaeda. To mark the one-year anniversary of the attack,
the Club de Madrid hosted an international summit on the causes and
solutions to terrorism. Three days of sessions and speakers crafted the same
recall that there are only five states under scrutiny.
few months later, Arab terrorists took over a TWA flight from Athens and
executed a U.S. Navy seaman on board, as they railed that it was payback time for
the Beirut bombing. One hijacker kept yelling 'New Jersey! New Jersey!' as terrified
passengers cowered in their seats. He was talking about the battleship New Jersey,
which had rained down death and, yes, terror in the form of 2000-pound shells on
Beirut the previous year" (Raimondo 2003).
12 Again,
13 "A
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conclusions. Javier Solana ( 2005), former Secretary-Gerneral of NATO
and the Secretary-General of the Council of the European Union/High
representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, during one of
the last plenary sessions perhaps said it best,
. . . vivimos en un mundo profundamente injusto y mientras
sigamos teniendo un mundo tan injusto, seguiremos teniendo
problemas de esta naturaleza sin ninguna duda. El siglo 21
tiene que ser un siglo en el que nos enfrentamos con estos prob
lemas seriamente. Solamente quiero decir que lo que vamos
viendo en los ultimos aiios es que los paises mas ricos son mas
ricos cada dia y sus poblaciones son mas viejas cada dia, y los
paises mas pobres son mas pobres cada dia y sus ciudadanos son
cada dia mas j6venes. La mitad de la poblaci6n mundial tiene
menos de 25 aiios. Creo que esta reflexion es la mas importante
para que nos enfrentemos de verdad con los graves problemas
que tenemos en estos momentos, unos de los cuales es el terror
ismo, pero hay muchos otros que conduciran sin duda, si no los
resolvemos, al veneno que lleva a algunos a utilizar las armas
de terrorismo.

Roughly translated,
. . . we live in a profoundly unjust world and, while we continue
having such an unjust world, we will continue having problems
of this nature, without doubt. The 2 1st century must be a
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century in which we confront these problems seriously. I only
mean that what we are seeing in the last years is that the richest
countries are richer every day and their populations are older
every day, and the poorest countries are poorer every day and
their citizens are younger every day. Half of the world's popu
lation is younger than twenty-five. I believe that this reflection
is the most important, for if we do not confront the grave prob
lems we have at this moment, one of which is terrorism, then
there are many others that without doubt will lead, if they are
not resolved, to the venom that makes some resort to using the
arms of terrorism.
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Codebook
BELIEF

Different Group Religion

MAR 3 1

0: Unknown
1 : Different sect within same religion as the dominant group.
2: Multiple Sects; some different from dominant group.
3: Different Religions.
99: No basis for judgment.
-99: Missing Value.

CUSTOM

Different Group Customs

MAR 30

0: The same social custom as dominant group.
1 : Different social custom than dominant group.
99: No basis for judgment.
-99: Missing Value.

DEMOC

Democracy Level of the State

Range: 0 - 10
-99: Missing Value.
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DEMOC_D

EQN

Change in Democracy Level

Range: -4 - 3
-99 : Missing Value.

EQN

DEMOCRACY Democratic State?
DEMOCRACY
Range: 0 - 1

=

(POLITY2 > 5) AND (POLITY2

< missing)

-99 : Missing Value.

ECDIFXX

Economic Differentials Index

MAR 121

The Economic Differentials Index is a seven-category scale ( values from - 2
to +4) of intergroup differentials in economic status and positions derived
from codings of six dimensions (i. e. , ECDIFXI to ECDIFX6). Economic
differentials are equivalent to economic inequalities but are not necessarily
the result of deliberate discrimination.
-2: Advantaged. There are 3 or more checked advantages.

- 1 : Some advantages. There are only 1 or two checked advantages.
0: N o socially significant differences. A "socially significant" difference is

one that is widely seen, within the minority, and/or the dominant
group, as an important distinguishing trait of the group.

1 : Slight differentials. There are socially significant differences between
the minority and the dominant group on one or two of the specified
qualities (i.e., there are one or two components checked).
2: Substantial differentials. There are socially significant differences with
respect to three specified qualities.
3: Major differentials. There are socially significant differences with re
spect to four specified qualities.
246

4: Extreme differentials. There are socially significant differences with
respect to five or six specified qualities.
99: No basis for judging.
-99: Missing Value.

Negative Economic Differentials

ECONEG

ECONEG

= ECDIFXX

EQN

x (ECODIFXX > 0)

1 : Slight differentials. There are socially significant differences between
the minority and the dominant group on one or two of the specified
qualities (i.e., there are one or two components checked).
2 : Substantial differentials. There are socially significant differences with
respect to three specified qualities.
3: Major differentials. There are socially significant differences with re
spect to four specified qualities.
4: Extreme differentials. There are socially significant differences with
respect to five or six specified qualities.
-99: Missing Value.

ETHDIFXX

Ethnic Difference Index

MAR 33

Ethnic difference index, "LANG" + "CUSTOM" + "BELIEF" + "RACE" ,
is constructed as follows: If all "LANG" , "CUSTOM" , "BELIEF" , and
"RACE" are not coded, score "ETHDIFXX" =O. If "LANG" is coded 1,
"ETHDIFXX" = +3. If "LANG" is coded 2, "ETHDIFXX" = +2. If
"LANG" is coded 3, "ETHDIFXX" = + 1 . If "CUSTOM" is coded 1,
"ETHDIFXX" = +2. W hen adding "BELIEF" and "RACE" into the
equation for ETHDIFXX, ETHDIFXX increases by the coded values of
these two variables. (eg. If "BELIEF" = 2, then ETHDIFXX = +2.)
Range: 1 - 7
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-99: Missing Value.

GC2

MAR 38

Regional Base

A spatially contiguous region larger than an urban area that is part of the
country, in which 25% or more of the minority resides and in which the
minority constitutes the predominant proportion of the population.
1: Yes
2: No .
-99: Missing Value.

GDPCAPK

GDP per capita, Constant USD

World Bank

Range: 45 7 1 - 46, 7 7 7
-99: Missing Value.

GDPCAPK_D

Change in GDP per capita
GDPCAPK_D

= d.GDPCAPK

EQN

Range: - 2 6 10 - 1945
-99: Missing Value.

GRPCONC

Group Concentration
GRPCONC

=

Range: 0 - 1
2 48

EQN
2 - GC2

-99: Missing Value.

LANG

Different Language Group

0: Unknown.

MAR 29

1 : Group speaks same language.
2 : Group speaks multiple languages.
3: Linguistic Assimilation w/ Dom. Group.
99: No basis for judgment.
-99 : Missing Value.

POLITY2

Democracy Level

p4v2002

Range: -7 - 10
-99 : Missing Value.

RACE

Different Physical Appearance

0: Unknown.

MAR 32

1 : Physically distinguishable subtype of same racial stock.
2: Different racial stock from the dominant group with substantial intermixture.
3 : Different racial stock, little or no intermixture.
99: No basis for judgment.
-99: Missing Value.
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REBEL

Rebellion Index: 1 945-99

MAR 424

0: None reported.
1 : Political banditry, sporadic terrorism.
2: Campaigns of terrorism.
3 : Local rebellions. Armed attempts to seize power in a locale. If they
prove to be the opening round in what becomes a protracted guerrilla
or civil war during the year being coded, code the latter rather than
local rebellion. Code declarations of independence by a minority
controlled government here.
4: Small-scale guerrilla activity. All of the following must exist: 1) fewer
than 1000 armed fighters; 2) sporadic armed attacks (less than six
reported per year) ; and 3) attacks in a small part of the area occupied
by the group, or in one or two other locales.
5 : Intermediate guerrilla activity. Has one or two of the defining traits of
large-scale activity and one or two of the defining traits of small-scale
activity.
6 : Large-scale guerrilla activity. All of the following must exist: 1) more
than 1000 armed fighters; 2)frequent armed attacks (more than 6 per
year) ; and 3)attacks affecting a large part of the area occupied by
the group.
7: Protracted civil war. Fought by rebel military units with base areas.
99 : No basis for judgment.
-99: Missing Value.

RISKECOO

GDP per capita decline

0: GDP per capita did not drop that year.
1 : GDP per capita did drop that year.
-99: Missing Value.
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EQN

RISKECOl

GDP per capita growth less than 1%

EQN

0: GDP per capita grew by more than 1% that year.

1: GDP per capita did not grow by more than 1% that year.
-99: Missing Value.

RISKEC0 2

GDP per capita growth less than 2%

EQN

0: GDP per capita grew by more than 2% that year.

1: GDP per capita did not grow by more than 2% that year.
-99: Missing Value.

RISKGMIN

Party Orientation Change that Year

various

0: Government party orientation did not change.
1: Government orientation changed.
-99: Missing Value.

RISKGMIN.L

Party Orientation Change, next Year

EQU

0: Government party orientation did not change the next year.
1: Government orientation changed the next year.
-99: Missing Value.

RISKGMIN_D

Party Orientation Change, previous Year

0: Government party orientation did not change the previous year.
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EQN

1: Government orientation changed the previous year.
-99: Missing Value.

TERR_YEAR

Use of Terrorism in the Year

various

0: No use of terror by the group that year.
1: Use of terror by the group that year.
-99: Missing Value.

TERR_PRE

Group Previous Use of Terrorism

EQN

0: No previous use of terror by the group.
1: Previous use of terror by the group.
-99: Missing Value.

TRADE

Total Trade for the State /' Barbieri/Eurostat

Range: 4. 95 x 108

-

9. 18 x 10 11

-99: Missing Value.

UNEMP

Unemployment Rate

Range: 0 - 24.2
-99: Missing Value.
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UN

UNEMP_D

Change in Unemployment Rate

EQN

Range: -3.0 - 4.3
-99: Missing Value.

URBANPCT

Urban Percent in the State

UN

Range: 44.3 - 88.9
-99: Missing Value.

YOUTHPCT

Percentage of Youth in the State

Range: 11.5 - 19. 2
-99: Missing Value.
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UN

Notes on Data Sources
Barbieri Trade figures for the states under investigation came from two
sources. Barbieri compiled a trade database for her dissertation. The
dataset is located on the Correlates of War project's website. The
address is http : // cow2 . la . psu . edu/.

EQN This variable was calculated using other data and the provided equa
tion. For sources on the component variables, see the entries for the
component variables.
Eurostat Trade figures for the states under investigation came from two
sources. Eurostat is the official collector of statistics for the European
Union. Its website is http : //epp . eurostat . cec . eu . int/.

MAR ## The Minorities at Risk project provided the majority of the
base data utilized in this research. In fact, the minorities examined
were classified as "at risk" by the Minorities at Risk project. All
MAR-designated variables can be located in their codebook online.
Their website is http : //www . c idcm . umd . edu/inscr/mar/.
p4v 2002 The Polity IV project resides at the University of Maryland.
Its dataset can be downloaded from http : //www . c idcm . umd . edu/
inscr/poli ty/.
UN The United Nations collects both primary and secondary data to aid
in the evaluation of their programs and of their member states. The
United Nations database used in this research is the Population In- .
formation Network (POP IN) at http : //www . un . org/popin/.
World Bank The World Bank produces economic statistics to evaluate
their programs. The dataset was downloaded from their subscrip
tion site, which is located at http : //www . worldbank . org/data/
onl inedatabases/.
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